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ABSTRACT 
Our research interests lie in studying the economic behavior, choices, and actions of 
individuals given their geographical and social proximity to others, and analyze the 
consequences of such decisions to the financial health and survival of households, firms, and the 
macro economy. Network analysis and spatial econometrics take account of information spill-
overs and constraints of behaviors as consequence of the geographical and social distance 
between and among individuals. In this research, we apply those techniques to analyze aspects of 
corporate governance and explanations for the recent housing crisis. 
The literature on principle-agent problems has devoted most of its attention to aligning 
the CEO’s incentives with public shareholders. The problems resulting from directors’ excessive 
loyalty to CEOs are largely ignored. In the first essay of the dissertation, we apply social network 
analysis to study the effectiveness of independent directors in directing the firm. We define 
powerful independent directors to be those with high social network centrality, and thus high 
social influence over their peers. We show that boards dominated by powerful independent 
directors are less likely to demonstrate excessive loyalty to CEOs. They carry out the duties of 
monitoring and advising more effectively, resulting in superior financial performance and higher 
firm value. 
In the second and third essays of the dissertation, we study how financial risks are spread 
by proximity and contagion. Given advancing technology and globalization, financial markets 
are ever-more linked. We examine Rajan’s (2010) “credit for income” hypothesis as a root cause 
of U.S. mortgage defaults during the financial crisis of 2008. Over the past several decades, as 
U.S. household income became more unequal, those with stagnant incomes took on high 
leverage to boost their consumption to keep up with their wealthier neighbors. We provide 
empirical support for the credit for income hypothesis using household-level data showing that 
default is highest for middle-income, low-educated borrowers ─ precisely the ones with 
stagnating income. 
We also apply spatial models to identify the “hot spots” of defaults. We use Spatial 
Statistics (Anselin, 1988, 1990) to analyze data of residential foreclosures at county level to 
account for the unusual concentration of foreclosures observed in the south Pacific, east North 
Central, and south Atlantic regions. We find that spatial correlation plays an important role in 
explaining the large number of mortgage foreclosures that are clustered strongly in those regions. 
Moreover, default contagions are more severe at counties with younger households and largely 
usage of variable loans.  
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The literature on principle-agent problems has devoted most of its attention to aligning 
the CEO’s incentives with public shareholders. In economics, an agency problem (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976)) arises where a CEO advances her private interests, instead of serving as a 
faithful agent of the uncomprehending shareholders, the firm’s owners or principals. The board 
of directors hypothetically limits agency problems by representing the shareholders’ interests in 
major decisions (Weisbach (1988)). However, there are limited empirical evidence that directors 
actually play such a role in directing a firm effectively (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010)).   
In the first essay, we apply Milgram’s (1974) famous agentic shift theory to examine the 
agency problem in a new perspective. Agency in social psychology entails individuals discarding 
rational decision-making to reflexively obey an authority figure. Economics thus finds problems 
with insufficiently loyal agents, while social psychology finds problems with agents’ sometimes 
excessively loyalty. For example, an Enron executive describes an atmosphere of intimidation in 
which many could see problems looming, but no-one dared confront the CEO (Cohan (2002)). 
Plausibly, the problem was not director’s self-interest eclipsing the shareholders, but an agentic 
shift disengaging their rational self-interest and rendering them pliant agents of the CEO.     
We use social network analysis to construct centrality measures as proxies for a person’s 
authority, influence, or social power (Proctor and Loomis (1951), Sabidussi (1966), Bonacich 
(1972), Freeman (1977, 1979), Watts and Strogatz (1998), Hanneman and Riddle (2005), 
Jackson (2008)). These power centrality measures gauge the number and importance of the 
person’s direct and indirect connections to others in the network. More or more important 
connections provide more access to information, more resources to fall back on, more ability to 
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influence events, and thus more power. In this study, we find that powerful independent boards 
are associated with high firm performance and firm value. We also show the linages of value 
enhancing through board of directors’ monitoring and advising functions.  
A recent growing body of literature documents the importance of geographic and social 
proximity on investor behavior, corporate governance, and financial policies. Households with 
similar social, economic, and demographic attributes will cluster together. Research shows that a 
foreclosure within 250 feet adversely affects housing price by about $1,666, after accounting for 
the spatial dependence of housing prices and in the errors of models and other known factors 
impacting sale price of a home (Leonard and Murdoch (2009)). Similarly, Harding, Rosenblatt 
and Yao (2009) show that contagion from nearby foreclosure amounts to about 1% decline in 
local housing price per foreclosed property and diminish quickly with the increased distance to 
the distressed property. Both papers focus on the effects of foreclosure on housing price changes, 
but not on the determinants of foreclosure itself.    
In the second and third essays of this dissertation, we study how financial risks are spread 
by geographic proximity and contagion. We examine the default decision of US households 
using a unique dataset with full information of household characteristics, property 
characteristics, and some loan information. We examine Rajan’s (2010) “credit for income” 
hypothesis as a root cause of U.S. mortgage defaults during the financial crisis of 2008. We 
provide empirical support for the credit for income hypothesis showing that default is highest for 
middle-income, low-educated borrowers ─ precisely the ones with stagnating income. The 




II. Powerful Independent Directors 
Abstract: In social psychology agentic behavior connotes excessive obedience to a proximate 
authority, and is mitigated by a rival authority or peer voicing dissent. Corporate governance 
reformers advocate non-CEO chairs and independent directors, respectively, as potential rival 
authorities and dissenting peers – plausibly to mitigate excessive director loyalty to errant CEOs. 
Measuring director power by social network power centrality, elevated market valuation is 
linked to powerful independent directors’ constituting a majority of independent directors and, 
less robustly, to a powerful director serving as the non-CEO chair. Sudden deaths of powerful 
independent directors significantly reduce shareholder value, consistent with independent 
director power “causing” shareholder value. Further empirical tests associate powerful 
independent directors with fewer value-destroying M&A bids, more high-powered CEO 
compensation and accountability for poor performance, and less earnings manipulation. These 
results suggest that independent directors and non-CEO chairs can be effective if they have 
sufficient power to challenge the CEO.    
A. Introduction 
Recent reforms in corporate governance stress independent directors, mandating their 
minimal number, proportion, and exclusive writ over key decisions; all while restricting the 
CEO’s power to chair the board, nominate directors, and even be present as certain decisions are 
made.  If the goal of corporate governance reforms is to constrain agency problems by 
empowering public shareholders, such reforms seem oblique. But if the goal is checking errant 
CEOs, they are more on point.   
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Ideally, CEOs are uniquely talented individuals to whom savers entrust capital.  Because 
such a CEO necessarily has abilities and information public shareholders do not have, 
shareholders must trust her with broad discretionary powers to “get things done” so as to 
advance their interests.  But because public shareholders do not understand precisely how the 
CEO is to do this, issues of accountability can arise. In economics, an agency problem (Jensen 
and Meckling (1976)) arises where a CEO advances her private interests, instead of serving as a 
faithful agent of the uncomprehending shareholders, the firm’s owners or principals. The board 
of directors hypothetically limits agency problems by representing the shareholders’ interests in 
major decisions (Weisbach (1988)). Empirically, evidence that directors actually play such a role 
is absent, problematic, or severely limited in scope (Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010)).   
This may be because economists have a somewhat one-sided approach to agency 
problems, and thus misapprehend the way in which directors constrain CEOs’ decisions and the 
situations in which their role is most pronounced. Agency in social psychology entails individuals 
discarding rational decision-making to reflexively obey an authority figure: Milgram’s (1974) 
famous agentic shift1. Economics thus finds problems with insufficiently loyal agents, while 
social psychology finds problems with agents’ sometimes excessively loyalty.   
U.S. law leaves directors personally liable for shareholder wealth destruction due to 
CEOs’ imprudence, aligning directors’ self-interest with shareholders’ wealth. Mired in 
multimillion dollar lawsuits and suddenly aware of the limitations of their liability insurance, the 
directors of AIG, Enron, Lehman Brothers, and other corporate governance shipwrecks hardly 
                                                     
1  The social psychology version of agency can also be thought of as an information cascade 
problem (Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandaqni et al. (1992)), in which directors accept the CEO’s 
decisions because gathering and processing information necessary make their own rational 
decisions is costly.  
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maximized their personal wealth. Post mortem accounts allege corporate cultures that equated 
honest dissent to disloyalty to the CEO. For example, an Enron executive describes an 
atmosphere of intimidation in which many could see problems looming, but no-one dared 
confront the CEO (Cohan (2002)). A lone dissenter might be fired, but a majority of directors 
could fire the CEO and avoid the lawsuits.2  Plausibly, the problem was not director’s self-
interest eclipsing the shareholders, but an agentic shift disengaging their rational self-interest and 
rendering them pliant agents of the CEO.     
The reform agenda above makes more sense if its objective is to prevent directors from 
abrogating rational decision-making under the sway of an authoritative CEO. Variants of 
Milgram’s study show the agentic shift weakened by the physical absence of the authority figure, 
further weakened by dissenting peers, and interrupted entirely by a rival authority figure openly 
disagreeing. Excluding the CEO from meetings of the board’s audit, compensation, and 
nominating committees render the CEO physically absent from key decisions delegated to those 
committees. Independent directors might be potential dissenting peers, able to disturb inside 
directors’ agentic shift and bestir their rational decision-making faculties.  A chair other than the 
CEO might become a rival authority, able to interrupt their agentic shift entirely. The efficacy of 
such measures depends on the authority directors or non-CEO chair can muster against the CEO.  
Proxies for a person’s authority, influence, or social power are constructed from graphs 
of the social networks in which they function (Proctor and Loomis (1951), Sabidussi (1966), 
Bonacich (1972), Freeman (1977, 1979), Watts and Strogatz (1998), Hanneman and Riddle 
                                                     




(2005), Jackson (2008)).3 These power centrality measures gauge the number and importance of 
the person’s direct and indirect connections to others in the network. More or more important 
connections provide more access to information, more resources to fall back on, more ability to 
influence events, and thus more power. Applying these measures to networks of connections 
reflecting past curriculum vitae commonalities, we construct four measures of the power 
centrality for every CEO and director. We say a person is powerful if and only if she scores in 
the top quintiles in three of four tests of power centrality. 4  CEOs, non-CEO chairs, and 
independent directors who are also powerful are designated powerful CEOs (PCEOs), powerful 
independent directors (PIDs), and powerful non-CEO chairs (PNCs), respectively. We say a firm 
has a powerful independent board (PIB) if a majority of its independent directors are PIDs. 
Consistent with power centrality capturing directors’ and non-CEO chairs’ authority and 
willingness to challenge CEO power, firms with PIBs exhibit significantly higher shareholder 
valuations, as measured by Tobin’s average Q ratios. Moreover, these effects are largely 
independent of each other. In contrast, legally independent directors and generic non-CEO chairs 
are uncorrelated with Q ratios.  Further regressions link PIBs and PNCs to less aggressive 
earnings manipulation, fewer value-destroying takeovers, and fewer free cash flow agency 
problems in general (Jensen (1986)). PIBs and PNCs are likely to fire CEOs for poor 
performance and to hire new CEOs from outside; but also pay CEOs more generously. Finally, 
                                                     
3  A second line of Milgram’s (1967) work helped develop the notion of a social network. 
Milgram mailed randomly selected people in Omaha, Nebraska packages, each with a note 
asking the recipient to forward the package (and note) to the “first name basis” acquaintance 
most likely able to forward it to a specified addressee in Boston. The packages passed through 
an average of 5.2 acquaintances of acquaintances. If individuals are nodes in a network, with 
lines between nodes denoting acquainted individuals, this exercise reveals about six mutual 
acquaintance pairs – “6º of separation” – linking a random Omahan to a Bostonian. 
4  This approach reflects the Pareto or power law distributions power centrality measures 
typically obey, whereby e.g. 20% of the individuals have 80% of the power. 
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an event study of PID sudden deaths reveals that PIDs cause changes in shareholder value, rather 
than the converse.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 links relevant social 
psychology work to a behavioral theory of corporate governance. Section 3 describes the data 
and variables. Section 4 presents the results and robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.  
B. A Behavioral Theory of Corporate Governance 
Behavioral finance constructively applies a set of findings from social psychology – 
prospect theory, salience, etc. – to augment rational agent models of financial markets (Shleifer 
(2000)). A different set of social psychology results, primarily due to the work of Stanley 
Milgram (1967, 1974), suggests a behavioral basis for corporate governance.       
1. Disobedience to Authority and Corporate Governance5 
Milgram (1974) sought to understand Nazi concentration camp guards, who met charges 
of mass murder by explaining “I was only obeying orders”. To see if Germans were more 
obedient to authority than Americans, he conducted an experiment.  Milgram asked the “real 
subject” of the experiment to “assist” by acting as a “teacher”, and introduced her to a second 
participant, the “learner”, actually a professional actor. The purpose the experiment, Milgram 
falsely explained to the “teacher”, was to measure how being punished for errors would affect 
the “learner’s” ability to concentrate.  Milgram explained that he would ask a series of questions, 
                                                     
5  This subsection and the next both draw heavily on material presented in more detail, and with 
more complete references to the psychology literature,  in Morck (2009), and recast as teaching 
material in Morck (2010). To avoid clutter, a pervasive reference to these sources is extended 
across the subsequent pages.   
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and each time “learner” answered incorrectly, he would gesture to the “teacher”, seated in front 
of a panel of switches marked with voltages increasing to potentially lethal levels, to give the 
“learner” a larger electric shock. The “learner” was scripted to feign worse electric shocks as the 
“teacher” increased the voltage.   
The real purpose of the experiment was to see if subjects would electrocute a total 
stranger merely because they were so instructed. Milgram planned to run the experiment in 
Connecticut and then in Germany to test for differences. In fact, he was so appalled by ordinary 
Americans obediently putting potentially deadly currents of electricity through screaming 
“learners” that he never repeated the experiments in Germany. One hundred percent of 
“teachers” obediently administered shocks up to 150 volts, whereupon the “learner” screamed in 
agony.  Some eighty percent obediently continued administering shocks up to 300 volts, after 
which the “learner” demanded to be released and refused to answer more questions.  About 63% 
of Milgram’s “teachers” continued administering shocks all the way up to 450 volts, the final 
few switches being marked “XXX”.   
Milgram’s findings are robust. Yale students and middle class Connecticut residents, 
males and females, blue and white collar workers, educated and uneducated subjects all exhibit 
similar obedience patterns.  Others replicate his general findings across a wide range of 
experimental settings and subject groups (Merritt and Helmreich (1996), Blass (1998, 2000, 
2004), Tarnow (2000), Burger (2009)), including Germans (Miller (1986)).  To ensure that 
subjects did not see through the actors’ pretense of pain, Sheridan and King (1972) replicate the 
experiment using real shocks to a puppy.     
These experiments were widely condemned for eliciting sadism. This seriously 
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misapprehends their actual findings.6  Milgram (1974, 188) despairs that the  
“virtues of loyalty, discipline, & self-sacrifice that we value so highly in the individual 
are the very properties that create destructive engines of war & bind men to malevolent 
systems of authority.”   
That is, he concludes that humans have a ‘loyalty reflex’, not a sadistic bent.  Martin et 
al. (1976) affirm this interpretation by replicating Milgram’s approximate results in a variant of 
the experiment in which “teachers” punish “learners” by activating a noise maker at levels 
marked as “50% risk of permanent hearing damage”.  Although the “teachers”, seated only feet 
away from the “learner”, obviously risked damaging their own hearing too, similar obedience 
ensued.7  
Many of Milgram’s subjects were visibly shaken, and clearly did not enjoy inflicting pain 
but did so anyway (Blass (2000, 2004)).8 In exit interviews, after the experiment was explained, 
Milgram (1974) found that “People … asked to render a moral judgment on what constitutes 
appropriate behavior … unfailingly see disobedience as proper.” Asked why they behaved 
inappropriately, the subjects advanced excuses such as politeness, the importance of keeping a 
promise, the awkwardness of disagreement,9 absorption in technical details of the experiment, or 
a belief that a greater good, such as the advancement science, must justify the learner’s pain. But 
the most universal response was a sense of loyalty to the experimenter.  
                                                     
6  This debate led to university ethics review committees, which prevent complete replications of 
the Milgram’s experiment at present (Blass (1991, 1996, 2000)).    
7 For further elaboration of the adverse social consequences of humans deriving utility from 
obeying authority, see Kelman and Hamilton (1989) and Zimbardo (2007).  
8  Consistent with this, Cheetham et al. (2009), recreating the Milgram experiment in a virtual 
setting with the subject in an fMRI scanner, report activation in areas of the brain associated 
with personal emotional distress, but not in areas associated with the representation of others’ 
emotional state.    
9  Brown and Levinson (1987) argue that “aspects of conversational politeness” check real 
tolerance of dissent.   
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Thus, Milgram (1974, p. 7-8) concludes  
“The typical subject did not lose his moral sense; instead, it acquires a radically different 
focus. He does not respond with a moral sentiment to the actions he performs, Rather, his 
moral concern now shifts to a consideration of how well he is living up to the 
expectations that the authority has of him.”  
He summarizes the exit interview results by noting that virtually every subject indicated 
disobedience as morally right choice, yet few disobeyed. Asked why they obeyed, subjects 
stressed loyalty (I agreed to obey instructions); duty (my role in the experiment); honor (I made a 
promise to the experimenter); trust (I presumed experimenter acting for the greater good); and 
fitting in (I felt discomfort about creating a scene). 
Based on these interviews, Milgram (1974, p. 8) proposes that the subjects experienced 
an agentic shift, which he defines thus:  
"the essence of obedience consists in the fact that a person comes to view themselves as 
the instrument for carrying out another person's wishes, and they therefore no longer see 
themselves as responsible for their actions. Once this critical shift of viewpoint has 
occurred in the person, all of the essential features of obedience follow"  
Milgram’s agentic shift is obverse to Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) agency theory, long a 
workhorse model in corporate governance research.  Jensen and Meckling correctly observe that 
problems can arise if agents, the CEOs who run widely held corporations, act in their own 
interests, rather than as faithful advocates of the interests of the corporation’s principals, its 
shareholders. Milgram’s agentic shift, equally correctly, sees problems arising from excessively 
obedient agents, such as dutiful concentration camp guards.   
The thesis that humans reflexively obey authority is not foreign to classical economics.  
Hobbes (1651) argues that people submit to the police power of the state, however capricious or 
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tyrannical, because the anarchy is worse. Darwin (1871) argues that evolution thus favors a 
propensity to, among other things, loyalty and obedience: 
“a tribe including many members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of 
patriotism, fidelity, obedience, courage, and sympathy, were always ready to give aid to 
each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be victorious over 
other tribes; and this would be natural selection.”  
Recent advances in mathematical biology demonstrate that natural selection can occur 
rapidly at the group level if in-group self-sacrifice is juxtaposed against continual deadly 
between-group warfare, now the standard model of hunter-gatherer societies in anthropology 
(Wilson (2012)). The depth of emotion that the concepts of loyalty, duty, and honor arouse – 
comparably profound in many to emotions associated with sexual reproduction and care for 
young – are consistent with Darwin’s hypothesis of an instinctive basis. For brevity, we refer to 
this as reflexive obedience, though a broader behavioral range encompassing patriotism, fidelity, 
and other related concepts is intended to be implicit throughout.       
Reflexive obedience appears to be an example of what Kahneman (2011) calls “fast” 
thinking. After an exhaustive overview of behavioral economics, Kahneman concludes that far 
more human behavior is, in one form or another, reflexive than was previously thought; but that 
humans nonetheless possess a capacity for rational decision-making – “slow” thinking – that can 
overrule reflexive behavior. Because slow thinking is apparently metabolically costly, though in 
ways not yet well understood, humans rely on what “fast” thinking by default. This entails 
unconscious or only marginally conscious “rules of thumb” that arise from instinct, either 
directly or from innate, and quite likely instinctive, learning-response mechanisms. This 
dichotomous model of human behavior differs from simple stimulus-response models in that, 
when “fast” thinking fails to converge on a decision rapidly, “slow” thinking activates. This 
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model, though far from universally accepted, finds increasingly solid support in both 
neuroimaging and experimental data (reviewed in Kahneman (2011)).    
Kahneman’s dichotomy may explain instances in which Milgram’s (1976) “teachers” 
decided to disobey his instructions to electrocute the “learner”, as well as a very few variants of 
the experiment that failed to replicate the baseline results described above. “Teachers” who 
decided to disobey appear to have switched from “fast” thinking, in which reflexive obedience 
induced an agentic shift, to “slow” thinking, in which the disobedient “teachers” rationally 
reflected on what they were doing – perhaps weighing the legal, ethical, and financial 
consequences of seriously harming the “learner”.  This cognitive cost expended, the “teacher’s” 
rational decision making system took charge and overruled reflexive obedience.   
Those variants of the experiment that failed to replicate the baseline pattern of obedience 
also fit this pattern (Milgram (1965), Packer (2008)). In the baseline experiments, Milgram 
instructed the “teacher” while standing a few feet away.  Disobedience increased if he instead 
stood outside the room, or instructed the “teacher” by phone. A second set of experiments, 
motivated by Asch’s (1951) finding that dissenting peers reduce conformity, introduced 
additional confederates who posed as “other teachers”.  The “real subject” was asked to operate 
the electrocution switches while the “other teachers” watched.  The “other teachers” were 
scripted to voice dissent by criticizing the propriety of the experiment once a pre-specified 
voltage was reached. This induced substantial disobedience. A third variant, in which a “second 
psychologist”, of similar heights and bearing to Milgram, and also wearing a white lab coat, 
entered the room partway through and criticized the experiment, induced every “teacher” to 
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switch entirely to disobeying Milgram – 100% disobedience.10 Each intervention was timed to 
correspond with the first drop in obedience evident in the baseline studies at 150 volts, when the 
“learner” first voiced objections, and thus can be interpreted as magnifying that effect.   
In each variant, Milgram posits that changes in the setting weaken reflexive obedience.  
However, equally consistent with the data, these situations might strengthen rational “slow” 
thinking. If the authority figure is not proximate, his authority becomes less salient, but 
obedience is also less rational because the authority figure may not have all the information the 
subject has.  Dissenting peers might weaken the subject’s innate tendency to fall into line with 
what he perceives to be the behavior expected of him, but could also disrupt “fast” thinking and 
allow “slow thinking” to be activated.  Conflicting rival authority figures likewise plausibly keep 
“fast” thinking due to the obedience reflex from converging, forcing the subject to snap out of 
her agentic shift and expend the effort necessary to make a rational decision.  
Institutions – legal, economic, and social – plausibly evolve at the group-level to 
reinforce or damp individual behavior that is socially beneficial or harmful, respectively.  For 
example, American soldiers in the War of 1812, allowed to elect their officers, tended to put in 
pacifists just before key battles (Taylor (2011)). Institutional constraints that protect reflexive 
obedience from rational decision-making arguably make for a more competitive army. Likewise, 
a communist economy demands obedient implementation of a central plan (Shleifer and Vishny 
(1992)), and all communist states equated rational profit-making decisions by state officials to 
treason. Hierarchical religions, government bureaucracies, and any number of other large 
                                                     
10   Burger (2009) fails to replicate this disobedience. However, because these subjects may 
administer shocks up to 150 volts only, not greatly above household AC current in the United 
States and below the 220 volt standard elsewhere, disobedience may have less obvious 
justification to them.   
14 
 
organizations rely heavily on obedience to overrule the self-interested behavior of individuals. 
Sometimes, this is accomplished by paying the individuals for obedience – the convergence of 
interests Jensen and Meckling (1976) stress. However, stirring individuals’ passions of 
patriotism, duty, loyalty, and so on may well stimulate reflexive obedience more effectively and 
more reliably than money (Wilson (2011)), which necessarily acts by triggering the undesirable 
process of rationally self-interested decision-making in the first place. 
Competition between economies, or even economic systems, arguably selects for 
institutions that allow reflexive obedience to play out in situations where obedience is generally 
socially beneficial, but that trigger rational decision-making in situations where society benefits 
from individuals thinking for themselves. Hobbes (1651), presaging Nash’s (1950) concept of a 
low-level equilibrium in arguing that life in nature is “every man against every other man” and 
inevitably leads to live that are “solitary, nasty, brutish, and short”, posits that people prefer 
universal obedience to an absolute monarch because this leads to less awful outcomes.  Thus, 
Hobbes’ Leviathan – the monster that is the State’s monopoly on the legal use of deadly force, 
and perhaps the most fundamental of institutions (North, Wallis and Weingast (2009)), arguably 
arises from economy-level competition of this sort.   
Institutions that activate rational decision-making likewise persist where they augment 
group survival odds. An important achievement of the 1688 Glorious Revolution was the 
creation of position of Leader of His Majesty’s Loyal Opposition – a leader-in-waiting duty-
bound to criticize the decisions of the Prime Minister and government.  In other words, the leader 
of the opposition demonstrates loyalty to the country by playing the role of an outspoken rival 
authority figure, often even in situations where a government he led would do no different.  
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Some variant of this Westminster system, with at least two parties and institutionalized rival 
authority figures, is now considered an integral part of every democracy.  Perhaps the sight of 
rival authority figures, volubly criticizing each other in Parliaments and Congresses throughout 
the developed world, induces “slow thinking” in elected representatives and thus elicits better 
quality legislation. Perhaps the sole authority figures who dominate the governments of 
authoritarian states, however well-intentioned and competent, elicit reflexive obedience that lets 
errors go uncorrected and lowers the quality of government. Official harmony might then be a 
sign of bad government, and argument a sign of broader rational decision-making. To the extent 
that democracy has gained ground against authoritarianism, dissent-induced rational decision-
making in governments is arguably a group survival trait.   
A major difference between Common Law and Napoleonic Code legal systems is 
procedural: In Common Law courts, rival lawyers attack each-others’ arguments as a 
disinterested judge and jury, both explicitly neutral, watch. In Napoleonic Code courts, in 
contrast, a judge magistrate directs the police, calls and grills witnesses, consults experts, and 
decides the case as the interested parties’ lawyers, who occasionally interject respectfully, remain 
largely passive. The large empirical literature correlating superior economic outcomes with 
Common Law legal systems may have less to do with the laws per se than with these procedural 
differences:  Common Law courts feature rival authority figures, whose discord can activate 
rational decision-making in the judge and jury; Civil Code courts feature a single authority, the 
judge magistrate, conducive to reflexive obedience.   
Academic journals and conferences draft referees and discussants, respectively, whose 
duty is to serve as rival authorities.  The effect is presumably to activate “slow” thinking, rational 
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decision making, in editors and conference attendees.  These practices arose recently, in the mid-
20th century in most disciplines, and science advanced at unprecedented rates in subsequent 
decades.  Argument from authority, once a crucial means of persuasion, is now risible in research 
universities.    
All of these institutional innovations create an official “devil’s advocate”, duty-bound to 
criticize the authority at hand.  In each case, this criticism arguably leads to better decision 
making by those watching on – backbenchers in Parliament, Common Law judges and juries, 
journal editors, or academic researchers.  Indeed, the term derives from the Holy Office of the 
Devil’s Advocate (Advocatus Diaboli), a Vatican position established in the Counterreformation 
by Pope Sixtus V to rebuild respect for the Roman Catholic Church by exposing sham sainthood 
nominees.  For centuries, the Devil’s Advocate was a top Canon Law expert duty-bound to 
contest the character and miracles of prospective saints.  The office was abolished by John Paul 
XXIII, who created more saints that all previous 20th century pontiffs combined. 
2. Corporate Governance Reforms 
Corporate governance reforms, from a behavioral perspective, can then be viewed as 
attempts to inject a Devil’s Advocate into key forums of corporate decision-making: boardrooms 
and annual general shareholders meetings. Corporate CEOs are, of necessity, powerful authority 
figures because business corporations are hierarchies, in which decisions at the top must be 
carried out below (Coase (1937)). This validates the view of many corporate executives that 
loyalty is an essential virtue in middle managers and employees.  As Milgram (1974, p. 145-6) 
explains,    
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“The most far-reaching consequence of the agentic shift is that a man feels responsibility 
to the authority directing him, but feels no responsibility for the content of the actions 
that the authority prescribes.”  
Neither an army nor a business corporate could function if every decision had to be 
justified economically and ethically to every employee before any action could ensue.  The 
information and coordination costs would be immense and the speed of implementation glacial, 
if not sessile.  The corporation is a command and control mechanism because obedience to an 
authority is less inefficient than information gathering, cost benefit analysis, and rational 
decision making throughout (Williamson (1979)).   
But like absolute monarchs, judge magistrates, and prominent academics, CEOs can err. 
Various corporate governance mechanisms appear designed to interrupt reflexive obedience in 
specific ways.  For example, some recent reforms seek to distance the CEO from key decision 
makers by, for example, excluding her from key board subcommittee meetings. Recall that 
obedience decreased if Milgram stepped outside the room, or issued instructions by phone.  
Efforts to increase the number and powers of independent or outside directors can be seen as 
efforts to encourage dissent among directors’ peers. Recall that Milgram’s experimental variants 
featuring dissenting peers reduced obedience. Designating a Lead Independent Director, like 
mandating that an independent director chair the board, arguably creates a Leader of His 
Majesty’s Loyal Opposition in the boardroom. Recall that rival authority figures entirely 
eliminated obedience in those variants of Milgram’s experiments.  
Empowered institutional investors might similarly serve as vocal dissenting peers at 
annual general meetings or shareholder, which otherwise can resemble one-position-one-
candidate elections in Soviet Socialist Republics. Dissident slates of candidates in proxy battles 
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can be thought of as rival authorities.   
In each case, these corporate governance reforms track results from Milgram’s 
experiments and subsequent related studies that expose situations likely to interrupt a subject’s 
agentic shift and restore individual responsibility and economic rationality. They deter 
Kahneman’s (2011) reflexive “fast” thinking, decision making via reflexive obedience, and 
promote his “slow” thinking, costly and time consuming decision-making requiring the gathering 
and processing of information and the calculation of a rational decision to stop the CEO before 
directors’ lives are destroyed by lawsuits and criminal charges, before middle managers’ and 
employees’ jobs are lost in corporate bankruptcies, and before shareholders’ wealth is 
demolished.   
This behavioral perspective on corporate governance thus views excessive or misplaced 
loyalty to the CEO as a potential problem for self-interested directors, officers, middle managers, 
employees, and shareholders.  This perspective in no way eclipses Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) 
theory that top managers’ insufficient loyalty to shareholders also causes problems. Rather, good 
corporate governance would appear to require attention to both. Thus, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) argue that social welfare maximization requires that CEOs be loyal to shareholders, but 
ensuring this loyalty may require institutions that promote disloyalty to CEOs.  Fama (1980), 
building on Jensen and Meckling (1976), argues that directors increase their pay by building 
reputations “as effective monitors”, but behavioral considerations suggest a reputation for 
“loyalty” might be more valuable if CEOs select directors, and that Fama’s argument might 
therefore be contingent on CEOs’ absence in nominating committees.  
Empirical studies present, at best, mixed evidence as to the efficacy of independent 
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directors or non-executive chairs in affecting corporate governance (Hermalin and Weisbach 
(2003), Adams, Hermalin, and Weisbach (2010)).  Weisbach (1988) finds that boards containing 
predominantly independent directors are more apt to replace the CEO after prolonged sub-par 
financial performance. However, the ultimate test of independent directors’ contribution to 
governance would be a clear causal link to superior share valuations (Rosenstein and Wyatt 
(1990), Shleifer and Vishny (1997), Rhoades et al. (2000), Perry and Shivdasani (2005), Jackling 
and Johl (2009)).  However, the preponderance of empirical studies find no correlation between 
board independence and firm performance (Daily and Dalton (1992), Yermack (1996), Dalton et 
al. (1998), Heracleous (2001), Bhagat and Black (2002), Shivdasani and Zenner (2002), 
Dulewicz and Herbert (2004), Erickson et al. (2005), Weir and Laing (2001), Hsu (2010)). 
Bhagat and Black (1999) even report a negative correlation.  The conclusion of Hermalin and 
Weisbach (2003) that the extant empirical literature forces the conclusion that “there does not 
appear to be an empirical relationship between board composition and firm performance” 
remains essentially unchallenged, though Duchin et al. (2010) find evidence of an effect in 
inverse proportion to information costs.   
Fama and Jensen (1983), Jensen (1993) and others similarly argue that separating the 
roles of CEO and board chair improves governance, and thus ought to elevate share valuations. 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1989), Finkelstein and D'Aveni (1994), and others link CEOs 
chairing their own boards to low shareholder value. However, Anderson and Anthony (1986), 
Stoeberl and Sherony (1985), Faleye (2007), and Coles et al. (2010) reported positive effects, 
whereas Brickley, Coles, and Jarrell (1997), Rechner and Dalton (1991), Baliga, Moyer, and Rao 
(1996), Dalton et al. (1998), and Dahya (2004) dispute these findings. 
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One explanation of this paucity of evidence, suggested by Higgs (2003, p. 39) in a report 
on British corporate governance, is that most independent directors and non-executive chairs are 
not, in fact, very independent.  Rather, Higgs explains that 
“Almost half of the non-executive [independent] directors surveyed for the Review were 
recruited to their role through personal contacts or friendships. Only four per cent had 
had a formal interview, and one per cent had obtained their job through answering an 
advertisement. This situation was widely criticised in responses to consultation, and I 
accept that it can lead to an overly familiar atmosphere in the boardroom.” 
 
In the United States, an independent director has “no relationship with the company, 
except the directorship and inconsequential shareholdings, that could compromise independent 
and objective judgment” (Securities and Exchange Commission (1972)). This definition was 
adopted in response to a study by Mace (1971), who found that U.S. directors “do not establish 
objectives, strategies, and policies” and refrain from “asking discerning questions - inside and 
outside the board meetings”. The current reincarnation of these rules for NYSE listed firms is as 
follows: 
An Independent Director must not, within the past three years, have been any of the 
following: 
 An employee (exception: Employment as an interim Chairman or CEO does not 
count) of this company. 
 The recipient of over $100,000 in direct compensation, excluding director fees, 
from this company. 
 Affiliated with this company’s internal or external auditor. 
 An executive director of another company, whose compensation committee 
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included any present executives of this company (exception:  directorships of 
charities do not count). 
 An executive officer of a supplier or customer of this company (exceptions:  
business amounting to less than $1M or less than 2% of the other firm’s sales 
does not count, nor do executive positions with charities) 
 The immediate relative of someone who would be disqualified as an independent 
director on any of the above grounds.   
 Higgs (2003) suggests that CEOs simply comb through lists of their friends until they 
find ones who satisfy such a checklist of independence requirements. Consistent with this, 
Hwang and Kim (2009) find informal ties – a common alma mater, hometown, military service, 
and the like – pervasive between CEOs and legally independent directors.  They further find that 
such ties correlate with higher CEO pay, lower CEO turnover, and lower firm operating 
performance. Such problems with the legal definition of director independence also loom large in 
recent litigation.  For example, in a case against the independent directors of DHB Industries for 
knowingly selling the US military defective body armour, the SEC alleges the independent 
directors “were [the CEO] Brooks' long-time friends and neighbors, with personal relationships 
with Brooks that spanned decades. Chasin lived close to Brooks, and he and his family went out 
to dinner with Brooks and the Brooks family two or three times a month. Nadelman and his 
family had a social relationship with Brooks and the Brooks family, and regularly attended 
Brooks' family social functions. Krantz had a relationship with Brooks starting in 1998 or 1999, 
and was Brooks' insurance agent before Brooks asked him to join DHB's board.”11   
                                                     
11 SEC v. Krantz et al. (USDC FL docket 02/28/2011). 
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3. Degrees of Separation and Corporate Governance 
Milgram’s finding that reflexive obedience is interrupted by distance, dissenting peers, 
and rival authorities suggests that more credibly authoritative and genuinely independent 
directors and board chairs might promote better corporate decision-making.  But what makes one 
a credible rival authority figure to the CEO? Intelligence, prestigious degrees, breeding, height, a 
baritone voice, hair, and power all come to mind.   
Oddly, power is arguably among the more readily measurable of these traits.  Decades of 
work in graph theory and social network theory (Milgram (1967), Proctor and Loomis (1951), 
Sabidussi (1966), Bonacich (1972), Freeman (1977, 1979), Watts and Strogatz (1998)) provides 
a set of network centrality measures, which in different ways measure a person’s power.  These 
measures, computed from ties between thousands of individuals, are intuitively plausible and 
empirically validated in diverse contexts (Padgett and Ansell (1993), Banerjee et al. (2012)). 
A social network, representing individual as nodes, social connections as lines between 
nodes, and the quickest routes for one individual to reach another as geodesic distances (shortest 
paths) between nodes, allows the calculation of each individual’s centrality, and thus her social 
power. Four measures of power centrality arguably apply in the present context.   
The simplest of these is an individual’s degree centrality (D), the number of direct 
connections that individual has with other people. Thus, D is an integer between 0 and N-1.  
Intuitively, a director with more connections may have more direct sources of information and 
more friends to fall back onto.    
A second measure, called betweenness centrality (B) is the number of shortest paths 
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between the (N-1)(N-2)/2 possible pairs of other people that pass through the individual in 
question. Intuitively, a director with a higher B has more power to connect people with each 
other and more power to provide information about people to each other. Padgett and Ansell 
(1993) use high betweenness to explain the Medici family dominance in 15th century Florence: 
other elite families generally connected to each other only through the Medicis, who had direct 
times to most elite families.    
A third measure, closeness centrality (C) averages the degrees of separation – that is, the 
number of links in the shortest paths – between the individual in question and every one of the 
other N – 1 individual in the network.  Closeness centrality is defined as N – 1 divided by the 
sum of these degrees of separation. Intuitively, having closer connections to more people makes 
an individual transmit information to others faster, and thus having greater influence on others’.  
A fourth measure, eigenvector centrality (E) is recursively calculated. Intuitively, 
eigenvector centrality is a weighted average of the importance of the individual’s direct contacts, 
with weights determined by the importance of their direct connections, with weights … and so 
on.   
Taken together, these centrality measures can readily be interpreted as meaningfully 
measuring the individual’s power (Hanneman and Riddle (2005, Chapter 10)).  High centrality 
individuals are more able to receive information, and to pass information along or not 
strategically. More connections and more central network positions mean more resources, more 
friends to fall back on, and more powerful friends, all of which lessen the downside of acting as a 
“Devil’s advocate”, enhancing a director’s credibility as a rival authority in the board room.   
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C. Data and Variables 
This section describes the social connection data and the mathematics we use to calculate 
these centrality measures. We then define a powerful independent director (PID) as an individual 
with at least three of these four centrality measures falling in their top quintiles of the 
distributions of the centrality measures of all officers and directors of listed firms included in 
Boardex.   
1. Social Network Centrality as A Measure of Power  
We use relational data reported in BoardEx from 1996 through 2010 to approximate the 
social network of executives and directors of over 8,000 U.S. public and private firms. These 
data include background information that let us estimate both current business relationships and 
common backgrounds potentially indicating relationships going back many decades. Each 
individual in the network is a node, and each connection (past and current) is a link.  These 
connections are all professional: through overlaps in graduate and professional education, prior 
or current common work experience in listed and unlisted firms, and shared board membership 
in non-profit organizations.  Obviously, a director’s network would ideally also include links 
from her social life – connections through family, neighbors, and friends – but these data cannot 
be collected systematically without self-reporting and self-selection biases. In contrast, 
information on professionally formed connections is from proxy statements and annual reports, 
and thus is likely to be more objective, comparable across individuals, and free of self-selection 
bias.  In total, our data include roughly 12 million pairs of connections formed through positions 
at listed firms, and another 9 million pairs formed through education and positions at unlisted 
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firms and non-profit organizations.12 This includes all reported individuals in BoardEx with at 
least one connection to the rest of the network. Table 1 reports the number of nodes in each 
year’s network  
For each year, using an IBM iDataPlex supercomputer, we calculate four measures of 
network centrality to capture the importance of each individual connected in the network.  As 
detailed below, some measures of centrality are based on the shortest social distances between 
pairs of individuals. Not including individuals from unlisted firms and firms outside the list of 
S&P 1500 could miss prominent individuals, such as bankers and hedge fund managers, who 
serve as bridges to shorten one’s social distance to many parts of the network.  The four 
measures are degree centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, and eigenvector 
centrality (Proctor and Loomis (1951), Sabidussi (1966), Freeman (1977), and Bonacich (1972)).  
For each individual, degree centrality is simply the number of unique and direct 
connections; that is  
Di = ∑ x  
where xij = 1 if individuals i and j has a connection, and zero otherwise. 
The first step for calculating both closeness and betweenness centralities is to identify the 
shortest social distance (or geodesic distance, g) between any pair of individuals in the network.  
If i does not know j directly, but knows k who knows j, then the shortest social path from i to j is 
                                                     
12 We lack information on the quality of these 21 million pairs of connections.  For example, we 
do not know whether the individuals at each end of the link are friendly or hostile, close friends 
or just acquaintances, talk daily or every ten years or never.  We assume that, once one person 
knows another, the connection lasts until one dies.        
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i – k – j, and thus i and j have a shortest distance of 2.   
Closeness centrality is the inverse of the sum of the shortest distances between one 
individual and every other individual in the network:  
Closenessi = ∑ 		∈
 
This definition assumes that the entire network is connected: that is, there exists at least 
one path between any two nodes. However, our data on business professionals contain a number 
of small sub-networks not connected to the rest of the nodes.  Setting the shortest distance 
between two unconnected nodes to g 	∞ in such a case is untenable because one infinite 
value in the denominator reduces all closeness measures to zero.  Excluding infinite g  from the 
calculation is also problematic.  Individual A in a small network might have a much higher 
Closeness than individual B in a large network, but A might have much less power than B, 
whose influence extends across many more people. As an extreme case, consider a sub-network 
with two connected individuals. Dropping all unconnected nodes leaves each has the highest 
possible Closeness value, one; yet they have negligible social influence because they are 
unconnected to the remaining 300,000+ business professionals.  
To account for these data issues, we modify closeness centrality to   
Ci = ∑ ∈
 
where n is the size of the sub-network (or component) individual i belongs to, and N is 
the total number of individuals in the entire network.  Such definition scales the original 
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closeness measures with the size of the component one belongs to in order to more accurately 
reflect one’s overall social power.  It follows that individuals in a larger network usually has a 
higher closeness value than those in smaller networks.  
Betweenness is the incidence of an individual lying on the shortest path between pairs of 
other members of the network.  For every possible triplet of individuals i, j and k, we define the 
indicator variable  




The betweenness centrality of k is then    




where m ,  is the number of geodesics linking i and j.  This adjustment is necessary 
because, while the length of the shortest path between two individuals is unique, they may be 
linked by more than one shortest path.   
Eigenvector centrality is recursively calculated. Individual i’s eigenvector centrality is his 
importance, weighed by the similarly calculated importance of all his direct contacts, each 
weighted by the importance of their direct connections, and so on.  More formally, assume the 
existence of this measure for person i, and denote it Ei.  In matrix notation, with E = [E1 , … Ei, 
… EN], the recursions collapse into the condition that λE ′E = E ′AE. Thus, E is an eigenvector 
of the matrix of connections A, and λ is its associated eigenvalue. To ensure that Ei ≥ 0 for all 
individuals, the modified Perron-Frobenius theorem is invoked and the eigenvector centrality 
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values of the individuals in the network are taken as the elements of the eigenvector E* 
associated with A’s principal eigenvalue, λ*.   
To make the centrality measures comparable with each other and over time, we rank the 
raw values of each centrality of all individual for each year and assign a percentile value, with 1 
the lowest and 100 the highest, to each individual’s centrality measures for that year.  In other 
words, regardless of the size of the network, a person with a higher valued centrality percentile is 
more centrally positioned in the network than a person with lower value.  We denote these rank-
transformations of Di, Bi, Ci, and Ei as di, bi, ci, and ei respectively.  
Table 2 presents summary statistics for the power centrality measures. Panel A presents 
the raw figures.  The mean CEO betweenness of 0.00455% indicates that the mean CEO in our 
sample lies on just under 0.005% of the shortest paths between all pairs of individuals in the 
network. Note that the mean exceeds the 75th percentile and the maximum is 0.362%.  Loosely 
speaking, the great majority of the connectedness power in the network is in the hands of the 
most connected individuals.  The typical director’s mean closeness is 25.3%, indicating that the 
typical director is about four (1 / 0.253 = 3.94) degrees of separation from any other randomly 
chosen individual.  The median degree centrality of 78 for CEOs indicates that the median CEO 
has direct ties with 78 other individuals in the network.  The raw eigenvector centrality measures 
are not readily amenable to intuitive explanation.  
The four centrality measures are highly correlated, with correlation coefficients averaging 
79%, and statistical significance under 0.001. For example, Jeffrey Garten, served at BlackStone 
and Lehman Brothers, as Dean of Yale’s School of Management, and in the Nixon, Ford, Carter, 
and Clinton administrations, exhibits high centrality by all four measures: his mean di over the 
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sample period is at the 94th percentile, his bi is at the 98th, his ci, at the 93rd, and his is also ei at 
the 93rd percentile.  The correlations are imperfect, largely because some individuals are 
connected directly to only a handful of others (low degree centrality), but these connect to highly 
powerful people (high betweenness or eigenvector centrality).  Thus, Ray Wilkins Jr., a director 
of H&R Block in 2000, ranks only in the 66th percentile in degree centrality, but the importance 
of some of those connections push his betweenness, centrality up to the 93th percentile.   
Hereafter, we focus in on officers and directors of S&P 1500 firms, as provided by Risk 
Metrics.  That is, we merge the percentile centrality measure data described in Panel B of Table 
2 with BoardEx date on the names of the CEOs and directors of listed firms, matching by 
individual’s first, middle, last names; company names, and years. This generates a final panel 
containing 132,020 individual-years from 1999-2010.  The mean percentile centrality within this 
group is 78, the maximum is 100, the minimum is 1, and the standard deviation is 22.6.  
2. Variables of Interest  
We define Powerful Independent Directors (PIDs) as legally independent directors with 
at least three centrality measures falling above the 80th percentiles of their full distributions 
across all CEOs and directors (not just those in S&P1500 firms).13 Directors are defined as 
                                                     
13 The tables below define a powerful independent director (PID) as one with at least three of the 
four centrality measures lying in the top quintiles of distributions based on the centrality 
measures of all officers and directors of listed firms covered by BoardEx. Qualitatively similar 
results ensue, by which we mean identical patterns of signs, significance, and rough coefficient 
magnitudes to those in the tables, if use top quintiles of distributions based on all officers and 
directors of listed and unlisted firms. Using the top 15% or 25%, rather than top quintiles, of 
the distributions also generates qualitatively similar results. 
  Also, in constructing the power centrality measures, we assume that, once one person knows 
another, the connection persists until one of them dies.  As robustness checks, we construct 
alternative versions of the network, and recalculate the power centrality measures assuming 
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independent if so-designated by the firm. To identify independent directors who are also 
powerful, we define four dummy variables, one for each percentile centrality measure, set to one 
if that measure falls in the top quintile of its distribution across all the executives and directors 
included in Tables 1 and 2, and to zero otherwise.  Thus, we denote whether or not individual i is 
powerful in terms of her degree centrality using 
δ d 	 	80 	 	1 if	d 	 	80
	0 otherwise		
 
and define  δ(bi ≥ 80), δ(ci, ≥ 80), and δ(ei ≥ 80) analogously.  We then say independent 
director i is powerful, setting her value of PID to one, if three or more of her power centrality 
measures fall into the top quintiles of their distributions.  That is,  
 
PID 	 	1 if	δ d 	 	80 δ b 	 	80 δ c 	 	80 δ e 	 	80 3
	0 otherwise																																																																																																					
 
We aggregate individual data to the firm-level, and set the indicator variable powerful 
independent board (PIB) to one if a majority of firm h’s independent directors are PIDs, and to 
zero otherwise.  	
PIB 	 	1 if	a	majority	of	firm	j’s	independent	directors	are	PIDs
	0 otherwise																																																																																					
 
For comparison, we define firm h as having an independent board by setting IBh to one if 
a majority of its directors are designated independent in its financial statements and to zero 
                                                                                                                                                                           
connections form only after three years of overlap, and assuming connections break after five 
years of non-overlap, and both. Qualitatively similar results to those in the tables ensue in each 
case.   
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otherwise.   
Also for comparison, we say a firm has a non-CEO chair of the board and NCCh to be 
one if firm h’s CEO is does not also chair its board of directors, but set NCCh to zero otherwise.  
We then designate firm h as having a powerful non-CEO chair if NCCh = 1 and the person 
serving as chair is powerful, in that at least three of her four centrality measures fall into the top 
quintiles of their distributions.  That is, we say firm h has a powerful non-CEO chair as 
PNC 	
1 if	h s	board	is	chaired	by	individual	i	who	is	not	its	CEO	&	has							
δ d 	 	80 δ b 	 	80 δ c 	 	80 δ e 	 	80 3
0 otherwise																																																																																																									
 
Finally, we analogously identify a firm as having a powerful CEO (PCEO) if at least 
three of its CEO’s four centrality measures in the top quintiles of their distributions.  Thus, we 
say firm h has a powerful CEO as 
PCEO 	
1 if	h s	CEO	is	individual	i	and	has																																																														
δ d 	 	80 δ b 	 	80 δ c 	 	80 δ e 	 	80 3	
0 otherwise																																																																																																									
 
   The average CEO centrality is the 74th percentile, and the median is the 80th 
percentile, indicating that half of S&P 1500 CEOs are powerful CEOs.     
We require all firms to have a minimum of three years in the sample. Our final sample 
includes 15,889 firm-years for 1956 unique firms. Table 3 lists the names and definitions of the 
variables that used in the tables to follow. 
Table 4 tallies the percentages of boards with a majority of independent directors and 
powerful independent directors, the percentages of firms that separate the CEO and chair jobs 
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and that appoint a powerful director as the non-CEO chair.  Over our sample period of 1999 to 
2009, boards with independent directors increase monotonically, as do boards with a majority of 
PIDs. Likewise, an increasing fraction of firms separate the CEO and board chair jobs and name 
a powerful director as the non-CEO chair. The importance of powerful independent directors on 
key board committees also rises steadily through time.   
3. Firm Governance and Financial Variables 
We obtain financial accounting data from Compustat and stock return data from CRSP 
for our sample of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2009.  CEO compensation data are taken from 
ExecuComp and additional information on each director of the S&P 1500 boards are obtained 
from Risk Metrics.  This includes a director’s age, and her assignments to the audit, nominating, 
and compensation committees.   
We measure shareholder valuation by a firm’s Tobin’s Q, the sum of book value of total 
assets and market equity of common shares, minus book value of equity and deferred taxes, all 
divided by total book assets.14 
We also include control variables known to affect Tobin’s Q. The control variables 
include various firm characteristics: size, the logarithm of total assets; leverage, defined as total 
debt over total assets; profitability, net operating cash flow plus depreciation and amortization; 
growth, net capital expenditure scaled by previous year’s net property, plant and equipment 
                                                     
14  Using Compustat variable names, Q = [at + (prcc_f   csho) - ceq – txdb]/at. As a robustness 
check, we also calculate the numerator as the sum of market value of common shares, book 
value of short-term and long-term debts, liquidating value of preferred shares, and deferred 
taxes and investment tax credit, while using the same denominator of total book assets. 
Qualitatively similar results ensue.   
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(Yermack (1996)); and intangibles, advertising and R&D expenditure, each scaled by total assets 
and set to zero if not reported (Morck et al. (1988)). We also control for key corporate 
governance variables shown elsewhere to affect Q ratios. These include CEO age (Morck et al. 
(1988)) and board size (Yermack (1996)), in logarithm form, and the e-index of Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Farrell (2009) – a composite index reflecting the absence or presence of economically 
important management entrenchment devices: supermajority requirements on amending 
corporate charters, similar requirements for mergers, limits on amending bylaws, staggered 
boards, poison pills, and golden parachutes.   
Table 5 Panel A presents summary statistics. In our sample, the average Tobin’s Q is 
1.58, with a standard deviation of 1.55. The average board has nine members. Over the entire 
sample period, independent directors constitute 80% of the typical board, and 57% are PIDs.  
The mean independent director centrality is at the 81th percentile.  The summary statistics of the 
other variables accord with those in other studies using these data.    
D. Empirical Results and Discussion 
We hypothesize that the presence of powerful CEOs, powerful non-CEO chairs, and a 
predominance of powerful independent directors might affect shareholder value.  In particular, 
we posit that powerful non-CEO chairs and powerful independent directors do so more reliably 
than generic non-CEO chairs and independent directors.   
1. Power and Shareholder Value 
As a first pass test of this, firm valuation is measured by Tobin’s Q, the market value of a 
firm over the replacement costs of its assets, or empirically defined using Compustat data as the 
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book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value of equity minus 
deferred tax obligations, divided by total book assets. Table 5 Panel B contrasts the Q ratios of 
firms with versus without PCEOs, PIBs and PNCs, inferring significance from t-tests adjusted 
for firm-level clustering.   
Table 5 Panel B shows firms with PIBs and PNCs exhibiting significantly higher Tobin’s 
Q’s. In contrast, the table shows that merely having someone other than the CEO chair the board 
and merely having a majority of legally independent appear unrelated to Q. Indeed, firms with a 
majority of independent directors who are not PIDs actually exhibit depressed Qs, as do firms 
that separate the roles of chair and CEO, but have a non-powerful individual as chair.  
Average Q is known to be affected by other factors.  Table 6 therefore re-estimates these 
comparisons using OLS regressions of Q ratios on industry and year dummies and a standard set 
of control variables, again adjusting significance for firm-level clustering.  The control variables   
attract their typical coefficients and significance levels. Larger firms, larger boards, more levered 
firms, and firms with more entrenched managers (indicated by a higher e-index) all have 
significantly lower shareholder valuations. Firms with more capital investment, higher R&D 
spending, and higher profitability are tend to have higher Tobin’s Q ratios. 
Regression 6.1 shows that shareholders no longer attach a valuation premium to firms 
with a powerful CEO after the various controls are included.  Regressions 6.2 and 6.3 reveal that 
shareholders do not value a generic non-CEO chair, but add a statistically and economically 
significant 5.1% (0.08 over 1.58) to a firm’s value for a powerful non-CEO chair.  Likewise, 6.5 
and 6.6 show shareholders attaching no value to a predominance of independent directors, but 
adding about 1.9% (0.03 over 1.58) to the market value of a firm if the average rank of 
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independent directors’ centrality increases by 10%. In panel B, we run the same regressions of 
firm value on a powerful independent board and the controls, but a powerful board is defined by 
each centrality respectively. A high firm value is attached for powerfully independent boards 
when the directors have higher rank of direct connections, linkage, and friends’ power.  
Table 7 investigates whether the effects in Table 6 are independent or not. All the 
controls and fixed effects using in table 6 are also included in the regressions in Table 7. 
However, to conserve space only the relevant variables are shown. Similar to Table 6, 
Regressions 7.1 through 7.7 show that the presence or absence of a powerful CEO does not 
significantly correlate with shareholder valuations. Neither do indicators for a non-CEO Chair 
and a predominantly legally independent board. In contrast, a powerful non-CEO chair 
insignificantly corresponds to shareholder valuations and a powerful independent board attracts a 
coefficient signaling a 5.4% boost in shareholder valuation.  
2. The Direction of Causality 
We wish to preclude reverse causality: CEOs of high Q firms tending to fill their boards 
with more powerful independent directors or more appointing powerful chairs.  Our first 
approach to investigating this possibility is an event study:  how does the stock market react to 
the sudden deaths of corporate directors?     
We collect a sample of news stories about sudden accidental director deaths. We confirm 
each death event date and obtain details of the cause of death through LexisNexis and Google 
searches. We exclude death events coincident with confounding events, such as earnings or 
M&A announcements, the 9-11 attacks, etc.; as well as death events following a long–term 
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illness. Each deceased director is classified as independent or not, and if independent, powerful 
or not.  These events provide cleanly exogenous changes to the power of independent directors in 
the affected firms’ boards, and measure the impact on shareholder valuation by the stock price 
reactions.   
Figure 1 represents the results of this exercise graphically.  The figure shows that firms’ 
stock prices rise when an insider-director or a non-PID suddenly passed away. The deaths of 
PIDs, in contrast, result in negative cumulative abnormal returns.  
Table 8 Panel A compares mean cumulative abnormal returns (CARs), in percentage 
points, around director sudden deaths.  The CARs are measured from one day prior to the event 
date, time -1, to the day after, and denoted CAR[-1,1]; and through 2 or 3 days later, denoted 
CAR[-1,2] or CAR[-1,3].  The first two columns contrast independent directors to non-
independent directors, and the next two columns, powerful independent directors to non-
powerful independent directors. On average, CARs are negatively associated with the sudden 
deaths of independent directors (Nguyen and Nielsen (2010)) and powerful independent 
directors, but turn positive for non-independent or non-PIDs.  Weighting the CARs equally or by 
the total assets of firms does not alter the results.   
Panel B regresses cumulative abnormal returns on the IB or PIB dummy of the deceased 
director. The negative coefficients indicate that shareholders value the presence of powerful 
independent directors: their deaths, over a three day window, trigger a 1.6% drop in shareholder 
value. Given an average market capitalization of $11.64 billion, the death of a powerful 
independent director costs shareholders an average of $186 million over a 3 day window. Panel 
C shows that shareholders appreciate the high rank of an independent director on the social 
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network. Panel D and E shows that market reacts to the importance of each centrality on sudden 
death of a independent director. 
Event studies of this sort are reliable measures of the direction of causality, but unreliable 
as to the magnitudes of the effects.  This is because subsequent events, often with uncertain event 
dates, also contribute to the overall cumulative value change.  For example, the death of a non-
powerful independent director enhances board power if the replacement is a very powerful 
independent director, but might weaken the board if the replacement is an insider or an even less 
powerful nominally independent director. Because these events are widely distributed across 
uneven time intervals, and may not be associated with any specific event dates, event study 
methodology leaves unanswered questions. 
We therefore next turn to Granger causality tests. In these tests, X is said to Granger-
cause Y if lagged values of X significantly explain Y after controlling for lagged values of Y.  
Here, the X are indicator variables for powerful independent boards and powerful non-CEO 
chairs and the Y are Tobin’s Q ratios. The exercise thus runs firm-year panel regressions of Q 
ratios on its own lags and on lagged values of the board power indicators, adjusted for firm-level 
clustering and including industry and year dummies. The left panel of Table 9 shows the lagged 
powerful board variables are jointly highly statistically significant in regressions explaining Q, 
with one, two, or three lags included for both these variables and Q. F-statistics for non-CEO 
chair are similarly significant, except when three lags are included. 
The right panel of Table 9 reverses the analysis, now using the board variables on the 
left-hand side.  The results indicate lags of Tobin’s Q, beyond the one lag, jointly insignificant in 
explaining PIB or PNC.  
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Substituting the mean power centrality of independent directors and of the non-CEO 
chair for the powerful independent board and powerful non-CEO chair dummies yields mostly 
qualitatively similar Granger causality results with one exception: a 6% significance is found in 
two Q lags in explaining the continuous version of the non-CEO Chair power measure.   
Overall, the results suggest that powerful board granger cause Tobin’s Q. While the 
significance of single lags of Q indicate that bidirectional causality cannot be precluded, the 
Granger causality results are consistent with powerful independent voices on the board causing 
high Q ratios.  
Lastly, Table 10 shows changes in Tobin’s Q after a new PID joins the board or a 
previously serving PID leaves the board.  Indicator variables are set to one to flag firm-year 
observations with such events and to zero otherwise.  A positive and significant coefficient 
shows that adding a new PID to the board correlates with a 6.8 percentage point rise in Q by the 
next year.  This positive effect swamps the significant negative effect associated with a larger 
board in cases where the board size rises.  In contrast, the departure of a PID presages an 8.4% 
lower Q ratio by the following year. Adding an independent director who is not also a powerful, 
director does not result in a significant change in market valuation in any of the regressions.   
While this exercise is conceptually an event study, the annual frequency of observations 
of Q makes causal inference problematic.  However, this exercise arguably provides a high 
estimate of the value increase associated with powerful independent voices on the board to 
counterbalance the CARs in Table 8, which can underestimate magnitudes if their windows are 
too short and become unreliable over longer windows because other characteristics of the firm 
and its environment change.  Estimated Q reflects changed firm characteristics captured in the 
39 
 
balance sheet, and so arguably provides a meaningful low-frequency valuation metric.   
In summary, the empirical evidence appears more consistent with powered independent 
directors elevating shareholder value than with higher shareholder value attracting powerful 
independent directors.     
3. How Powerful Independent Directors Matter 
The previous section provides both event study and panel evidence of a causal 
relationship between more powerful independence directors on the board and higher shareholder 
valuation.  This section considers channels through which this effect might operate.   
Boards are often said to have two duties:  advising and monitoring the CEO. Boards need 
not be equally effective in both roles: for example Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach (2012) find 
Israeli boards mainly engaging in monitoring, while Faleye et al., (2012) report US boards 
delegating monitoring to committees. We therefore consider these factors in investigating 
situations where one or both of these duties are plausibly very important.  Our objective is to see 
if powerful non-CEO chairs and powerful independent directors are associated with evidence of 
enhanced board effectiveness in situations where their role can potentially be economically 
significant.  
a. M&A 
Mergers and acquisitions often rank among the most economically important decisions 
CEOs make.  Many acquisitions result in substantial bidder shareholder value losses, and boards’ 
failure to provide sound advice or to rein in CEOs who ignore it are often blamed (Morck et al. 
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(1990b), Moeller et al (2004, 2005)). If powerful non-CEO chairs and powerful independent 
directors render boards more effective, their presence ought to decrease the incidence of 
shareholder value-destroying M&A.   
A sample of acquisitions by S&P 1500 firms from 2000 to 2009 for which Securities 
Data Company (SDC) data are available let us identify takeovers of listed firms by listed firms 
and estimate their value to the acquiring firm (the bidder’s CAR) and to shareholders (the size-
weighted average of the two firms’ announcement CARs).  This exercise excludes acquirers with 
pre-acquisition majority ownership and a post-acquisition ownership below 100% to eliminate 
effects associated with stalled takeovers. This leaves 632 takeovers by 379 distinct acquirers.      
Table 11 presents OLS regressions of bidder and combined cumulative abnormal returns 
around the merger announcement – specifically, from three days prior to three days after the 
announcement date, and denoted CAR[-3, 3] – on PCEO, PIB, and PNC indicators.  Consistent 
with El-Khatib, Fogel, and Jandik (2013), firms with more powerful CEOs make deals make 
worse acquisitions:  both the acquirer firm CAR and the combined acquirer-plus-target are lower. 
However, acquirers with powerful independent boards make significantly better M&A decisions, 
especially in cases where a powerful CEO is present. A powerful independent board correlates 
with a bidder CAR higher by 2.2% and a combined CAR higher by 2.0. Given number and sizes 
of the deals in our sample, this constitutes an economically significant addition of $640 million 
to acquirer shareholder wealth and of $1174 million to overall shareholder wealth. In panel B, 
we divided the sample into related and unrelated subsamples weather a deal is horizontally or 
vertically related or not. Compared with related deals, a powerful independent board more 
correlates with a bidder CAR or combined CAR.  
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The coefficients on the control variables in Table 11 are consistent with prior studies. 
Profitable acquirers with high leverage gain more in M&A. The bidder, target and the combined 
entity are more apt to lose value if the deal is stock financed or larger. 
b. Free Cash Flow  
Jensen (1986) argues that self-interested managers are apt to retain earnings excessively 
from shareholders perspective, and thus to pay lower dividends than shareholders would prefer.  
This free cash flow agency problem, Jensen argues, is worse in firms where boards are less 
effective in advising and monitoring the CEO.   
We define a proxy for the likelihood of free cash flow problems as an indicator variable 
set to one if the firm has all of a below median Tobin’s Q, an above median cash flow to 
property, plant and equipment ratio, and a below median dividend payout ratio; and to zero 
otherwise.  On average, our data indicate that 6.72% of firms suffer a free cash flow problem.   
Table 12 presents probit regressions of the likely free cash flow problem dummy variable 
on the PIB dummy, the PID ratio, and the average power of independent directors variable, all as 
described above. The regressions show that a PIB corresponds to an 9.2% lower likelihood of 
free cash flow problems. Consistent with Jensen’s (1986) hypothesis, and with previous studies, 
leverage is negatively correlated with the likelihood of free cash flow problems proxy. Firms 
with more entrenched boards are more apt to have likely free cash flow problems. In panel B of 
table 12, we redefine the likely free cash flow problem as a dummy which takes the value of one 
if a firm’s cash flow is the top quartile by two digit SIC industry and year, and zero otherwise. 
Sample. The results are consistent to the results in Panel A.  
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c. CEO Turnover 
Boards fulfill their monitoring duties by, among other things, firing CEOs who oversee 
persistently poor firm performance.  Weisbach (1988) shows poor past financial performance to 
increase the likelihood of a forced CEO exit in firms with more independent boards. To see if 
Weisbach’s effect is stronger where independent directors are more powerful, we examine a 
sample of forced CEO exit events collected by Jenter and Kanaan (2011) and Peters and Wagner 
(2010).15 This sample provides a defensibly clean identification of involuntary exits, but is 
limited primarily to events occurring before 2006.    
Table 13 presents the results of this exercise.  The left-hand side variables in its probit 
regressions are a dummy set to one for a forced CEO exit, and to zero otherwise; and a dummy 
set to one if an outside CEO is replaced the ejected CEO, and to zero otherwise.  The right-hand 
side variables of interest are a PIB or PIBN indicator variable, reflecting the structure of the full 
board or the nominating committee, and a PNC indicator variable, representing the presence of a 
powerful independent chair. Following Weisbach (1988), interactions of these dummies with the 
firm’s past stock returns are employed to see if more powerful independent directors make CEO 
hiring and firing decisions with more regard to past stock returns.     
Large and negative coefficients on the interaction of powerful non-CEO chair (PNC) with 
the prior year’s stock return indicate that large negative stock returns in the previous year are 
more likely to lead to old CEO being fired and replaced by an outsider where boards are chaired 
by a more powerful independent director, the independent directors are powerful, and the 
                                                     




nominating committee contains powerful independent directors.     
d. CEO Compensation 
We collect data from ExecuComp on the cash, equity, and total compensation of CEOs, 
and take log transformations of these as dependent variables.  The key variable of interest on the 
right hand side of our regressions is the sensitivity of the CEO’s compensation components to 
past stock return performance in PIB boards versus other boards.  Table 14 presents the 
regression coefficients and significance levels. 
Panel A examines the link between powerful independent boards (PIBs) and total 
compensation. Panel B examines how the composition of the compensation committee affects 
CEO incentive-based pay. We define a Compensation Powerful Independent Board (PIBC) to be 
one with a majority of PIDs on its compensation committee. More powerful CEOs receive higher 
compensation across the board; as do CEOs running larger firms and CEOs serving in the wake 
of higher past returns.  Older CEOs receive more cash and less equity-based compensation.  
PID dominated boards and compensation committee generally award CEOs higher total 
compensation package. However, table 14 reveals a highly significant positive interaction 
between powerful directors on the Compensation Committee and past stock returns in explaining 
the equity component of CEO compensation. Powerful independent compensation committees 
(PIBCs) are associated with 50% more overall pay-performance sensitivity, particularly if the 
CEO is also powerful.   
e. Earnings Management 
44 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit that boards use firms’ internal control mechanisms, 
such as their financial reporting systems, to monitor CEOs. However, much recent work shows 
that CEOs can and do manipulate earnings, a key performance indicator.  A large body of 
empirical work links more extensive earnings management to less effective internal control 
procedures (Doyle et al. (2007)), less disciplinary executive turnover (DeAngelo (1988), Dechow 
and Sloan (1991), and less independent boards and audit committees (Klein (2002)).  
This section examines whether or not more powerful independent directors on the board, 
and on the audit committee, correlates with earnings management. We also examine whether a 
powerful non-CEO chair might correlate with less earnings management. Abnormal earnings 
accruals are estimated as in Jones (1991), but adjusting for growth in credit sales (Dechow et al. 
(1995)), and benchmarking against a control firm – that with the closest ROA in the same 
industry that year (Kothari et al. (2005)).   
Table 15 reveals abnormal accruals 0.043% lower if the firm has a powerful independent 
board, roughly the same amount lower if a powerful independent director chairs the board. These 
decreases are each more than 50% of the overall 84% mean value of abnormal accruals, and so 
are highly economically significant.  The proportion of powerful independent directors on the 
audit committee is also negatively and marginally significant in explaining earnings 
management.16   
4. Robustness Checks 
                                                     
16 As a robustness check, abnormal accruals are also estimated using an alternative variant of the 
method in Jones (1991) that benchmarks accruals against a control firm – that with the closest 
ROA in the same industry that year (Kothari et al. (2005)). Qualitatively similar results ensue. 
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The results presented above survive a battery of robustness checks.  Throughout the 
analysis, we test for outliers and windsorize the continuous variables to mitigate outlier influence 
in the results.   
The precise way the PIB dummy is constructed does not drive these results.  First, the 
exact fraction of independent directors we require to be PIDs in order for PIB to be set to one 
does not greatly affect our results: other reasonable values, such as 3/5, 2/3, 3/4, or 4/5, yields 
qualitatively similar results, by which we mean identical patterns of signs and significance to 
those in the tables, along with plausible coefficient point estimates given the specific robustness 
exercise.     
Continuous power centrality measures tell much the same story as the indicator variables 
do, through the substitutes a PID ratio, the number of PIDs divided by the number of 
independent directors, for the PIB indicator variable.  This is a continuous variable ranging from 
0 to 1, with 1 indicating all independent directors are also PIDs, and 0 indicating none is.  This 
exercise also yields results qualitatively similar to those in the tables. 
Further robustness checks utilize yet other continuous analogs of PID, PNC, and PCEO, 
defined as the arithmetic mean of the individual’s three highest centrality measures, expressed in 
percentiles. For example, for individual i, a CEO, the continuous CEO centrality measure is  
 CEOC 	 d b c e min d , b , c , e 	 
The continuous variables mean independent director centrality (IDCi) and non-CEO chair 
centrality (NCCi) are defined analogously. These variables are all also percentile measures, 
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ranging from 1 to 100, with 100 indicating the highest and 0 indicating the lowest power 
centrality of all business executives in the network.  Once again, using these measures generates 
qualitatively similar results to those shown.  
E.  Conclusions 
Boards dominated by powerful independent directors increase shareholder’s valuations of 
those companies. Sudden director death event study regressions show causation to flow from 
powerful independent directors to shareholder valuations. These results validate measuring not 
just directors’ status as independent, but also their power – their ability to access information, 
draw on external resources, and mobilize support to question and, if necessary, defy CEOs bent 
on strategies that risk destroying shareholder wealth and exposing directors to lawsuits.    
These findings may explain why a robust link between independent directors on boards 
and firm value has proved so elusive.  Nominally independent directors who lack a power-base 
with which to exercise their independence might as well be officers of the company as far as 
shareholder wealth effects are concerned.  That a few very recent studies find some evidence of 
independent directors mattering may reflect the fact that more independent directors have such 
power bases in more recent years. Nonetheless, such findings may well be due to variables based 
on nominally independent directors becoming noisy proxies for measures reflecting effectively 
independent directors in recent years, not to legal director independence mattering per se..   
These findings also suggest a range of public policy and corporate governance strategy 
considerations.  First, public policy should recognize two sorts of agency issues in corporate 
governance: compromised director loyalty to shareholders and uncompromised director loyalty 
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to powerful CEOs.  Directors’ loyalty to shareholders may well be adequately ensured by a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders limited by a business judgment rule. However, additional 
measures designed to disrupt directors’ loyalty to a powerful CEO might be considered if the 
goal of corporate governance reform is greater value creation by corporations.  Specifically, 
attention might be given to recruiting independent directors with independent power bases that 
let them challenge a CEO if necessary.  
CEOs who lead their firms into corporate governance disasters also destroy their own 
wealth and careers, and so might welcome powerful dissenting voices that protect them from 
mistakes.  Bernardo, Antonio and Welch (2001), Adams, Almeida, and Ferreira (2005) and 
others identify overconfident and powerful CEOs who turn out to be right as valuable 
trailblazers; and boards that become debating societies could plausibly be as problematic as a 
board of loyal “yes men”.  Nonetheless, the tables above suggest that, at present in the United 
States, more capacity for debate in boards elevates shareholder valuations and limits strategic 
mistakes such as value destroying takeover bids, cash flow retention in excess of liquidity and 
capital spending needs, or a failure to keep up with technological change.   
This may not be true in every circumstance. Different issues may matter more in different 
firms, industries, time periods, or countries. For example, where controlling shareholders – 
tycoons or business families, rather than professional hired CEOs – dominate corporate 
governance, large-shareholder entrenchment (Stulz (1988)) and self-dealing (Johnson et al. 
(1999)) may attain greater economic importance and directors with power bases independent of 
the controlling shareholder might merit attention. Where state-owned enterprises or listed firms 
controlled by sovereign investment funds attain more importance than they have in the United 
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States, attention might be given to mechanisms that allow powerful independent voices within 
those entities – perhaps to remind political appointees of a duty to taxpayers. We welcome 
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Table 1: Corporate Executives and Directors Social Network Characteristics 
 
Each Node is a director or business executive with at least one connection to other directors or 
executives.  The Listed Network includes all business professionals who ever worked at or 
served on the board of a listed firm. The Largest Component of the Listed Network includes 
those connected to the largest sub-network based on ties established in listed firms.  The Full 
Network includes all directors or executives with at least one connection to another business 
professional who ever worked at any firm, public or private, covered by BoardEx from 1998 
through 2010. 
Year 
No. of Nodes in Listed 
Firm Network  
No. of Nodes in the 
Largest Component 
of the Listed Firm 
Network 
No. of Nodes in the  
Full Network (Listed 
& Unlisted Firms) 
1998 191,049 167,211 267,979 
1999 200,156 178,209 275,377 
2000 210,220 190,310 283,643 
2001 219,321 201,059 291,002 
2002 228,375 211,299 298,138 
2003 237,980 222,129 305,074 
2004 249,126 234,714 313,040 
2005 261,823 249,123 322,010 
2006 276,237 264,915 332,341 
2007 292,131 281,985 343,779 
2008 305,399 295,763 336,175 
2009 313,958 304,460 384,489 






Table 2: Officer and Director Power Centrality Measure Characteristics 
 
The social networks described in Table 1 contain nodes representing 15,889 CEO-years with 
3,302 unique CEOs, 5,983 non-CEO chairs-year, and 132,000 Director-years with 19,223 unique 
directors.  Other nodes represent corporate executives, bankers, and other business executives 
included in Boardex, but not serving as a CEO, chair or director of the S&P 1500 sample from 





Panel A:  Characteristics of Raw Power Centrality Measures 





Betweenness Bi 0.00450% 0.0111% 0.00% 0.0000425% 0.000795% 0.00396% 0.362%
Closeness Ci 24.8% 3.03% 0.00619% 22.8% 24.9% 26.9% 33.6% 
Degree Di 192 261 3 45 94 218 3,006 











 Betweenness Bi 0.00685% 0.0158% 0.00% 0.000113% 0.00129% 0.00630% 0.336%
Closeness Ci 25.2% 3.08% 0.00856% 23.2% 25.3% 27.2% 33.7% 
Degree Di 170 220 5 40 81 203 2,064 






 Betweenness Bi 0.00975% 0.0229% 0.00% 0.000147% 0.00216% 0.00905% 0.675%
Closeness Ci 25.3% 3.20% 0.000688% 23.2% 25.4% 27.6% 34.4% 
Degree Di 249 313 1 55 130 305 3,221 
Eigenvector Ei 0.0581% 0.371% 0.00% 0.000129% 0.00213% 0.0117% 4.15% 
 
 





Betweenness bi 76.2 24.0 1 66 84 94 100 
Closeness ci 74.7 21.4 2 61 80 92 100 
Degree di 72.1 23.5 2 56 78 92 100 











 Betweenness bi 79.7 22.5 1 72 87 96 100 
Closeness ci 75.8 21.0 2 64 81 93 100 
Degree di 74.3 22.7 3 59 80 94 100 






 Betweenness bi 79.8 25.7 1 73 90 98 100 
Closeness ci 78.2 21.3 1 66 85 95 100 
Degree di 77.0 22.4 1 63 86 95 100 






Table 3: Variables and Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Measures of CEO Power 
Powerful CEO (PCEO) 
Dummy set to one if CEO is powerful – defined as at least three of CEO’s four 
centrality measures (degree, closeness, betweenness and eigenvector) in their 
distributions’ top quintiles 
CEO Centrality (CEOC) Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for the CEO 
Measures of Chair’s Power 
Non-CEO Chair (NCC) 
Dummy set to 1 if someone other than the CEO chair’s the board and 0 if the CEO 
also serves as chair 
Powerful Non-CEO Chair (PNC) 
Dummy set to 1 for a non-CEO Chairman whose top three centrality measures 
average over 80th percentile of all business professionals and 0 otherwise 
Non-CEO Chair Centrality (NCCC) Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for non-CEO Chair 
Measures of Independent Directors’ Power 
Independent Board (IB) 
Dummy set to 1 if more than 50% of directors are independent (as defined in 
financial statements) and 0 otherwise 
Powerful Independent Director (PID) 
A director-level dummy, used to construct firm-level variables, and defined as 
follows: An independent director is a powerful independent director (PID) if at least 
three of his four  centrality measures are in their distributions’ top quintiles) 
Powerful Independent Board (PIB) 
Dummy set to 1 if more than 50% of directors are both independent and powerful, 
and 0 otherwise 
Independent Director Centrality (IDC) Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for all independent directors on board 
PID Ratio on Board (PIDR) Fraction of powerful independent directors on board 
Regression Variables 
Tobin’s Q (Q) 
The book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 





CEO Age (CEOA) CEO age 
Board Size (BSIZE) Total number of directors on board 
E-Index (ENDX) Entrenchment Index (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell, 2009) 
Assets (ASSETS) Log total assets, in billions of dollars 
Leverage (LEV) Total debt over total assets 
Probability (PROF) Net income over total assets 
Tangibility(TANG) Property, Plant, and Equipment over total assets 
Capital Investment(CAPEX) Net Capital expenditure over last year’s property, plant and equipment 
Cash Flows(CF) 
The sum of net income, depreciation, and amortization over last year’s property, 
plant and equipment 
Research &Development (R&D) Research & Development expense over total assets 
Advertising (ADV) Advertising expense over total assets 
Event Study Variables  
Stock Return(RET) 
Annual stock return minus the NYSE/AMSE/NASDAQ market index value weighted 
return 
Sudden Death (DEATH) 
An indicator variable set to one on the date of a powerful independent director’s 
sudden death and zero otherwise 
Measures of Changing Independent Director Power 
PID Addition (PIDA) Dummy set to 1 if at least one new PID joins the board and 0 otherwise 
PID Deletion (PIDD) Dummy set to 1 if at least one new PID leaves the board and 0 otherwise. 
Measures of Independent Directors’ Power in Specific Decisions 
PID Ratio on Nominating Committee 
(PIDN) 
Ratio of PIDs over total number of directors on nominating committee 
PID Ratio on Auditing Committee (PIDA) Ratio of PIDs over total number of directors on auditing committee 
PID Ratio on Compensation Committee 
(PIDC) 





Centrality of Nominating Comm. Members 
(IDCN) 
Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for independent directors who serve on 
nominating committee 
Centrality of Auditing Comm. Members 
(IDCA) 
Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for independent directors who serve on 
auditing committee  
Centrality of Compensation Comm. 
Members (IDCC) 
Mean of the top 3 centrality measures for independent directors who serve on 
compensation committee  
Other variables 
Bidder Return (BRET) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return between [-3, +3] to a bidder upon merger 
announcement 
Combined Return (CRET) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return between [-3, +3] to the combined entity, calculated as 
the asset weighted CARs of the bidder and the target, upon merger announcement 
Free Cash Flow 
Dummy set to 1 if a firm’s cash flow is higher than two digit SIC industry median, 
dividend payout is lower than two digit SIC industry median, and Tobin’s Q is lower 
than two digit SIC industry median. 
CEO Pay - Total 
Log of total compensation (tdc1), defined as the sum of salary, bonus, stock grants, 
and option grants. 
CEO Pay - Base Log of cash compensation 
CEO Pay – Performance-based Log of stock and option compensation 
Earnings Manipulation  






Table 4: Characteristics of CEOs, Independent Directors, Chairs, and Committees 
 
No. firms is number of S&P 1500 firms in sample each year. Board characteristics include: PCEO is set to one if the CEO is 
designated as powerful, that is having at least three of her four power centrality measures lying in the top quintiles of their overall 
distributions.  PCEO is one if the CEO is designates as powerful. BSIZE, mean directors per board; NID is the number of a firm’s 
directors designated independent in SEC filings and IB is one for firms with a majority of independent directors so defined and zero 
otherwise.  NPID/ID is the fraction of independent directors designated as powerful and PIB is one for firms for whom a majority of 
independent directors are powerful Board chair characteristics are : NCC,set to one if the CEO is not the chair and to zero otherwise 
and PNC set to one if NCC is one and if the chair is designated as powerful, and PNCs, the fraction both not serving as CEO and also 
designated powerful  Board committee characteristics are the means of dummies set to one if majorities of the Audit, Compensation 
and Nominating committee members are powerful.   
  CEOs Full boards Board chairs Board committees 
Year 
















PIB NCC PNC PIDA PIDC PIDN BSIZE ID 
1999 1,110 44.7 9.74 58.7 76.9 34.5 49.4 30.5 17.7 43.6 49.1 31.4 
2000 1,233 46.4 9.58 61.8 80.2 36.2 49.9 29.9 17.2 46 50.4 31.8 
2001 1,343 46.4 9.44 63.3 81.9 37.8 51.8 30.8 18.0 48.9 51.6 33.8 
2002 1,327 46.9 9.42 65.5 86.1 39.8 53.7 30.7 17.2 50.5 52.8 38.7 
2003 1,372 47.1 9.38 67.6 89.5 41.3 54.1 31.9 18.1 52.5 54 47.8 
2004 1,384 47.3 9.36 69.7 93.1 42 54.6 34.5 19.8 52.9 54.6 52.2 
2005 1,354 46.5 9.36 71.2 93.9 43.4 54.9 36.6 22.0 54.5 55.8 53.1 
2006 1,341 47.7 9.48 71.6 94.9 44.6 58.1 38.3 22.5 55.2 57.3 52.8 
2007 1,367 46.2 9.32 76.3 99.1 46.9 56.8 40.5 24.7 56.9 59.5 56.7 
2008 1,417 44.8 9.43 77.2 99.1 48 58.1 40.9 25.8 56.8 59.6 56.8 
2009 1,376 46.2 9.43 77.2 98.8 49.2 58.9 43.0 27.5 59 60.8 58.1 
2010 1,265 46.1 9.44 78.3 99.3 49.9 59.8 39.8 25.7 59.8 61.7 59 





Table 5: Summary Statistics: Firm Characteristics 
 
Panel A reports comparisons of financial and board characteristics of all firms in the sample.  
Tobin’s Q is the book value of total assets minus the book value of equity plus the market value 
of equity minus deferred tax obligations, divided by total book assets. Independent director 
centrality is the average centrality of all independent directors satisfying SEC definitions. CEO 
Centrality is the average value of the highest three centrality measures for CEOs. CEO age is 
measured in years. PID age is the average age of all PIDs on board.  Board size is the total 
number of directors for each board. E-Index is Bebchuk, et al. (2009) Entrenchment Index that 
adds 1 for each of the six index components of poison pills, staggered board, golden parachute, 
supermajority vote in charter and bylaw amendments and calling special meetings. Total Assets 
is firm’s asset. Leverage is Total Debt/Total Assets. Capital Expenditure is net capital 
investments over last year’s net PPE. Cash Flow is the sum of net income and depreciation and 
amortization divided by last year’s net PPE. R&D is R&D expenses over total assets 
Advertising is Advertising expenses over total assets. Panel B compares financial characteristics 
of firms whose CEO is a PCEO or not; boards have a majority of PIDs and those that do not; and 
boards who has a PNC or not.  Numbers in parentheses in Panels B are probability levels 






Panel A:  
Univariate Statistics 
 
  Mean Standard 
deviation
Q1 Median Q3 
Powerful CEO  PCEO 0.464 0.499 0 0 1 
CEO Centrality  CEOC 77.3 19.2 65.3 82.3 93 
Non-CEO Chair  NCC 0.358 0.479 0 0 1 
Powerful Non-CEO 
Chair  
PNC 0.214 0.41 0 0 1 
Non-CEO Chair 
Centrality 
NCCC 28.5 39.7 0 0 74 
Independent Board  IB 0.906 0.292 1 1 1 
Powerful Independent 
Board  
PIB 0.551 0.497 0 1 1 
PID Ratio  PIDR 0.572 0.33 0.333 0.6 0.875 
Indep. Director 
Centrality  
IDC 81.1 14.9 74.3 84.9 92.1 
PID on Auditing 
Committee  
PIBA 0.490 0.500 0 0 1 
PID on Compensation 
Committee  
PIBC 0.520 0.500 0 1 1 
PID on Nominating 
Committee  
PIBN 0.442 0.497 0 0 1 
Centrality of Auditing 
Comm. Members  








IDCN 70.7 32.0 64.0 83.8 92.8 
Tobin's Q  Q 1.58 1.55 0.848 1.19 1.83 
CEO Age  CEOA 55.7 7.33 51 56 60 
Board Size  BSIZE 9.44 2.62 8 9 11 
E-Index  ENDX 2.72 1.4 2 3 4 
Total Assets  ASSETS 16.8 89.2 0.755 2.12 7.37 
Leverage  LEV 0.225 0.181 0.066 0.212 0.339 
Profitability  PROFIT 0.126 0.101 0.07 0.121 0.176 
Capital Expenditure  CAPEX 0.049 0.062 0.013 0.0324 0.0638 
Cash Flow  CF 0.0908 0.125 0.0407 0.0878 0.142 
R&D  R&D 0.024 0.0444 0 0 0.0279 
Advertising  ADV 0.0102 0.0245 0 0 0.00584
  
 




Panel B. Comparisons of Means and Medians 
  PCEO firms 
Non-PCEO 
firms 
PIB firms Non-PIB firms PNC firms Non-PNC firms 
  Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Tobin's Q 1.65 (0.02) 1.22 (0.00) 1.52 1.17 1.66 (0.00) 1.26 (0.00) 1.48 1.13 1.70 (0.00) 1.26 (0.00) 1.55 1.17 
PCEO 1.00   1.00   0.00 0.00 0.737 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.314 0.00 0.514 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.450 0.00 
CEOC 93.2 (0.00) 93.7 (0.00) 63.54 66.7 86.0 (0.00) 89.5 (0.00) 66.6 67.7 81.3 (0.00) 84.7 (0.00) 76.2 81.7 
NCC 0.309 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.40 0.00 0.370 (0.02) 0.00 (0.00) 0.385 0.00 1.00 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.182 0.00 
PNC 0.237 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.19 0.00 0.290 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.137 0.00 1.00   1.00   0.00 0.00 
NCCC 27.0 (0.04) 0.00 (0.00) 29.74 0.00 32.3 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 26.7 0.00 92.0 (0.00) 93.3 (0.00) 11.1 0.00 
IB 0.936 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.88 1.00 0.941 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.858 1.00 0.935 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.897 1.00 
PIB 0.777 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.36 0.00 1.00   1.00   0.00 0.00 0.712 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.507 1.00 
IDC 88.6 (0.00) 91.0 (0.00) 74.58 78.2 90.9 (0.00) 91.4 (0.00) 69.1 72.5 86.5 (0.00) 88.4 (0.00) 79.6 83.6 
PIBA 0.704 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.31 0.00 0.820 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.0858 0.00 0.627 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.453 0.00 
PIBC 0.731 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.34 0.00 0.850 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.114 0.00 0.664 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.480 0.00 
PIBN 0.639 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.27 0.00 0.737 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.0798 0.00 0.570 (0.00) 1.00 (0.00) 0.407 0.00 
IDCA 88.2 (0.00) 91.3 (0.00) 74.3 78.2 90.5 (0.00) 92.0 (0.00) 68.8 72.3 85.9 (0.00) 88.9 (0.00) 79.3 83.5 
IDCC 88.7 (0.00) 92.2 (0.00) 74.14 79 90.9 (0.00) 92.8 (0.00) 68.5 72.7 86.5 (0.00) 90.1 (0.00) 79.3 84.6 
IDCN 81.2 (0.00) 91.3 (0.00) 61.71 74.5 83.1 (0.00) 91.9 (0.00) 55.5 67.8 77.7 (0.00) 88.3 (0.00) 68.8 81.8 
CEO Age 55.7 (0.84) 56.0 (0.01) 55.67 55 55.1 (0.00) 55 (0.00) 56.5 56.0 53.2 (0.00) 53.0 (0.00) 56.4 56.0 
Board Size 9.93 (0.00) 10.0 (0.00) 9.02 9.00 9.90 (0.00) 10 (0.00) 8.88 9.00 9.60 (0.05) 9.00 (0.00) 9.40 9.00 
E-Index 2.73 (0.74) 3.00 (0.34) 2.72 3.00 2.74 (0.43) 3 (0.07) 2.7 3.00 2.77 (0.29) 3.00 (0.02) 2.71 3.00 
Assets ($B) 28.4 (0.00) 3.90 (0.00) 6.83 1.36 27.0 (0.00) 3.41 (0.00) 4.33 1.26 19.1 (0.50) 2.10 (0.96) 16.2 2.13 
Leverage 0.238 (0.00) 0.228 (0.00) 0.213 0.196 0.231 (0.02) 0.221 (0.00) 0.216 0.200 0.221 (0.58) 0.203 (0.06) 0.225 0.214 
Profitability 0.128 (0.25) 0.124 (0.00) 0.124 0.118 0.128 (0.12) 0.125 (0.00) 0.123 0.116 0.123 (0.35) 0.121 (0.49) 0.126 0.121 
Capital 
Expenditure 
0.0455 (0.01) 0.0330 (0.00) 0.0520 0.0316 0.0454 (0.00) 0.0327 (0.07) 0.0534 0.0320 0.0468 (0.17) 0.0315 (0.89) 0.0496 0.0326 
Cash Flow 0.0893 (0.43) 0.0893 (0.18) 0.0920 0.0868 0.0897 (0.50) 0.0906 (0.03) 0.092 0.0844 0.0858 (0.10) 0.0864 (0.05) 0.0921 0.0883 
R&D 0.0322 (0.00) 0.00407 (0.00) 0.0191 0.00 0.0309 (0.00) 0.00275 (0.00) 0.0153 0.00 0.0382 (0.00) 0.00 (0.00) 0.0216 0.00 
Advertising 0.0124 (0.03) 0 (0.00) 0.0100 0.00 0.0115 (0.00) 0 (0.00) 0.0085 0.00 0.0114 (0.73) 0.00 (0.37) 0.0110 0.00 




Table 6: Firm Value Explained by CEO, Chair, and Director Characteristics 
 
Shareholder valuation, measured by Tobin’s average Qratios (Q), explained by OLS regressions 
on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director presence and power as well control 
variables including industry and year fixed effects.  Variables are as described in Table 3. 
Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance 
at 10% or better.  
 
 PanelA: 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.5 6.6 
PIB 0.0890 0.0849 0.0804       
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)       
PCEO   0.0158 0.0166       
    (0.64) (0.62)       
PNC     0.0397       
      (0.26)       
IDC       0.00254 0.00325 0.00322 
        (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) 
CEOC         -0.00106 -0.00105 
          (0.35) (0.35) 
NCCC           0.000106 
            (0.78) 
log (ceo age) -0.151 -0.153 -0.135 -0.148 -0.144 -0.138 
  (0.16) (0.16) (0.21) (0.17) (0.18) (0.21) 
log(board size) -0.318 -0.318 -0.323 -0.311 -0.308 -0.310 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
e-index -0.0602 -0.0604 -0.0603 -0.0601 -0.0594 -0.0592 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
log (total assets) -0.0505 -0.0521 -0.0516 -0.0502 -0.0474 -0.0469 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
book leverage -0.136 -0.137 -0.138 -0.140 -0.140 -0.140 
  (0.27) (0.27) (0.26) (0.25) (0.25) (0.25) 
profitability 5.373 5.370 5.371 5.377 5.378 5.378 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment 0.813 0.818 0.818 0.821 0.812 0.813 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
R&D/total assets 8.548 8.524 8.488 8.569 8.615 8.609 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
advertising / total 
assets 
1.704 1.693 1.712 1.723 1.729 
1.740 
  (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 





Panel B: Degree Betweenness 
PIB 0.0590 0.0427 0.0369       -0.00649 -0.00652 -0.00868       
  (0.10) (0.24) (0.31)       (0.83) (0.83) (0.78)       
PCEO   0.0649 0.0654         0.000228 0.000946       
    (0.04) (0.04)         (0.99) (0.98)       
PNC     0.0682           0.0316       
      (0.07)           (0.33)       
IDC       0.00355 0.00330 0.00324       0.00208 0.00235 0.00233 
        (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)       (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
CEOC         0.000406 0.000418         -0.000549 -0.000544 
          (0.63) (0.62)         (0.43) (0.43) 
NCCC           0.000213           0.000107 
            (0.58)           (0.76) 
R2 0.388 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.389 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.388 0.388 
  Closeness Eigenvector 
PIB 0.0601 0.0537 0.0469       0.00111 0.00578 0.00326       
  (0.08) (0.15) (0.20)       (0.97) (0.87) (0.93)       
PCEO   0.0178 0.0174         -0.0101 -0.0118       
    (0.62) (0.63)         (0.77) (0.74)       
PNC     0.0611           0.0228       
      (0.10)           (0.58)       
IDC       4.61e-05 -5.62e-05 -7.16e-05       0.000954 0.00255 0.00252 
        (0.94) (0.93) (0.91)       (0.35) (0.07) (0.07) 
CEOC         0.000388 0.000374         -0.00192 -0.00192 
          (0.67) (0.68)         (0.10) (0.10) 
NCCC           0.000210           9.94e-05 
            (0.58)           (0.80) 





Table 7: Firm Value Explained by Combinations of CEO, Chair and Director Characteristics 
 
Tobin’s Q (Q) explained by measures of CEO, chair, and independent director power and control variables in OLS with industry and year fixed effects.  Variables are as described in Table 3. Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel 
of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. All regressions include the controls and fixed effects used in Table 7, whose coefficients and p-levels are suppressed for brevity.  Numbers in parentheses are robust probability levels 
with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance at 10% or better.  
 
7.1 7.2 7.3 7.4 7.5 7.6 7.7 7.8 7.9 7.10 7.11 7.12 7.13 7.14 7.15 7.16 7.17 7.18 7.19 
PCEO 0.0365 0.0359 0.0373 0.0375 0.0393 0.0158 0.0230                         
  (0.26) (0.27) (0.25) (0.25) (0.22) (0.64) (0.48)                         
IB         -0.0571     -0.0523 -0.0540 -0.0485 -0.0478                 
          (0.25)     (0.30) (0.28) (0.33) (0.34)                 
PIB           0.0849           0.0890 0.0848 0.0840 0.0957         
            (0.01)           (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)         
PNIB             0.0915                 0.0953 0.0898 0.0685 0.0925 
              (0.00)                 (0.00) (0.00) (0.03) (0.00) 
NCC 0.00107             -0.00273       0.000388       -0.00507       
  (0.97)             (0.93)       (0.99)       (0.87)       
PNC   0.0495             0.0509       0.0393       0.0325     
    (0.16)             (0.15)       (0.27)       (0.38)     
PNINCC     0.160             0.159       0.154       0.131   
      (0.00)             (0.00)       (0.00)       (0.01)   
PINCC       -0.0763             -0.0726       -0.0896       -0.0677 
        (0.13)             (0.15)       (0.07)       (0.18) 
Controls Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Industry Fixed 
Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 




Table 8: Cumulative Abnormal Returns when a PID Suddenly Died 
 
This table reports t-test statistics and OLS regressions of Cumulative Abnormal Returns when a 
director suddenly died. The abnormal returns are calculated after the director death over four 
event windows including [-3, 3], [-1, 1], [-1, 2], and [-1, 3], respectively. Numbers in Panel A are 
percentages of CARs over these windows. Boldface indicates t-test statistics with p-values 
rejecting equal means at 10% significance or less. Panel B are regressions of CARs on dummies 
of IB and PIB and controls. Controls include director age at death plus firm characteristics as in 
Table 6. Numbers in parentheses are probability levels rejecting the null hypothesis of zero 
coefficients. Boldface indicates significance at 10% or better. 
 
Panel A: Mean CAR comparisons surrounding the sudden deaths of independent directors 
(IB=1) versus other directors (IB = 0) and of powerful independent directors (PID=1) versus 
other directors (PID = 0) 
 














  Y N Y N Y N Y N 
[-1, +1] -0.0285 0.572 -0.320 0.387 -0.0197 0.618 -0.311 0.394 
[-1, +2] -0.0275 0.142 -0.308 0.372 0.0602 0.219 -0.251 0.503 
[-1, +3] -0.0265 0.0665 -0.250 0.291 0.0247 0.158 -0.252 0.419 
[-3, +3] -0.247 0.154 -0.383 -0.0532 0.0267 -0.0385 -0.121 0.237 
Observations 172 54 101 71 172 54 101 71 
 
Panel B: Regressions of CARs on dummies for sudden death of an independent director (IB) and 
of a powerful independent director (PID).  
 







Directors  Event 
Window 
  coeff. 
p-
value 




[-1, +1] -0.0101 (0.10) -0.0161 (0.02) -0.0104 (0.08) -0.0135 (0.06) 
[-1, +2] -0.00654 (0.36) -0.0168 (0.01) -0.00677 (0.34) -0.0148 (0.03) 
[-1, +3] -0.00362 (0.63) -0.0209 (0.01) -0.00434 (0.57) -0.0183 (0.03) 
[-3, +3] -0.00730 (0.40) -0.0181 (0.05) -0.00552 (0.48) -0.0121 (0.13) 






Panel C: Regressions of CARs on centralities for sudden death of an independent director (IB). 
 







Directors  Event 
Window 






























226   172   226   172   
 
Panel D: Regressions of CARs on dummies for sudden death of a powerful independent director 
(PID) for each centrality measure. 
  
Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector 
Event Window 















                
[-1, +1] -0.0174 (0.05) -0.0151 (0.10) -0.0143 (0.14) -0.0174 (0.09)
[-1, +2] -0.0167 (0.01) -0.00689 (0.29) -0.0155 (0.02) -0.0130 (0.07)
[-1, +3] -0.0160 (0.01) -0.00420 (0.51) -0.0147 (0.03) -0.0153 (0.03)




                
[-1, +1] -0.0163 (0.03) -0.00998 (0.18) -0.0111 (0.16) -0.0108 (0.21)
[-1, +2] -0.0151 (0.02) -0.00664 (0.32) -0.0129 (0.06) -0.0134 (0.07)
[-1, +3] -0.0150 (0.02) -0.00488 (0.46) -0.0128 (0.06) -0.0158 (0.03)
[-3, +3] -0.0169 (0.03) -0.00975 (0.23) -0.0162 (0.06) -0.0184 (0.05)
Observations 172 
 
Panel E: Regressions of CARs on centralities for sudden death of an independent director (IB) 
for each centrality measure. 
Event 
Window 













Equally weighted mean CARs: 
[-1, +1] -0.000304 (0.11) -0.000313 (0.06) -0.000304 (0.11) -0.000279 (0.14)
[-1, +2] -0.000292 (0.02) -0.000134 (0.23) -0.000313 (0.01) -0.000254 (0.05)
[-1, +3] -0.000264 (0.05) -0.000142 (0.22) -0.000261 (0.05) -0.000226 (0.11)
[-3, +3] -0.000358 (0.03) -0.000230 (0.16) -0.000389 (0.04) -0.000347 (0.08)
Firm value weighted mean CARs: 
[-1, +1] -0.000323 (0.07) -0.000292 (0.04) -0.000274 (0.11) -0.000256 (0.15)
[-1, +2] -0.000280 (0.04) -0.000164 (0.16) -0.000305 (0.02) -0.000256 (0.07)
[-1, +3] -0.000283 (0.05) -0.000193 (0.15) -0.000281 (0.04) -0.000254 (0.10)






Table 9: Granger Causality Tests 
 
The left panel runs regressions of y’s on lags of y’s and lags of x’s and the right panel runs x’s 
on lags of y’s and lags of x’s.  In both panels, y is Tobin’s Q and x’s are one of the PIB dummy, 
PNC dummy, average centralities of independent directors, or centrality of PNC. Table reports 
F-statistics on the joint significance of x lags in the left panel, and the joint significance of y lags 
in the right panel.  Numbers in the parentheses are probability levels rejecting the null hypothesis 
that the x lags are unrelated to y in the left panel, and that the y lags are unrelated to x in the right 
panel.    
 
Panel A: 
Board power Granger causes 
shareholder value 








    
 
Xi,t 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 
PIB 
6.79 3.33 3.28 4.35 1.45 2.05 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.02) (0.04) (0.23) (0.11) 
PCEO 
0.33 0.56 0.34 0.32 0.02 0.28 
(0.57) (0.57) (0.80) (0.57) (0.98) (0.84) 
PNC 
2.77 1.50 1.13 3.25 1.66 1.12 
(0.10) (0.22) (0.33) (0.07) (0.19) (0.34) 
IDC 
4.33 3.97 4.99 2.05 1.36 1.16 
(0.04) (0.02) (0.00) (0.15) (0.26) (0.32) 
CEOC 
0.00 0.80 1.57 1.17 0.55 0.40 
(0.99) (0.45) (0.19) (0.28) (0.58) (0.76) 
NCCC 
4.15 2.87 0.62 3.44 2.80 0.75 







Panel B-1: Degree Betweenness 
Xi,t 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 
PIB 
4.94 4.51 1.04 2.58 2.54 1.98 1.94 3.3 0.82 2.08 0.58 1.12 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.37) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12) (0.16) (0.04) (0.49) (0.15) (0.56) (0.34) 
PCEO 
0.28 0.84 1.22 0.62 0.02 0.48 0.07 0.10 1.48 0.15 0.16 0.44 
(0.59) (0.42) (0.30) (0.43) (0.98) (0.70) (0.79) (0.91) (0.22) (0.69) (0.85) (0.72) 
PNC 
1.82 1.93 0.63 4.17 1.27 1.72 3.45 2.20 2.18 1.95 1.07 0.76 
(0.18) (0.15) (0.60) (0.04) (0.28) (0.16) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.16) (0.34) (0.52) 
IDC 
1.43 3.05 3.67 2.46 2.31 2.09 2.18 2.74 3.56 0.51 0.07 0.23 
(0.23) (0.05) (0.01) (0.12) (0.10) (0.10) (0.14) (0.06) (0.01) (0.47) (0.94) (0.87) 
CEOC 
0.28 0.13 0.83 0.71 0.38 0.64 0.68 0.28 1.74 0.16 0.13 0.91 
(0.60) (0.88) (0.48) (0.40) (0.68) (0.59) (0.41) (0.76) (0.16) (0.69) (0.88) (0.44) 
NCCC 
2.40 1.38 0.82 2.06 0.94 1.58 2.36 1.43 0.82 0.88 0.81 1.68 
(0.12) (0.25) (0.49) (0.15) (0.39) (0.19) (0.12) (0.24) (0.48) (0.35) (0.45) (0.17) 
Panel B-2: Closeness Eigenvector 
Xi,t 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 1 lag 2 lags 3 lags 
PIB 
5.52 3.19 0.91 0.29 2.09 2.85 3.26 2.2 1.10 0.17 0.89 1.99 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.43) (0.59) (0.12) (0.04) (0.07) (0.11) (0.35) (0.68) (0.41) (0.11) 
PCEO 
0.50 1.33 0.80 0.64 0.22 0.18 0.92 0.77 0.88 2.11 4.19 3.06 
(0.48) (0.26) (0.49) (0.42) (0.80) (0.91) (0.34) (0.46) (0.45) (0.15) (0.02) (0.03) 
PNC 
3.59 1.43 0.52 4.29 1.27 1.32 3.77 0.83 0.58 6.72 1.71 1.37 
(0.06) (0.24) (0.67) (0.04) (0.28) (0.27) (0.05) (0.43) (0.63) (0.01) (0.18) (0.25) 
IDC 
6.19 3.57 3.36 3.43 2.27 1.79 5.91 3.96 2.92 4.98 3.32 2.54 
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02) (0..06) (0.10) (0.15) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0..03) (0.04) (0.05) 
CEOC 
0.42 1.55 2.14 1.30 0.43 0.20 0.64 2.68 2.04 4.75 1.54 1.00 
(0.52) (0.21) (0.09) (0.25) (0.65) (0.90) (0.42) (0.07) (0.11) (0.03) (0.22) (0.39) 
NCCC 
3.51 1.62 0.92 2.92 1.14 1.66 3.37 1.49 0.88 3.37 1.38 1.69 





Table 10: Additions and Departures of PIDs 
 
Change in Tobin’s Q explained by OLS regressions on measures of PID additions to or 
departures from the board in the prior year.  Controls are one year changes of the variables 
described in Table 3. Numbers in parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by 
firm. Boldface denotes significance at 10% or better.  
 
 Change in Tobin’s Q 
  10.1 10.2 




Net deletion of PIDs -0.0835 
(0.02) 
∆log(ceo age) 0.0680 0.0617 
(0.15) (0.19) 
∆log(board size) -0.0477 -0.0479 
(0.00) (0.00) 
∆log(assets) -0.383 -0.384 
(0.00) (0.00) 
∆book leverage 0.0221 0.0232 
(0.84) (0.83) 
∆profitability -0.147 -0.148 
(0.30) (0.30) 
∆investments -0.106 -0.105 
(0.44) (0.45) 
∆R&D -1.130 -1.126 
(0.05) (0.05) 
∆Advertising 0.752 0.749 
(0.42) (0.42) 






Table 11: PIDs and M&A Performance 
 
Cumulative abnormal returns around -3 and +3 days of M&A announcement dates explained by OLS regressions on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director presence 
and power as well control variables including industry and year fixed effects.  Sample includes 632 mergers and acquisitions by S&P 1500 firms that took place between 1999 and 
2009.  Variables are as described in Table 3. Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. Panel A reports the results for all deals, Panel B reports the 
results for deals which are either horizontal or vertical related. Panel C reports the results for deals which are neither horizontal nor vertical related. Numbers in parentheses are 
robust probability levels with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance at 10% or better. 
 
Bidder CAR [-3, 3] Combined CAR [-3, 3] 
Panel A: 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12 
PIB 0.0101 0.0220 0.0214       0.0106 0.0197 0.0198       
  (0.24) (0.01) (0.02)       (0.20) (0.02) (0.03)       
PCEO   -0.0342 -0.0339         -0.0264 -0.0264       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     0.00335           -0.000865       
      (0.66)           (0.91)       
IDC       -0.000235 0.000705 0.000682       -0.000180 0.000435 0.000438 
        (0.47) (0.09) (0.10)       (0.57) (0.28) (0.28) 
CEOC         -0.00112 -0.00111         -0.000733 -0.000734 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.02) (0.02) 
NCCC           4.94e-05           -6.56e-06 
            (0.52)           (0.93) 
log (ceo age) 0.000865 0.00107 0.00109 0.000733 0.000952 0.000998 0.000492 0.000638 0.000632 0.000374 0.000514 0.000508 
  (0.09) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.06) (0.05) (0.31) (0.19) (0.20) (0.45) (0.30) (0.31) 
log(board size) -0.00437 -0.0145 -0.0151 -0.00467 -0.00524 -0.00603 -0.00686 -0.0145 -0.0144 -0.00678 -0.00714 -0.00703 
  (0.77) (0.33) (0.32) (0.76) (0.72) (0.69) (0.64) (0.32) (0.33) (0.64) (0.62) (0.63) 
e-index 0.00228 0.00328 0.00323 0.00197 0.00283 0.00280 0.00293 0.00376 0.00377 0.00264 0.00321 0.00322 
  (0.34) (0.16) (0.17) (0.41) (0.23) (0.24) (0.20) (0.10) (0.10) (0.25) (0.17) (0.17) 
log (total assets)  -0.00242 0.00142 0.00140 -0.000194 0.000687 0.000800 -0.00523 -0.00217 -0.00217 -0.00325 -0.00267 -0.00269 
  (0.34) (0.59) (0.60) (0.95) (0.81) (0.78) (0.04) (0.41) (0.41) (0.24) (0.34) (0.34) 
book leverage 0.0348 0.0187 0.0185 0.0381 0.0303 0.0298 0.0127 0.00547 0.00551 0.0144 0.0114 0.0114 
  (0.12) (0.40) (0.41) (0.09) (0.17) (0.18) (0.28) (0.64) (0.64) (0.21) (0.33) (0.33) 





  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment -0.00199 -0.00616 -0.00595 0.00114 0.000370 0.000842 0.00163 0.000199 0.000175 0.00320 0.00281 0.00278 
  (0.88) (0.63) (0.64) (0.93) (0.98) (0.95) (0.81) (0.98) (0.98) (0.64) (0.68) (0.68) 
Deal Value -0.0365 -0.0360 -0.0363 -0.0371 -0.0371 -0.0374 0.0209 0.0197 0.0199 0.0187 0.0182 0.0183 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.24) (0.24) 
Same Industry 0.00395 0.00115 0.00103 0.00204 0.00165 0.00143 0.00498 0.00285 0.00288 0.00318 0.00295 0.00297 
  (0.56) (0.87) (0.88) (0.77) (0.81) (0.83) (0.46) (0.67) (0.67) (0.63) (0.66) (0.65) 
Stock Deal -0.0122 -0.0126 -0.0124 -0.0130 -0.0124 -0.0121 -0.0119 -0.0124 -0.0124 -0.0127 -0.0124 -0.0124 
  (0.11) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
R&D/total assets  -0.245 -0.179 -0.183 -0.209 -0.165 -0.168 -0.216 -0.166 -0.165 -0.183 -0.155 -0.154 
  (0.00) (0.03) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) 
advertising / total 
assets  
-0.0299 0.0469 0.0477 -0.0278 0.0110 0.0158 0.0118 0.0708 0.0706 0.0132 0.0382 0.0376 
  (0.87) (0.80) (0.79) (0.88) (0.95) (0.93) (0.95) (0.69) (0.69) (0.94) (0.83) (0.83) 
Ind.dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 









  Bidder CAR [-3, 3] Combined CAR [-3, 3] 
Panel B: 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12 
Related Deals:                         
PIB -0.00504 0.00365 0.00257       -0.00843 -0.00254 -0.00409       
  (0.74) (0.81) (0.87)       (0.55) (0.86) (0.78)       
PCEO   -0.0371 -0.0355         -0.0235 -0.0211       
    (0.00) (0.01)         (0.06) (0.10)       
PNC     0.00592           0.00881       
      (0.60)           (0.41)       
IDC       -0.000913 -2.65e-05 -6.66e-05       -0.000620 -0.000142 -0.000174 
        (0.20) (0.97) (0.93)       (0.35) (0.85) (0.82) 
CEOC         -0.00121 -0.00116         -0.000642 -0.000603 
          (0.03) (0.04)         (0.21) (0.25) 
NCCC           7.22e-05           5.56e-05 
Ind.dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0810 0.115 0.111 0.0885 0.107 0.104 0.114 0.126 0.125 0.116 0.119 0.115 
Unrelated Deals:                       
PIB 0.0142 0.0278 0.0275       0.0137 0.0255 0.0259       
  (0.21) (0.02) (0.02)       (0.22) (0.03) (0.03)       
PCEO   -0.0363 -0.0364         -0.0322 -0.0322       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     0.00275           -0.00303       
      (0.79)           (0.77)       
IDC       -0.000268 0.000715 0.000699       -0.000278 0.000437 0.000434 
        (0.51) (0.17) (0.18)       (0.49) (0.40) (0.40) 
CEOC         -0.00113 -0.00114         -0.000826 -0.000827 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.03) (0.03) 
NCCC           7.24e-05           1.40e-05 
            (0.48)           (0.89) 
R2 0.0810 0.115 0.111 0.0885 0.107 0.104 0.114 0.126 0.125 0.116 0.119 0.115 






  Bidder CAR [-3, 3] Combined CAR [-3, 3] 
Panel C-Degree: 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 11.9 11.10 11.11 11.12 
PIB 0.00303 0.0120 0.0116 0.00788 0.0217 0.0212 
  (0.69) (0.13) (0.14)  (0.31) (0.01) (0.01) 
PCEO -0.0343 -0.0341 -0.0388 -0.0387 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
PNC 0.00442 0.00413 
    (0.57)  (0.60) 
IDC   -0.000276 0.000411 0.000396 -0.000291 0.000643 0.000620 
    (0.37) (0.25) (0.27) (0.24) (0.08) (0.10) 
CEOC   -0.000917 -0.000909 -0.00102 -0.00101 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NCCC    4.42e-05 4.58e-05 
     (0.57) (0.56) 
Ind.dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0737 0.0972 0.0962 0.0747 0.0927 0.0916 0.0750 0.102 0.101 0.0756 0.0910 0.0900 
 Panel C-
Betweenness:  
PIB 0.00587 0.0130 0.0131 0.0106 0.0217 0.0219 
  (0.43) (0.09) (0.09)  (0.16) (0.01) (0.01) 
PCEO -0.0277 -0.0277 -0.0311 -0.0311 
   (0.00) (0.00)    (0.00) (0.00) 
PNC -0.000748 -0.00220 
    (0.92)  (0.77) 
IDC   -0.000221 0.000296 0.000301 -0.000228 0.000367 0.000374 
    (0.46) (0.40) (0.39) (0.34) (0.31) (0.30) 
CEOC   -0.000690 -0.000692 -0.000653 -0.000655 
    (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) 
NCCC    -1.34e-05 -1.30e-05 
     (0.86) (0.87) 






 Panel C: 
Closeness  
PIB -0.000151 0.00256 0.00248 0.00892 0.0233 0.0223 
  (0.98) (0.73) (0.74)  (0.24) (0.01) (0.01) 
PCEO -0.0125 -0.0125 -0.0327 -0.0336 
   (0.11) (0.11)    (0.00) (0.00) 
PNC 0.00348 0.00983 
    (0.64)  (0.20) 
IDC   -0.000108 0.000277 0.000267 -0.000278 0.000545 0.000518 
    (0.68) (0.34) (0.36) (0.29) (0.15) (0.18) 
CEOC   -0.000555 -0.000551 -0.000903 -0.000909 
    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
NCCC    4.20e-05 8.01e-05 
     (0.58) (0.31) 
R2 0.0734 0.0759 0.0747 0.0737 0.0858 0.0847 0.0755 0.0977 0.0986 0.0752 0.0868 0.0868 
 Panel C: 
Eigenvector  
PIB 0.00467 0.00707 0.00708 0.0123 0.0229 0.0227 
  (0.51) (0.33) (0.33)  (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) 
PCEO -0.0111 -0.0111 -0.0242 -0.0244 
   (0.14) (0.14)    (0.00) (0.00) 
PNC -0.000649 0.00147 
    (0.93)  (0.85) 
IDC   -6.25e-05 0.000195 0.000196 -0.000211 0.000255 0.000251 
    (0.80) (0.49) (0.49) (0.41) (0.49) (0.50) 
CEOC   -0.000366 -0.000367 -0.000511 -0.000512 
    (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) (0.09) 
NCCC    -6.58e-06 1.07e-05 
     (0.93) (0.89) 





Table 12: PIDs and the Free Cash Flow Problem 
 
Probit regression of free cash flow problem on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director 
presence and power as well control variables including industry and year fixed effects.  Variables 
are as described in Table 3. In panel A, the free cash flow is a dummy which takes the value of 
one if a firm’s cash flow is higher than two digit SIC industry median, dividend payout is lower 
than two digit SIC industry median, and Tobin’s Q is lower than two digit SIC industry median, 
and zero otherwise. In panel B, the free cash flow is a dummy which takes the value of one if a 
firm’s cash flow is the top quartile by two digit SIC industry and year, and zero otherwise. 
Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. Numbers in 
parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance 
at 10% or better.  
 
  Dummy set to 1 if High Cash Flow Retention, 0 otherwise 
Panel A: 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 
PIB -0.0920 -0.0892 -0.0916       
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)       
PCEO   -0.0116 -0.0113       
    (0.82) (0.82)       
PNC     0.0192       
      (0.72)       
IDC       -0.00386 -0.00524 -0.00544 
        (0.06) (0.02) (0.01) 
CEOC         0.00205 0.00209 
          (0.18) (0.17) 
NCCC           0.000551 
            (0.33) 
log (ceo age) -0.233 -0.232 -0.228 -0.258 -0.262 -0.241 
  (0.14) (0.14) (0.16) (0.11) (0.11) (0.14) 
log (board size) -0.296 -0.296 -0.298 -0.299 -0.303 -0.313 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
e-index 0.0111 0.0113 0.0113 0.0114 0.0103 0.0111 
  (0.53) (0.53) (0.53) (0.52) (0.57) (0.54) 
log (total assets) -0.0446 -0.0434 -0.0431 -0.0389 -0.0444 -0.0417 
  (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.08) (0.05) (0.06) 
book leverage 0.0360 0.0363 0.0351 0.0424 0.0419 0.0405 
  (0.79) (0.79) (0.79) (0.75) (0.76) (0.76) 
profitability -0.306 -0.305 -0.303 -0.308 -0.308 -0.300 
  (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14) 
investment 1.455 1.452 1.452 1.425 1.436 1.433 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D / total assets -1.328 -1.311 -1.328 -1.254 -1.343 -1.368 
  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) 
advertising / total assets 0.697 0.702 0.710 0.694 0.702 0.747 




Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.0229 0.0229 0.0229 0.0233 0.0237 0.0240 
 
  Dummy set to 1 if High Cash Flow Retention, 0 otherwise 
Panel B: 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.6 
PIB -0.105 -0.0979 -0.0991       
  (0.02) (0.04) (0.03)       
PCEO   -0.0278 -0.0276       
    (0.52) (0.52)       
PNC     0.00995       
      (0.83)       
IDC       -0.00361 -0.00306 -0.00303 
        (0.03) (0.11) (0.12) 
CEOC         -0.000794 -0.000802 
          (0.57) (0.56) 
NCCC           -7.72e-05 
            (0.87) 
log (ceo age) -0.257 -0.255 -0.252 -0.270 -0.269 -0.272 
  (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
log (board size) -0.215 -0.215 -0.216 -0.220 -0.218 -0.217 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
e-index -0.00541 -0.00511 -0.00507 -0.00527 -0.00483 -0.00495 
  (0.73) (0.74) (0.74) (0.73) (0.76) (0.75) 
log (total assets) 0.0252 0.0280 0.0281 0.0277 0.0297 0.0294 
  (0.19) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.13) (0.14) 
book leverage -0.577 -0.574 -0.575 -0.570 -0.568 -0.568 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
profitability 9.778 9.785 9.785 9.780 9.781 9.780 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment 1.882 1.875 1.875 1.852 1.847 1.847 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D / total assets 2.930 2.976 2.966 2.961 2.997 3.002 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
advertising / total assets 0.473 0.495 0.497 0.474 0.483 0.479 
  (0.63) (0.61) (0.61) (0.63) (0.62) (0.62) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 







  Dummy set to 1 if High Cash Flow Retention, 0 otherwise 
Panel C: Degree Betweenness 
PIB -0.0276 -0.0242 -0.0262       -0.0332 -0.0326 -0.0351       
  (0.58) (0.63) (0.60)       (0.47) (0.48) (0.45)       
PCEO   -0.0134 -0.0133         -0.00419 -0.00370       
    (0.78) (0.79)         (0.93) (0.94)       
PNC     0.0192           0.0274       
      (0.72)           (0.58)       
IDC       -0.00325 -0.00411 -0.00428       -0.00329 -0.00399 -0.00415 
        (0.07) (0.03) (0.03)       (0.05) (0.02) (0.02) 
CEOC         0.00140 0.00143         0.00152 0.00156 
          (0.24) (0.23)         (0.16) (0.15) 
NCCC           0.000504           0.000560 
            (0.39)           (0.31) 
R2 0.0221 0.0221 0.0221 0.0230 0.0234 0.0236 0.0221 0.0221 0.0222 0.0232 0.0237 0.0240 
  Closeness Eigenvector 
PIB -0.0545 -0.0570 -0.0577       -0.0879 -0.0608 -0.0678       
  (0.27) (0.25) (0.26)       (0.08) (0.27) (0.23)       
PCEO   0.00692 0.00685         -0.0595 -0.0630       
    (0.89) (0.89)         (0.28) (0.26)       
PNC     0.00517           0.0510       
      (0.92)           (0.40)       
IDC       -0.00293 -0.00486 -0.00505       -0.00285 -0.00423 -0.00445 
        (0.09) (0.01) (0.01)       (0.11) (0.04) (0.03) 
CEOC         0.00243 0.00245         0.00168 0.00166 
          (0.11) (0.11)         (0.28) (0.28) 
NCCC           0.000544           0.000653 
            (0.35)           (0.27) 







  Dummy set to 1 if High Cash Flow Retention, 0 otherwise 
Panel D: Degree Betweenness 
PIB -0.0690 -0.0654 -0.0680       -0.0796 -0.0739 -0.0731       
  (0.13) (0.16) (0.14)       (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)       
PCEO   -0.0145 -0.0142         -0.0363 -0.0366       
    (0.75) (0.75)         (0.37) (0.37)       
PNC     0.0297           -0.0117       
      (0.54)           (0.79)       
IDC       -0.00189 -0.00202 -0.00201       -0.00270 -0.00237 -0.00233 
        (0.23) (0.24) (0.25)       (0.06) (0.11) (0.12) 
CEOC         0.000210 0.000206         -0.000650 -0.000665 
          (0.85) (0.85)         (0.49) (0.48) 
NCCC           -4.85e-05           -0.000156 
            (0.92)           (0.74) 
R2 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 0.251 
  Closeness Eigenvector 
PIB -0.118 -0.104 -0.107       -0.0782 -0.0685 -0.0698       
  (0.01) (0.03) (0.03)       (0.08) (0.17) (0.16)       
PCEO   -0.0375 -0.0377         -0.0210 -0.0219       
    (0.42) (0.42)         (0.66) (0.65)       
PNC     0.0190           0.0108       
      (0.68)           (0.82)       
IDC       -0.00340 -0.00254 -0.00252       -0.00345 -0.00282 -0.00281 
        (0.01) (0.16) (0.17)       (0.01) (0.13) (0.13) 
CEOC         -0.00106 -0.00106         -0.000747 -0.000747 
          (0.47) (0.46)         (0.61) (0.61) 
NCCC           -5.17e-05           -2.51e-05 
            (0.92)           (0.96) 






Table 13: Forced CEO Turnover and Selection of an Outside CEO 
 
The likelihoods of forced CEO turnover and external CEO explained by Probit regressions on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director presence and power as well 
control variables including industry and year fixed effects.  Variables are as described in Table 3. Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance at 10% or better.  
 
  Forced Turnover 
Panel A1: 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.10 13.11 13.12 
PIB 0.0640 0.0110 -0.0186                   
  (0.73) (0.95) (0.92)                   
PIB×Ret -0.154 -0.143 -0.0158                   
  (0.77) (0.79) (0.98)                   
PIBN             -0.0330 -0.0882 -0.119       
              (0.86) (0.67) (0.58)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.270 -0.247 -0.225       
              (0.59) (0.64) (0.70)       
PCEO   0.123 0.110         0.152 0.137       
    (0.53) (0.57)         (0.45) (0.50)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.146 -0.247         -0.130 -0.197       
    (0.77) (0.62)         (0.80) (0.71)       
PNC     0.281           0.302       
      (0.22)           (0.19)       
PNC×Ret     -0.457           -0.390       
      (0.49)           (0.55)       
IDC       0.0103 0.00744 0.00907             
        (0.15) (0.40) (0.31)             
IDC×Ret       -0.00696 0.00187 0.0240             
        (0.72) (0.94) (0.32)             
IDCN                   0.00489 0.00444 0.00347 
                    (0.11) (0.17) (0.29) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.000965 0.000845 0.00125 
                    (0.90) (0.91) (0.87) 





          (0.59) (0.68)         (0.52) (0.47) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.0122 -0.0229         -0.0124 -0.0125 
          (0.51) (0.17)         (0.25) (0.16) 
NCCC           0.00497           0.00515 
            (0.03)           (0.03) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.0147           -0.0117 
            (0.03)           (0.07) 
Ret -1.084 -1.021 -0.982 -0.603 -0.360 -1.001 -1.076 -1.025 -0.951 -1.138 -0.263 -0.0166 
  (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.70) (0.79) (0.39) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.05) (0.76) (0.98) 
log (ceo age) -1.980 -2.084 -2.040 -1.900 -1.969 -1.651 -2.046 -2.137 -2.069 -1.837 -1.917 -1.656 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.04) 
log (board size) 0.599 0.565 0.568 0.431 0.416 0.401 0.660 0.627 0.628 0.314 0.273 0.289 
  (0.08) (0.10) (0.10) (0.23) (0.25) (0.27) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) (0.39) (0.47) (0.45) 
e-index 0.0590 0.0673 0.0714 0.0754 0.0745 0.101 0.0532 0.0635 0.0682 0.0554 0.0629 0.0901 
  (0.37) (0.31) (0.29) (0.26) (0.27) (0.15) (0.42) (0.34) (0.31) (0.41) (0.35) (0.20) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.131 0.132 0.140 0.136 0.138 0.173 0.131 0.133 0.141 0.139 0.143 0.174 
 
 
  Forced Turnover 
Panel A2:  Degree 
PIB -0.0240 -0.0359 -0.0299                   
  (0.90) (0.85) (0.88)                   
PIB×Ret -0.391 -0.383 -0.270                   
  (0.45) (0.47) (0.64)                   
PIBN             -0.0572 -0.0760 -0.0654       
              (0.75) (0.68) (0.73)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.382 -0.405 -0.372       
              (0.47) (0.47) (0.51)       
PCEO   0.0414 -0.00288         0.0729 0.0245       
    (0.84) (0.99)         (0.71) (0.90)       





    (0.90) (0.89)         (1.00) (0.99)       
PNC     0.352           0.340       
      (0.12)           (0.13)       
PNC×Ret     -0.474           -0.566       
      (0.48)           (0.37)       
IDC       0.00529 0.00289 0.00394             
        (0.39) (0.69) (0.59)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0114 -0.00562 0.0106             
        (0.45) (0.77) (0.57)             
IDCN                   0.00407 0.00381 0.00314 
                    (0.19) (0.23) (0.33) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00236 -0.000485 0.000431 
                    (0.74) (0.95) (0.96) 
CEOC         0.00343 0.00221         0.00265 0.00240 
          (0.53) (0.68)         (0.57) (0.60) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.00905 -0.0152         -0.0111 -0.0115 
          (0.52) (0.25)         (0.28) (0.18) 
NCCC           0.00508           0.00518 
            (0.04)           (0.03) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.0142           -0.0124 
            (0.04)           (0.07) 
R2 0.132 0.132 0.142 0.131 0.137 0.171 0.132 0.132 0.142 0.132 0.138 0.169 
  Closeness 
PIB 0.116 0.0534 0.0529                   
  (0.51) (0.78) (0.77)                   
PIB×Ret -0.134 0.0424 0.191                   
  (0.80) (0.93) (0.70)                   
PIBN             -0.0781 -0.178 -0.187       
              (0.66) (0.34) (0.32)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.369 -0.389 -0.214       
              (0.47) (0.47) (0.68)       
PCEO   0.214 0.230         0.298 0.309       





PCEO×Ret   -0.494 -0.445         -0.374 -0.333       
    (0.33) (0.36)         (0.49) (0.52)       
PNC     0.0821           0.0874       
      (0.73)           (0.72)       
PNC×Ret     -1.088           -1.062       
      (0.13)           (0.13)       
IDC       0.00793 0.00398 0.00545             
        (0.20) (0.64) (0.52)             
IDC×Ret       0.00381 0.0170 0.0372             
        (0.83) (0.46) (0.11)             
IDCN                   0.00503 0.00447 0.00356 
                    (0.11) (0.19) (0.30) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.000171 0.00206 0.00292 
                    (0.98) (0.81) (0.73) 
CEOC         0.00500 0.00394         0.00339 0.00392 
          (0.52) (0.61)         (0.56) (0.49) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.0168 -0.0288         -0.0115 -0.0119 
          (0.40) (0.14)         (0.37) (0.25) 
NCCC           0.00519           0.00531 
            (0.03)           (0.03) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.0156           -0.0121 
            (0.02)           (0.08) 
R2 0.132 0.139 0.148 0.131 0.140 0.178 0.132 0.142 0.150 0.136 0.141 0.174 
  Eigenvector 
PIB -0.0215 -0.125 -0.122                   
  (0.90) (0.55) (0.57)                   
PIB×Ret -0.945 -0.873 -0.795                   
  (0.08) (0.17) (0.24)                   
PIBN             -0.0689 -0.171 -0.183       
              (0.70) (0.38) (0.35)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.562 -0.470 -0.355       
              (0.28) (0.42) (0.54)       





    (0.39) (0.53)         (0.33) (0.44)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.143 -0.102         -0.396 -0.306       
    (0.80) (0.86)         (0.48) (0.60)       
PNC     0.205           0.172       
      (0.45)           (0.52)       
PNC×Ret     -0.408           -0.631       
      (0.59)           (0.37)       
IDC       0.00998 0.000599 0.00193             
        (0.11) (0.95) (0.84)             
IDC×Ret       -0.00274 0.00640 0.0193             
        (0.86) (0.81) (0.48)             
IDCN                   0.00570 0.00395 0.00320 
                    (0.07) (0.25) (0.35) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.000275 0.000714 0.00146 
                    (0.97) (0.93) (0.86) 
CEOC         0.0105 0.00884         0.00752 0.00719 
          (0.20) (0.28)         (0.20) (0.21) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.0107 -0.0179         -0.00833 -0.00829 
          (0.64) (0.44)         (0.56) (0.48) 
NCCC           0.00481           0.00497 
            (0.05)           (0.04) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.0143           -0.0124 
            (0.04)           (0.08) 






  Outside CEO 
Panel B1: 13.1 13.2 13.3 13.4 13.5 13.6 13.7 13.8 13.9 13.10 13.11 13.12 
PIB 0.136 0.0821 0.164                   
  (0.66) (0.78) (0.57)                   
PIB×Ret -0.943 -0.912 -0.513                   
  (0.22) (0.26) (0.49)                   
PIBN             -0.411 -0.525 -0.391       
              (0.20) (0.14) (0.29)       
PIBN×Ret             -1.747 -1.832 -1.465       
              (0.03) (0.03) (0.10)       
PCEO   0.138 0.188         0.285 0.316       
    (0.61) (0.48)         (0.33) (0.25)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.178 -0.210         -0.0139 -0.0419       
    (0.82) (0.77)         (0.98) (0.95)       
PNC     -0.510           -0.436       
      (0.29)           (0.39)       
PNC×Ret     -1.756           -1.614       
      (0.15)           (0.22)       
IDC       0.0167 0.00791 0.00853             
        (0.18) (0.52) (0.50)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0434 -0.0741 -0.0711             
        (0.00) (0.01) (0.02)             
IDCN                   0.000425 -0.000656 -0.000667 
                    (0.92) (0.88) (0.88) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00272 -0.000504 0.000960 
                    (0.79) (0.96) (0.93) 
CEOC         0.00813 0.00812         0.00765 0.00882 
          (0.41) (0.41)         (0.39) (0.33) 
CEOC×Ret         0.0199 0.0188         -0.0158 -0.0143 
          (0.24) (0.26)         (0.16) (0.20) 
NCCC           0.000925           0.000115 





NCCC×Ret           -0.00207           -0.00699 
            (0.82)           (0.40) 
Ret -0.666 -0.598 -0.508 2.283 3.267 3.160 -0.713 -0.707 -0.544 -1.017 0.0918 0.0693 
  (0.21) (0.21) (0.23) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.05) (0.10) (0.13) (0.19) (0.90) (0.92) 
log (ceo age) 1.324 1.284 1.181 1.457 1.421 1.512 0.973 0.972 0.958 1.192 1.166 1.261 
  (0.21) (0.23) (0.27) (0.18) (0.20) (0.18) (0.35) (0.37) (0.37) (0.25) (0.26) (0.24) 
log (board size) -0.767 -0.803 -0.857 -1.010 -1.047 -1.104 -0.583 -0.628 -0.729 -0.617 -0.719 -0.781 
  (0.10) (0.09) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.20) (0.17) (0.10) (0.22) (0.17) (0.13) 
e-index 0.127 0.137 0.150 0.166 0.167 0.177 0.0941 0.110 0.130 0.115 0.137 0.155 
  (0.14) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.06) (0.26) (0.19) (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.08) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
R2 0.130 0.133 0.147 0.150 0.155 0.156 0.133 0.140 0.151 0.114 0.127 0.132 
 
 
  Forced Turnover 
Panel B2:  Degree 
PIB -0.433 -0.460 -0.430                   
  (0.18) (0.16) (0.18)                   
PIB×Ret -2.290 -2.248 -2.040                   
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)                   
PIBN             -0.343 -0.367 -0.339       
              (0.26) (0.26) (0.28)       
PIBN×Ret             -1.196 -1.219 -1.113       
              (0.11) (0.13) (0.14)       
PCEO   0.143 0.174         0.205 0.230       
    (0.60) (0.51)         (0.48) (0.40)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0515 0.00770         -0.207 -0.0826       
    (0.93) (0.99)         (0.76) (0.90)       
PNC     -0.386           -0.446       





PNC×Ret     -1.127           -1.656       
      (0.31)           (0.15)       
IDC       0.0103 0.00306 0.00338             
        (0.31) (0.78) (0.76)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0410 -0.0749 -0.0736             
        (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)             
IDCN                   -0.000285 -0.000746 -0.000612 
                    (0.95) (0.87) (0.89) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00402 -0.00299 -0.00120 
                    (0.69) (0.79) (0.92) 
CEOC         0.00622 0.00605         0.00280 0.00302 
          (0.45) (0.46)         (0.69) (0.66) 
CEOC×Ret         0.0243 0.0238         -0.00730 -0.00753 
          (0.13) (0.14)         (0.67) (0.58) 
NCCC           0.00104           -0.000126 
            (0.77)           (0.97) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00111           -0.00772 
            (0.91)           (0.36) 
R2 0.151 0.153 0.159 0.146 0.154 0.155 0.124 0.130 0.144 0.114 0.117 0.122 
  Betweenness 
PIB -0.140 -0.205 -0.154                   
  (0.62) (0.48) (0.60)                   
PIB×Ret -1.937 -2.119 -1.853                   
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)                   
PIBN             -0.457 -0.450 -0.431       
              (0.13) (0.14) (0.15)       
PIBN×Ret             -1.462 -1.562 -1.386       
              (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)       
PCEO   0.258 0.268         0.201 0.196       
    (0.38) (0.37)         (0.48) (0.50)       
PCEO×Ret   0.301 0.199         -0.0273 -0.207       
    (0.62) (0.73)         (0.96) (0.71)       





      (0.55)           (0.46)       
PNC×Ret     -1.126           -1.476       
      (0.18)           (0.09)       
IDC       -0.00251 -0.000935 -0.000682             
        (0.83) (0.93) (0.95)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0508 -0.0627 -0.0605             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)             
IDCN                   -0.000811 -0.000493 -0.000314 
                    (0.85) (0.91) (0.94) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00387 -0.00296 -0.00193 
                    (0.68) (0.76) (0.85) 
CEOC         -0.00274 -0.00273         -0.00330 -0.00306 
          (0.72) (0.72)         (0.64) (0.67) 
CEOC×Ret         0.00785 0.00760         -0.00882 -0.00758 
          (0.25) (0.26)         (0.24) (0.30) 
NCCC           -0.000209           -0.00111 
            (0.95)           (0.74) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00207           -0.00772 
            (0.82)           (0.35) 
R2 0.157 0.161 0.168 0.141 0.145 0.145 0.132 0.136 0.151 0.114 0.117 0.121 
  Closeness 
PIB -0.100 -0.162 -0.106                   
  (0.74) (0.59) (0.70)                   
PIB×Ret -1.762 -1.772 -1.541                   
  (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)                   
PIBN             0.0536 0.0373 0.111       
              (0.85) (0.90) (0.68)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.844 -0.822 -0.557       
              (0.26) (0.29) (0.44)       
PCEO   0.190 0.236         0.159 0.219       
    (0.52) (0.41)         (0.60) (0.46)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0657 -0.00340         -0.423 -0.326       





PNC     -0.317           -0.382       
      (0.44)           (0.38)       
PNC×Ret     -0.859           -1.300       
      (0.38)           (0.23)       
IDC       0.0187 0.00883 0.00991             
        (0.07) (0.42) (0.37)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0355 -0.0534 -0.0474             
        (0.01) (0.05) (0.08)             
IDCN                   0.000974 -0.00126 -0.00121 
                    (0.82) (0.78) (0.79) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00276 -0.000763 0.00123 
                    (0.79) (0.94) (0.91) 
CEOC         0.00970 0.00957         0.0114 0.0126 
          (0.32) (0.33)         (0.17) (0.14) 
CEOC×Ret         0.0134 0.0111         -0.0160 -0.0146 
          (0.47) (0.54)         (0.20) (0.22) 
NCCC           0.000471           7.67e-05 
            (0.90)           (0.98) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00405           -0.00804 
            (0.66)           (0.35) 
R2 0.147 0.151 0.155 0.155 0.159 0.161 0.125 0.132 0.141 0.114 0.138 0.143 
  Eigenvector 
PIB 0.158 0.156 0.216                   
  (0.61) (0.61) (0.45)                   
PIB×Ret -1.320 -1.086 -0.858                   
  (0.13) (0.30) (0.38)                   
PIBN             0.302 0.308 0.333       
              (0.28) (0.27) (0.21)       
PIBN×Ret             -0.540 -0.173 -0.0519       
              (0.46) (0.82) (0.94)       
PCEO   0.00901 0.0538         0.0207 0.110       
    (0.98) (0.86)         (0.95) (0.73)       





    (0.69) (0.77)         (0.27) (0.43)       
PNC     -0.242           -0.289       
      (0.60)           (0.53)       
PNC×Ret     -0.681           -0.984       
      (0.51)           (0.36)       
IDC       0.0157 0.00398 0.00556             
        (0.12) (0.74) (0.65)             
IDC×Ret       -0.0288 -0.0375 -0.0315             
        (0.03) (0.20) (0.28)             
IDCN                   0.00154 -0.00135 -0.00125 
                    (0.73) (0.77) (0.78) 
IDCN×Ret                   -0.00286 0.000722 0.00234 
                    (0.79) (0.95) (0.84) 
CEOC         0.0113 0.0112         0.0132 0.0145 
          (0.27) (0.28)         (0.12) (0.10) 
CEOC×Ret         0.00755 0.00642         -0.0173 -0.0146 
          (0.73) (0.77)         (0.19) (0.27) 
NCCC           -0.000165           -0.000332 
            (0.96)           (0.93) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00583           -0.00752 
            (0.51)           (0.39) 





Table 14: PIDs and CEO Compensation 
 
CEO compensation explained by OLS regressions on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director presence and power as well control variables including industry and year 
fixed effects.  The dependent variable in the first panel is natural log of total compensation (tdc1), defined as the sum of salary, bonus, stock grants, and option grants. The 
dependent variable in the second panel is the natural log of equity-based compensation. The dependent variable in the third panel is natural log of cash compensation. Variables are 
as described in Table 3. Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms from 1999 to 2010. Numbers in parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by firm. 





14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 14.11 14.12 
PIB 0.271 0.223 0.230                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0497 0.0668 0.0728                   
  (0.40) (0.22) (0.19)                   
PIBC             0.258 0.215 0.219       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.0398 0.0501 0.0505       
              (0.53) (0.35) (0.30)       
PCEO   0.186 0.185         0.191 0.190       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0324 -0.0333         -0.0232 -0.0246       
    (0.61) (0.60)         (0.70) (0.68)       
PNC     -0.0548           -0.0499       
      (0.22)           (0.25)       
PNC×Ret     -0.0137           0.00553       
      (0.83)           (0.93)       
IDC       0.0145 0.0103 0.0107             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       -0.000167 0.000812 0.000341             
        (0.95) (0.76) (0.89)             
IDCC                   0.0104 0.00731 0.00744 





IDCC×Ret                   -0.00204 -0.00191 -0.00216 
                    (0.26) (0.31) (0.25) 
CEOC         0.00595 0.00585         0.00690 0.00687 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.00132 -0.00124         0.000138 1.40e-05 
          (0.45) (0.48)         (0.95) (0.99) 
NCCC           -0.00101           -0.000911 
            (0.03)           (0.04) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000411           0.000538 
            (0.52)           (0.45) 
stock return 0.0981 0.102 0.103 0.126 0.150 0.173 0.103 0.107 0.107 0.275 0.254 0.274 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.54) (0.47) (0.36) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.08) (0.15) (0.08) 
log (ceo age) -0.0222 -0.0495 -0.0755 0.0701 0.0516 -0.0134 -0.0431 -0.0662 -0.0903 0.0386 0.0315 -0.0284 
  (0.87) (0.72) (0.57) (0.60) (0.70) (0.92) (0.75) (0.63) (0.50) (0.77) (0.81) (0.83) 
log (board size) -0.0825 -0.0837 -0.0763 -0.0934 -0.109 -0.0883 -0.0744 -0.0773 -0.0704 -0.103 -0.120 -0.101 
  (0.44) (0.43) (0.48) (0.37) (0.30) (0.42) (0.48) (0.46) (0.52) (0.33) (0.25) (0.36) 
e-index 0.0715 0.0690 0.0687 0.0697 0.0660 0.0644 0.0697 0.0673 0.0670 0.0680 0.0640 0.0624 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
log (total assets) 0.411 0.392 0.391 0.381 0.367 0.362 0.414 0.393 0.393 0.400 0.375 0.371 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
book leverage 0.0705 0.0658 0.0680 0.0461 0.0428 0.0451 0.0754 0.0694 0.0716 0.0409 0.0374 0.0395 
  (0.56) (0.59) (0.58) (0.70) (0.72) (0.71) (0.54) (0.57) (0.56) (0.74) (0.76) (0.74) 
profitability 1.556 1.522 1.518 1.522 1.514 1.504 1.558 1.522 1.519 1.562 1.539 1.530 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment 0.155 0.211 0.211 0.316 0.366 0.362 0.159 0.218 0.217 0.225 0.318 0.314 
  (0.63) (0.52) (0.52) (0.35) (0.27) (0.28) (0.63) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.34) (0.34) 
R&D / total assets 2.540 2.273 2.331 2.120 1.878 1.941 2.583 2.295 2.349 2.295 1.929 1.987 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
advertising / total 
assets  
-0.610 -0.742 -0.765 -0.730 -0.760 -0.854 -0.488 -0.644 -0.663 -0.592 -0.676 -0.758 
(0.52) (0.43) (0.42) (0.45) (0.42) (0.37) (0.61) (0.50) (0.48) (0.54) (0.47) (0.43) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 





  Total Compensation 
Panel A2: Degree 
PIB 0.787 0.621 0.613                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.237 0.270 0.214                   
  (0.26) (0.24) (0.38)                   
PIBC             0.930 0.808 0.801       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.255 0.278 0.241       
              (0.21) (0.17) (0.24)       
PCEO   0.656 0.658         0.647 0.649       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0878 -0.0958         -0.0508 -0.0710       
    (0.72) (0.69)         (0.82) (0.75)       
PNC     0.112           0.0869       
      (0.44)           (0.55)       
PNC×Ret     0.222           0.205       
      (0.45)           (0.47)       
IDC       0.0452 0.0371 0.0369             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00767 0.00726 0.00680             
        (0.29) (0.38) (0.46)             
IDCC                   0.0388 0.0331 0.0330 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0132 0.0153 0.0153 
                    (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
CEOC         0.0127 0.0128         0.0134 0.0135 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         0.000467 0.000588         -0.00290 -0.00286 
          (0.94) (0.93)         (0.65) (0.66) 
NCCC           0.000555           0.000676 
            (0.73)           (0.67) 





            (0.90)           (0.94) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.662 0.662 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.662 0.663 0.663 
  Betweenness 
PIB 0.926 0.857 0.850                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.217 0.235 0.179                   
  (0.28) (0.24) (0.41)                   
PIBC             0.914 0.867 0.860       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.258 0.208 0.222       
              (0.26) (0.39) (0.36)       
PCEO   0.432 0.436         0.478 0.480       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   0.255 0.278         0.170 0.214       
    (0.27) (0.23)         (0.48) (0.38)       
PNC     0.0984           0.107       
      (0.48)           (0.45)       
PNC×Ret     0.201           0.329       
      (0.47)           (0.19)       
IDC       0.0378 0.0313 0.0312             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.0106 0.00766 0.00604             
        (0.31) (0.47) (0.58)             
IDCC                   0.0328 0.0283 0.0282 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0143 0.0131 0.0133 
                    (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
CEOC         0.0129 0.0130         0.0129 0.0130 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         0.00491 0.00558         0.00259 0.00287 
          (0.38) (0.33)         (0.64) (0.60) 
NCCC           0.000555           0.000722 





NCCC×Ret           0.00248           0.00287 
            (0.32)           (0.23) 
R2 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.662 0.662 0.662 
  Closeness 
PIB 0.855 0.605 0.594                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.298 0.671 0.615                   
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.03)                   
PIBC             0.858 0.667 0.658       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.261 0.488 0.434       
              (0.21) (0.04) (0.07)       
PCEO   0.691 0.692         0.720 0.721       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.580 -0.584         -0.415 -0.434       
    (0.03) (0.03)         (0.10) (0.09)       
PNC     0.0897           0.0884       
      (0.54)           (0.54)       
PNC×Ret     0.195           0.243       
      (0.48)           (0.36)       
IDC       0.0360 0.0257 0.0255             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00454 0.00865 0.00949             
        (0.47) (0.29) (0.30)             
IDCC                   0.0344 0.0275 0.0274 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0105 0.0194 0.0206 
                    (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEOC         0.0128 0.0128         0.0113 0.0113 
          (0.02) (0.02)         (0.02) (0.02) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.00538 -0.00559         -0.0116 -0.0116 
          (0.51) (0.49)         (0.16) (0.16) 





            (0.68)           (0.68) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.000743           -0.00161 
            (0.82)           (0.61) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.662 0.662 
  Eigenvector 
PIB 0.795 0.511 0.513                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0744 0.334 0.356                   
  (0.73) (0.30) (0.28)                   
PIBC             0.720 0.487 0.489       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.0174 0.202 0.240       
              (0.94) (0.42) (0.33)       
PCEO   0.609 0.609         0.649 0.648       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.352 -0.325         -0.267 -0.243       
    (0.25) (0.25)         (0.23) (0.28)       
PNC     -0.0146           -0.0102       
      (0.92)           (0.95)       
PNC×Ret     -0.141           -0.166       
      (0.68)           (0.63)       
IDC       0.0353 0.0236 0.0234             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00553 0.0178 0.0190             
        (0.41) (0.10) (0.10)             
IDCC                   0.0349 0.0278 0.0277 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0101 0.0231 0.0242 
                    (0.16) (0.03) (0.02) 
CEOC         0.0137 0.0137         0.0110 0.0109 
          (0.01) (0.01)         (0.04) (0.04) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.0118 -0.0117         -0.0138 -0.0132 





NCCC           0.000712           0.000694 
            (0.67)           (0.68) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00138           -0.00191 
            (0.68)           (0.56) 





14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 14.11 14.12 
PIB 0.934 0.751 0.744                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.102 0.110 0.0619                   
  (0.61) (0.66) (0.83)                   
PIBC             1.079 0.922 0.917       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.295 0.401 0.382       
              (0.14) (0.05) (0.07)       
PCEO   0.708 0.710         0.685 0.686       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0152 -0.0161         -0.205 -0.208       
    (0.96) (0.95)         (0.38) (0.37)       
PNC     0.0605           0.0539       
      (0.67)           (0.71)       
PNC×Ret     0.151           0.0730       
      (0.61)           (0.78)       
IDC       0.0475 0.0361 0.0359             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00761 0.00876 0.00948             
        (0.36) (0.35) (0.37)             
IDCC                   0.0411 0.0335 0.0334 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 





                    (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) 
CEOC         0.0164 0.0165         0.0166 0.0166 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.00153 -0.00167         -0.00609 -0.00591 
          (0.85) (0.83)         (0.43) (0.44) 
NCCC           0.000674           0.000797 
            (0.67)           (0.62) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.000575           -0.000897 
            (0.85)           (0.75) 
stock return 0.0820 0.0893 0.0841 -0.460 -0.434 -0.468 0.0380 0.0624 0.0584 -1.141 -1.034 -1.070 
  (0.27) (0.24) (0.28) (0.45) (0.50) (0.49) (0.71) (0.51) (0.55) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
log (ceo age) -2.301 -2.406 -2.374 -2.013 -2.065 -2.022 -2.313 -2.395 -2.367 -1.991 -2.003 -1.952 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
log (board size) 0.215 0.213 0.204 0.186 0.143 0.129 0.211 0.198 0.190 0.0922 0.0485 0.0324 
  (0.57) (0.57) (0.58) (0.61) (0.70) (0.73) (0.57) (0.59) (0.61) (0.80) (0.89) (0.93) 
e-index 0.290 0.280 0.281 0.283 0.273 0.274 0.278 0.270 0.270 0.271 0.262 0.264 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
log (total assets) 0.367 0.295 0.296 0.277 0.236 0.239 0.353 0.280 0.280 0.306 0.247 0.250 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
book leverage -0.160 -0.180 -0.182 -0.247 -0.257 -0.259 -0.145 -0.165 -0.166 -0.307 -0.313 -0.315 
  (0.71) (0.67) (0.67) (0.56) (0.55) (0.55) (0.74) (0.70) (0.70) (0.47) (0.46) (0.46) 
profitability 1.349 1.214 1.220 1.240 1.218 1.225 1.309 1.186 1.190 1.345 1.289 1.298 
  (0.10) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.11) (0.14) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) 
investment 4.201 4.424 4.420 4.754 4.892 4.893 4.332 4.533 4.532 4.603 4.817 4.818 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D / total assets 6.015 4.995 4.925 4.678 4.009 3.971 5.720 4.695 4.631 4.648 3.788 3.745 
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.04) (0.05) 
advertising / total assets  
-6.249 -6.740 -6.716 -6.616 -6.689 -6.627 -6.002 -6.563 -6.548 -6.358 -6.576 -6.504 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Industry fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 






  Equity Compensation 
Panel B2: Degree 
PIB 0.787 0.621 0.613                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.237 0.270 0.214                   
  (0.26) (0.24) (0.38)                   
PIBC             0.930 0.808 0.801       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.255 0.278 0.241       
              (0.21) (0.17) (0.24)       
PCEO   0.656 0.658         0.647 0.649       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0878 -0.0958         -0.0508 -0.0710       
    (0.72) (0.69)         (0.82) (0.75)       
PNC     0.112           0.0869       
      (0.44)           (0.55)       
PNC×Ret     0.222           0.205       
      (0.45)           (0.47)       
IDC       0.0452 0.0371 0.0369             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00767 0.00726 0.00680             
        (0.29) (0.38) (0.46)             
IDCC                   0.0388 0.0331 0.0330 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0132 0.0153 0.0153 
                    (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
CEOC         0.0127 0.0128         0.0134 0.0135 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         0.000467 0.000588         -0.00290 -0.00286 
          (0.94) (0.93)         (0.65) (0.66) 
NCCC           0.000555           0.000676 
            (0.73)           (0.67) 





            (0.90)           (0.94) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.662 0.662 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.662 0.663 0.663 
  Betweenness 
PIB 0.926 0.857 0.850                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.217 0.235 0.179                   
  (0.28) (0.24) (0.41)                   
PIBC             0.914 0.867 0.860       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.258 0.208 0.222       
              (0.26) (0.39) (0.36)       
PCEO   0.432 0.436         0.478 0.480       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   0.255 0.278         0.170 0.214       
    (0.27) (0.23)         (0.48) (0.38)       
PNC     0.0984           0.107       
      (0.48)           (0.45)       
PNC×Ret     0.201           0.329       
      (0.47)           (0.19)       
IDC       0.0378 0.0313 0.0312             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.0106 0.00766 0.00604             
        (0.31) (0.47) (0.58)             
IDCC                   0.0328 0.0283 0.0282 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0143 0.0131 0.0133 
                    (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) 
CEOC         0.0129 0.0130         0.0129 0.0130 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
CEOC×Ret         0.00491 0.00558         0.00259 0.00287 
          (0.38) (0.33)         (0.64) (0.60) 
NCCC           0.000555           0.000722 





NCCC×Ret           0.00248           0.00287 
            (0.32)           (0.23) 
R2 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.662 0.662 0.662 
  Closeness 
PIB 0.855 0.605 0.594                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.298 0.671 0.615                   
  (0.16) (0.01) (0.03)                   
PIBC             0.858 0.667 0.658       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.261 0.488 0.434       
              (0.21) (0.04) (0.07)       
PCEO   0.691 0.692         0.720 0.721       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.580 -0.584         -0.415 -0.434       
    (0.03) (0.03)         (0.10) (0.09)       
PNC     0.0897           0.0884       
      (0.54)           (0.54)       
PNC×Ret     0.195           0.243       
      (0.48)           (0.36)       
IDC       0.0360 0.0257 0.0255             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00454 0.00865 0.00949             
        (0.47) (0.29) (0.30)             
IDCC                   0.0344 0.0275 0.0274 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0105 0.0194 0.0206 
                    (0.14) (0.04) (0.04) 
CEOC         0.0128 0.0128         0.0113 0.0113 
          (0.02) (0.02)         (0.02) (0.02) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.00538 -0.00559         -0.0116 -0.0116 
          (0.51) (0.49)         (0.16) (0.16) 





            (0.68)           (0.68) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.000743           -0.00161 
            (0.82)           (0.61) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 0.661 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.662 0.662 
  Eigenvector 
PIB 0.795 0.511 0.513                   
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0744 0.334 0.356                   
  (0.73) (0.30) (0.28)                   
PIBC             0.720 0.487 0.489       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.0174 0.202 0.240       
              (0.94) (0.42) (0.33)       
PCEO   0.609 0.609         0.649 0.648       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.352 -0.325         -0.267 -0.243       
    (0.25) (0.25)         (0.23) (0.28)       
PNC     -0.0146           -0.0102       
      (0.92)           (0.95)       
PNC×Ret     -0.141           -0.166       
      (0.68)           (0.63)       
IDC       0.0353 0.0236 0.0234             
        (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)             
IDC×Ret       0.00553 0.0178 0.0190             
        (0.41) (0.10) (0.10)             
IDCC                   0.0349 0.0278 0.0277 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   0.0101 0.0231 0.0242 
                    (0.16) (0.03) (0.02) 
CEOC         0.0137 0.0137         0.0110 0.0109 
          (0.01) (0.01)         (0.04) (0.04) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.0118 -0.0117         -0.0138 -0.0132 





NCCC           0.000712           0.000694 
            (0.67)           (0.68) 
NCCC×Ret           -0.00138           -0.00191 
            (0.68)           (0.56) 




14.1 14.2 14.3 14.4 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.8 14.9 14.10 14.11 14.12 
PIB 0.0715 0.0519 0.0645                   
  (0.02) (0.07) (0.03)                   
PIB×Ret 0.00793 -0.00296 -0.0143                   
  (0.87) (0.93) (0.68)                   
PIBC             0.0920 0.0757 0.0859       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             0.0106 -0.000836 -0.00786       
              (0.84) (0.98) (0.83)       
PCEO   0.0768 0.0749         0.0724 0.0713       
    (0.01) (0.01)         (0.02) (0.02)       
PCEO×Ret   0.0205 0.0176         0.0183 0.0133       
    (0.67) (0.71)         (0.69) (0.77)       
PNC     -0.108           -0.110       
      (0.00)           (0.00)       
PNC×Ret     0.0485           0.0452       
      (0.36)           (0.37)       
IDC       0.00431 0.00274 0.00314             
        (0.00) (0.11) (0.07)             
IDC×Ret       7.02e-05 7.36e-05 -0.000685             
        (0.97) (0.97) (0.70)             
IDCC                   0.00391 0.00299 0.00317 
                    (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   -0.00129 -0.00182 -0.00213 





CEOC         0.00226 0.00214         0.00208 0.00204 
          (0.07) (0.09)         (0.06) (0.06) 
CEOC×Ret 
    
    
-3.42e-
07 
0.000133       
  0.000970 0.000811 
          (1.00) (0.92)         (0.52) (0.58) 
NCCC           -0.00123           -0.00122 
            (0.00)           (0.00) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000640           0.000669 
            (0.18)           (0.19) 
stock return 0.0647 0.0638 0.0624 0.0618 0.0614 0.0984 0.0645 0.0639 0.0619 0.169 0.140 0.166 
  (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.70) (0.71) (0.51) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.15) (0.32) (0.19) 
log (ceo age) 0.323 0.311 0.261 0.354 0.346 0.267 0.325 0.316 0.263 0.356 0.353 0.273 
  (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) 
log (board size) 0.0839 0.0841 0.0984 0.0789 0.0730 0.0988 0.0820 0.0813 0.0964 0.0707 0.0663 0.0917 
  (0.39) (0.39) (0.32) (0.42) (0.46) (0.33) (0.41) (0.41) (0.34) (0.48) (0.50) (0.37) 
e-index 0.0391 0.0379 0.0375 0.0384 0.0369 0.0349 0.0380 0.0371 0.0366 0.0373 0.0360 0.0339 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
log (total assets) 0.207 0.199 0.197 0.197 0.191 0.186 0.204 0.196 0.195 0.198 0.191 0.186 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
book leverage 0.334 0.332 0.337 0.327 0.325 0.328 0.336 0.333 0.339 0.324 0.322 0.325 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
profitability 0.963 0.948 0.943 0.951 0.948 0.936 0.958 0.943 0.938 0.959 0.951 0.939 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment -0.755 -0.729 -0.731 -0.702 -0.683 -0.688 -0.743 -0.718 -0.720 -0.717 -0.687 -0.692 
  (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
R&D / total assets -0.316 -0.427 -0.317 -0.463 -0.555 -0.480 -0.357 -0.468 -0.353 -0.474 -0.587 -0.509 
  (0.44) (0.30) (0.45) (0.25) (0.17) (0.25) (0.38) (0.25) (0.40) (0.24) (0.15) (0.23) 
advertising / total 
assets  
-0.395 -0.446 -0.493 -0.443 -0.453 -0.568 -0.383 -0.441 -0.486 -0.426 -0.449 -0.560 
(0.69) (0.65) (0.62) (0.66) (0.65) (0.57) (0.70) (0.66) (0.62) (0.67) (0.65) (0.58) 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 






  Cash Compensation 
Panel C2: Degree 
PIB 0.0985 0.0816 0.0899                   
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0239 0.0214 0.00627                   
  (0.67) (0.59) (0.86)                   
PIBC             0.0752 0.0612 0.0686       
              (0.02) (0.06) (0.04)       
PIBC×Ret             0.0264 0.0247 0.0151       
              (0.60) (0.56) (0.72)       
PCEO   0.0670 0.0664         0.0746 0.0744       
    (0.03) (0.03)         (0.02) (0.02)       
PCEO×Ret   0.000290 -0.00287         0.00264 -0.00390       
    (0.99) (0.95)         (0.96) (0.94)       
PNC     -0.0967           -0.0951       
      (0.01)           (0.01)       
PNC×Ret     0.0663           0.0626       
      (0.26)           (0.30)       
IDC       0.00404 0.00297 0.00335             
        (0.00) (0.03) (0.01)             
IDC×Ret       0.000118 -0.000194 -0.000952             
        (0.95) (0.91) (0.54)             
IDCC                   0.00374 0.00308 0.00328 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   -0.000941 -0.00160 -0.00197 
                    (0.49) (0.14) (0.05) 
CEOC         0.00168 0.00158         0.00159 0.00155 
          (0.05) (0.07)         (0.04) (0.05) 
CEOC×Ret         0.000407 0.000543         0.00104 0.000976 
          (0.68) (0.59)         (0.34) (0.37) 





            (0.00)           (0.00) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000768           0.000786 
            (0.15)           (0.17) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.662 0.662 
  Betweenness 
PIB 0.0767 0.0690 0.0766                   
  (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0278 0.0205 0.0107                   
  (0.54) (0.63) (0.77)                   
PIBC             0.0618 0.0553 0.0611       
              (0.03) (0.06) (0.04)       
PIBC×Ret             -0.111 -0.0964 -0.0953       
              (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)       
PCEO   0.0561 0.0532         0.0601 0.0576       
    (0.06) (0.07)         (0.04) (0.05)       
PCEO×Ret   -0.0684 -0.0651         -0.0423 -0.0377       
    (0.03) (0.05)         (0.17) (0.26)       
PNC     -0.108           -0.106       
      (0.00)           (0.00)       
PNC×Ret     0.0454           0.0487       
      (0.37)           (0.38)       
IDC       0.00367 0.00268 0.00298             
        (0.00) (0.04) (0.03)             
IDC×Ret       -0.00192 -0.00179 -0.00222             
        (0.23) (0.26) (0.13)             
IDCC                   0.00336 0.00271 0.00284 
                    (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
IDCC×Ret                   -0.00223 -0.00222 -0.00214 
                    (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
CEOC         0.00195 0.00185         0.00188 0.00181 
          (0.01) (0.01)         (0.01) (0.01) 
CEOC×Ret         -0.000314 -0.000154         -7.62e-05 -5.72e-05 





NCCC           -0.00121           -0.00119 
            (0.00)           (0.00) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000714           0.000551 
            (0.18)           (0.30) 
R2 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.659 0.661 0.661 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 
  Closeness 
PIB 0.0964 0.0728 0.0849                   
  (0.00) (0.02) (0.01)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0238 -0.00553 -0.0125                   
  (0.67) (0.89) (0.74)                   
PIBC             0.0895 0.0717 0.0811       
              (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)       
PIBC×Ret             -0.00100 -0.0338 -0.0408       
              (0.99) (0.42) (0.34)       
PCEO   0.0662 0.0667         0.0714 0.0735       
    (0.05) (0.05)         (0.02) (0.02)       
PCEO×Ret   0.0399 0.0357         0.0563 0.0503       
    (0.30) (0.35)         (0.21) (0.23)       
PNC     -0.104           -0.102       
      (0.01)           (0.01)       
PNC×Ret     0.0399           0.0474       
      (0.46)           (0.41)       
IDC       0.00373 0.00236 0.00276             
        (0.00) (0.13) (0.08)             
IDC×Ret       0.000272 0.000866 0.000351             
        (0.87) (0.59) (0.82)             
IDCC                   0.00355 0.00269 0.00292 
                    (0.00) (0.01) (0.01) 
IDCC×Ret                   -0.000426 -0.000602 -0.00100 
                    (0.77) (0.60) (0.37) 
CEOC         0.00170 0.00161         0.00145 0.00146 
          (0.21) (0.23)         (0.21) (0.20) 





          (0.57) (0.63)         (0.84) (0.88) 
NCCC           -0.00127           -0.00127 
            (0.00)           (0.00) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000506           0.000612 
            (0.31)           (0.25) 
R2 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.659 0.661 0.660 0.659 0.660 0.660 0.660 0.661 0.661 
  Eigenvector 
PIB 0.0460 0.0315 0.0455                   
  (0.09) (0.35) (0.17)                   
PIB×Ret 0.0216 -0.00547 -0.0101                   
  (0.72) (0.91) (0.83)                   
PIBC             0.0553 0.0460 0.0572       
              (0.03) (0.08) (0.03)       
PIBC×Ret             -0.00401 -0.0460 -0.0531       
              (0.94) (0.31) (0.27)       
PCEO   0.0317 0.0411         0.0279 0.0393       
    (0.40) (0.27)         (0.39) (0.22)       
PCEO×Ret   0.0353 0.0262         0.0608 0.0503       
    (0.34) (0.47)         (0.18) (0.24)       
PNC     -0.124           -0.125       
      (0.00)           (0.00)       
PNC×Ret     0.0411           0.0513       
      (0.44)           (0.37)       
IDC       0.00281 0.00184 0.00225             
        (0.01) (0.27) (0.18)             
IDC×Ret       0.000134 -0.00105 -0.00152             
        (0.94) (0.55) (0.37)             
IDCC                   0.00276 0.00224 0.00243 
                    (0.00) (0.04) (0.03) 
IDCC×Ret                   -0.000290 -0.00159 -0.00183 
                    (0.85) (0.17) (0.11) 
CEOC         0.00115 0.00114         0.000887 0.000990 





CEOC×Ret         0.00113 0.00109         0.00143 0.00122 
          (0.36) (0.38)         (0.26) (0.31) 
NCCC           -0.00134           -0.00133 
            (0.00)           (0.00) 
NCCC×Ret           0.000581           0.000574 
            (0.22)           (0.23) 







Table 15: PIDs and Earnings Management 
 
The absolute value of discretionary accruals generated from the modified Jones model explained by OLS regressions on measures of CEO, chair, and independent director 
presence and power as well control variables including industry and year fixed effects.  Variables are as described in Table 3. Sample is 13,933 firm-year panel of S&P 1500 firms 
from 1999 to 2010. Numbers in parentheses are robust probability levels with clustering by firm. Boldface denotes significance at 10% or better.  
 
  Abnormal Accruals 
 Panel A: 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.5 15.6 15.7 15.8 15.9 15.10 15.11 15.12 
                          
PIB -0.00430 -0.00363 -0.00329                   
  (0.04) (0.11) (0.15)                   
PIBA             -0.00326 -0.00259 -0.00231       
              (0.11) (0.22) (0.28)       
PCEO   -0.00240 -0.00245         -0.00272 -0.00274       
    (0.29) (0.28)         (0.22) (0.21)       
PNC     -0.00292           -0.00308       
      (0.22)           (0.19)       
IDC       -0.000263 -0.000168 -0.000162             
        (0.00) (0.05) (0.06)             
IDCA                   -0.000210 -0.000137 -0.000132 
                    (0.00) (0.06) (0.07) 
CEOC         -0.000138 -0.000140         -0.000152 -0.000153 
          (0.04) (0.04)         (0.02) (0.01) 
NCCC           -2.06e-05           -2.13e-05 
            (0.40)           (0.38) 
log (ceo age) 0.0271 0.0274 0.0261 0.0251 0.0255 0.0242 0.0277 0.0280 0.0265 0.0259 0.0259 0.0245 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
log (board size) 0.00391 0.00389 0.00424 0.00402 0.00424 0.00469 0.00345 0.00349 0.00389 0.00393 0.00425 0.00471 
  (0.39) (0.40) (0.36) (0.38) (0.36) (0.31) (0.45) (0.45) (0.40) (0.39) (0.35) (0.31) 
e-index -0.000224 -0.000192 -0.000201 -0.000144 -4.79e-05 -8.18e-05 -0.000246 -0.000208 -0.000216 -0.000169 -4.80e-05 -8.28e-05 
  (0.75) (0.79) (0.78) (0.84) (0.95) (0.91) (0.73) (0.77) (0.76) (0.81) (0.95) (0.91) 
log (total assets) 0.000794 0.00104 0.00100 0.00139 0.00176 0.00166 0.000638 0.000934 0.000900 0.00117 0.00170 0.00161 





book leverage 0.00389 0.00380 0.00377 0.00370 0.00377 0.00374 0.00408 0.00395 0.00392 0.00357 0.00364 0.00361 
  (0.62) (0.63) (0.63) (0.64) (0.63) (0.64) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62) (0.65) (0.65) (0.65) 
profitability 0.0668 0.0668 0.0664 0.0658 0.0651 0.0648 0.0671 0.0670 0.0665 0.0658 0.0650 0.0647 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
investment -0.114 -0.115 -0.115 -0.117 -0.119 -0.119 -0.114 -0.115 -0.115 -0.116 -0.118 -0.118 
  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Industry fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Year fixed 
effects 
Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y 







  Degree 
Panel B: Bidder CAR [-3, 3] Combined CAR [-3, 3] 
PIB 0.00303 0.0120 0.0116       0.00788 0.0217 0.0212       
  (0.69) (0.13) (0.14)       (0.31) (0.01) (0.01)       
PCEO   -0.0343 -0.0341         -0.0388 -0.0387       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     0.00442           0.00413       
      (0.57)           (0.60)       
IDC       -0.000276 0.000411 0.000396       -0.000291 0.000643 0.000620 
        (0.37) (0.25) (0.27)       (0.24) (0.08) (0.10) 
CEOC         -0.000917 -0.000909         -0.00102 -0.00101 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
NCCC           4.42e-05           4.58e-05 
            (0.57)           (0.56) 
R2 0.0737 0.0972 0.0962 0.0747 0.0927 0.0916 0.0750 0.102 0.101 0.0756 0.0910 0.0900 
  Betweenness 
PIB 0.00587 0.0130 0.0131       0.0106 0.0217 0.0219       
  (0.43) (0.09) (0.09)       (0.16) (0.01) (0.01)       
PCEO   -0.0277 -0.0277         -0.0311 -0.0311       
    (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     -0.000748           -0.00220       
      (0.92)           (0.77)       
IDC       -0.000221 0.000296 0.000301       -0.000228 0.000367 0.000374 
        (0.46) (0.40) (0.39)       (0.34) (0.31) (0.30) 
CEOC         -0.000690 -0.000692         -0.000653 -0.000655 
          (0.01) (0.01)         (0.03) (0.03) 
NCCC           -1.34e-05           -1.30e-05 
            (0.86)           (0.87) 





  Closeness 
PIB -0.000151 0.00256 0.00248       0.00892 0.0233 0.0223       
  (0.98) (0.73) (0.74)       (0.24) (0.01) (0.01)       
PCEO   -0.0125 -0.0125         -0.0327 -0.0336       
    (0.11) (0.11)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     0.00348           0.00983       
      (0.64)           (0.20)       
IDC       -0.000108 0.000277 0.000267       -0.000278 0.000545 0.000518 
        (0.68) (0.34) (0.36)       (0.29) (0.15) (0.18) 
CEOC         -0.000555 -0.000551         -0.000903 -0.000909 
          (0.00) (0.00)         (0.00) (0.00) 
NCCC           4.20e-05           8.01e-05 
            (0.58)           (0.31) 
R2 0.0734 0.0759 0.0747 0.0737 0.0858 0.0847 0.0755 0.0977 0.0986 0.0752 0.0868 0.0868 
  Eigenvector 
PIB 0.00467 0.00707 0.00708       0.0123 0.0229 0.0227       
  (0.51) (0.33) (0.33)       (0.10) (0.01) (0.01)       
PCEO   -0.0111 -0.0111         -0.0242 -0.0244       
    (0.14) (0.14)         (0.00) (0.00)       
PNC     -0.000649           0.00147       
      (0.93)           (0.85)       
IDC       -6.25e-05 0.000195 0.000196       -0.000211 0.000255 0.000251 
        (0.80) (0.49) (0.49)       (0.41) (0.49) (0.50) 
CEOC         -0.000366 -0.000367         -0.000511 -0.000512 
          (0.04) (0.04)         (0.09) (0.09) 
NCCC           -6.58e-06           1.07e-05 
            (0.93)           (0.89) 








Cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the sudden deaths of directors, by status of decedent as 
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III. Income Inequality, Leverage and the Mortgage Crisis 
Abstract: Mian and Sufi (2009) show that a securitization-driven surge in the supply of credit to 
households in subprime zip codes was the proximate cause of the mortgage crisis.  It is unclear, 
however, why rational households increased debt beyond their ability to repay.  Rajan (2010) 
advances a credit for income substitution thesis, namely that rising income inequality spurred a 
demand for credit among households with stagnant income growth.  Using household level data 
on mortgage default, we provide empirical support for this thesis.  Default is highest among 
middle-income, low-educated borrowers, and the rate of default rises in urban counties with 
greater income inequality.  
A. Introduction 
 Rajan (2010) argues that understanding the deep underlying causes – the fault lines – of 
the recent financial crisis is crucial to advance appropriate policy solutions that make future 
crises less likely.  A deep analysis of the financial crisis must explain why households, especially 
those with poor credit scores, demanded so much mortgage credit and why banks and other 
financial institutions were willing to supply it. 
 Mian and Sufi (2009) establish that the mortgage crisis centered around subprime 
borrowers. The sharp rise in 30-day mortgage delinquencies was concentrated in subprime zip 
code quartiles where the fraction of households with credit scores below 660 was highest.  
Moreover, the dramatic expansion of mortgage credit in the 2000s cannot be explained by higher 




increased willingness of lenders to extend mortgage credit. 
 Why would financial institutions take on such risk? One possibility is that asset 
securitization created moral hazard. Indeed, Mian and Sufi (2009) find that the growth in 
subprime mortgage credit coincided with increased financial institution purchases of subprime 
mortgages originated by unaffiliated mortgage brokers to support asset securitization.  Subprime 
mortgage securities were predominantly purchased by non-government sponsored entities and 
default rates were higher in mortgages sold in private asset securitization and to non-commercial 
bank finance companies.  Mortgage brokers and bankers had less incentive to closely monitor the 
quality of mortgages intended for package and sale to third parties (Purnanandam, 2011; Keys, 
2010).  Banks as well as credit rating agencies overestimated the risk diversification benefits 
from asset securitization.  Moreover, opacity likely played a role.  Not only did investors fail to 
discipline excessive risk-taking by banks during the housing bubble, banks were awarded higher 
stock prices. The growing complexity of large banking organizations made it more difficult for 
investors to assess bank risk (Morgan, 2002; Jones, Lee, Yeager, 2011).  Lastly, performance-
based CEO compensation may have contributed to the surge in mortgage credit.  However, as 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) show, the aggregate stock and option holdings of bank CEOs 
averaged eight times the value of their annual compensation.  The amount of personal wealth at 
risk prior to the financial crisis makes it unlikely that rational CEOs either knowingly engaged in 
excessively risky behavior or foresaw an impending financial crisis. 
 The surge in the supply of subprime credit does not explain why (rational) subprime 
households took on added debt which, in the absence of better income prospects, greatly 




income inequality in the U.S. since the 1970s stimulated a substitution of credit for income 
among households with stagnating incomes. Rising inequality combined with easy access to 
credit induces less affluent households to increase leverage.  Analyzing spending patterns in the 
1980 and 2008 Consumer Expenditure Surveys between the top 20% and bottom 80% of 
households across geographic markets, Bertrand and Morse (2012) find that less affluent 
households spend relatively more on luxury goods and services than their more affluent 
neighbors.  Moreover, in states where the highest earners were also the wealthiest, less affluent 
households were more likely to report financial duress.  A higher percentage of upper income 
households predicts increased personal bankruptcy filings. 
 Similar patterns of financing and consumption preceded the Great Depression. Kumhof 
and Rancière (2010) note that rising income inequality in the years prior to the Great Depression 
starting in 1929, and prior to the Great Recession starting in 2007, were accompanied by sharp 
increases in debt-to-income ratios among lower and middle income households. Using a simple 
theoretical construct, they show that income inequality can systematically lead to crisis.  The 
shift in incomes that results when an investor class becomes better at capturing the returns to 
production slows the wage growth of the working class.  Workers borrow from investors to fund 
consumption.  Increased saving at the top and increased borrowing at the bottom causes 
consumption inequality to fall but at a rate significantly less than income inequality.  More 
importantly, the saving and borrowing patterns of both groups expands the need for financial 
services and intermediation.  As a result, the size of the financial sector, embeded in the ratio of 
banks’ liabilities to GDP, increases.  The large and persistent growth in leverage creates financial 




 As the credit substitution theory predicts, many subprime borrowers used mortgage debt to 
finance consumption during the recent housing bubble.  Using detailed credit report information 
from Equifax for 74,149 homeowners in 2,307 zip codes located in 68 MSAs over the period 
1997 to 2008, Mian and Suffi (2011) find that borrowing against the increase in home equity by 
existing homeowners was responsible for a significant fraction of both the rise in U.S. household 
leverage from 2002 to 2006 and the increase in defaults from 2006 to 2008.  Home equity-based 
borrowing was stronger among younger households, and among households with lower credit 
scores and higher rates of credit card use.  Money extracted from increased home equity was not 
used either to purchase new real estate or pay down high credit card balances.  Instead, borrowed 
funds were most likely used to finance consumption.  Default rates from 2002 to 2006 declined 
as lower credit quality households living in high home price appreciation areas borrowed heavily 
against their home equity, but from 2006 to 2008, their default rates rose significantly. 
 In this paper, we provide empirical support for the credit substitution thesis.  Across the 
U.S., households with stagnant incomes were inclined toward debt to finance current 
consumption.  Access to inexpensive mortgage credit in the 2000s presented the opportunity.  
Stagnant-income households residing in urban counties with more unequal income distributions 
increased leverage the most.  The resulting mortgage defaults in these counties accounts for the 
high concentration of foreclosures in relatively wealthy counties. 
 Mian and Sufi (2009) stress the importance of using disaggregated data to detect credit 
patterns during the housing boom and bust. We combine three nationwide, household-level 
datasets to analyze the pattern of nationwide mortgage defaults in the third quarter of 2008, prior 




income, middle-income and low-education households – precisely the households with 
stagnating incomes – consistently had the highest mortgage leverage and the highest mortgage 
foreclosure rates.  Further, the leverage and default rates of these households were significantly 
higher in urban counties with high income inequality. Our evidence is consistent with the Rajan 
conjecture that high levels of income inequality combined with access to credit was the fault line 
in the U.S. financial system. 
 We proceed by describing the data in Section B. Section C discusses factors that influence 
foreclosures, and it presents summary statistics. The research design and empirical analysis 
follow in Section D. Section E concludes. 
B.   Household Data Sources 
 We merge two nationwide datasets to assemble a comprehensive database of U.S. 
households that identifies those in foreclosure during the third quarter of 2008.  Our first dataset, 
compiled by RealtyTrac, is a foreclosure database with continuously updated listings of homes in 
all three stages of foreclosure: notice of default, notice of sale, and repossession.  A notice of 
default occurs when the homeowner is notified by the lender that the mortgage is in default (also 
called a lis pendens in judicial proceedings).  The notice is usually sent after the homeowner has 
missed three or more monthly payments.  The homeowner must make restitution or otherwise 
modify the terms of the mortgage to re-establish good standing.  If the mortgage remains in 
default, the lender issues a notice of sale (or notice of transaction).  The notification includes the 
time, place, and date when the home will be sold.  In the third and final stage, the home is 
auctioned.  Should the bank end up with the winning (or only) bid, the property is held as real 




default or notices of sale.17  For the third quarter of 2008, the total number of foreclosures is 
217,088. 
 The second dataset merges Real Property and Consumer databases compiled by Acxiom 
Corporation in Little Rock, Arkansas. 18   The Real Property database contains 59.5 million 
observations, and the Consumer database, 191 million observations.  The Real Property database 
includes important property characteristics such as loan value, interest rate type, year built, and 
estimated market value of the home.  The Consumer database contains household attributes such 
as estimated income, education, net worth, marital status, age, number of children, and length of 
residency.  The key identifiers used to combine these databases are property address and the first 
and last name of the head of household.  The merged dataset includes 44 million individual 
properties over 45 states and the District of Columbia.19  Combining the RealtyTrac and Acxiom 
databases by address for the third quarter 2008 results in a foreclosure dataset with 13.2 million 
households, of which 46,584 are in foreclosure, representing an average nationwide default rate 
of 3.53 per 1,000 households. 
C.  Household and Regional Influences on Mortgage Foreclosure 
 The ultimate objective of our analysis is to provide evidence that, all else equal, 
households with stagnating income – especially those that live in counties with high income 
inequality – are more likely to highly leverage their homes and subsequently default.  We 
                                                     
 17We exclude real estate owned properties because by the time a bank repossesses a property, 
the home is no longer technically in foreclosure. 
 18Acxiom uses these databases either to customize mailing lists or target advertising to specific 
consumer segments for its clients. 
 19Five of the least populated states are missing from the database:  Maine, Vermont, New 




carefully control for other factors that might influence default such as household and county 
characteristics.  Using spatial statistics, we also control for latent factors such as the social 
stigma of foreclosure that may lead to differences in default across geographical areas.  
 To distinguish households with stagnating income from households with growing income, 
we categorize households by education and income.  Census data clearly show that all of the 
income gains between 1974 and 2003 accrued to households with at least some college 
education.20  The Acxiom dataset provides the total number of years of education of the head of 
household ranging from 12 (completed high school) to 20 (completed graduate school).  We 
classify households as highly educated (HE) if the head of household at least completed 
vocational or technical school (a value of 14).  Households where the head of household only 
completed high school are those with low education (LE). 
 Census data also clearly show that income inequality increased significantly between 1974 
and 2003. 21   Reconciling Census patterns with Acxiom’s income groupings, we divide 
households into three income categories.  Low income households (LI) are those that earned less 
than $30,000 annually.  In 2008, this category accounted for 30.3% of all households.  Middle-
income households (MI) are households that earned between $30,000 and less than $75,000.  
                                                     
 20The mid-1970s are often viewed as the period when the returns to blue-collar workers peaked, 
and 2003 is a non-recession year in the midst of the housing bubble.  Our conclusions are not 
sensitive to the beginning and ending years that we select for analysis.  Census Bureau Table H-
13 “Educational Attainment of Householder--Households with Householder 25 Years Old and 
Over by Median and Mean Income:  1991 to 2010” and Table H-14, “Years of School 
Completed--Households with Householder 25 Years Old and Over by Median and Mean Income: 
1967 to 1990.” 
21Data for historical household income trends come from U.S. Census Bureau Table H-1 
“Income Limits for Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of All Households: 1967 to 2010,” Table H-2 
“Share of Aggregate Income Received by Each Fifth and Top 5 Percent of Households, All 
Races: 1967 to 2010,” and Table HINC-01 “Selected Characteristics of Households, by Total 




This group accounted for 37.4% of all households in 2008.  High-income households (HI) earned 
more than $75,000 and accounted for 32.4% of all households.  We considered classifying the 
high-income households as those earnings more than $100,000 because even stronger income 
growth over the last three decades occurred for these households.  The lower threshold, however, 
results in a more even number of Census households in each category, and if anything, biases our 
tests against finding support for the credit substitution thesis because more households with 
relatively low-growth incomes that may have inappropriately leveraged up during the housing 
boom are included.   
1. Household Attributes and Property Characteristics: Profiles of Mortgage Default 
 Table 1 details the household attributes and property characteristics that describe the 
profiles of mortgage default as of the 3rd quarter of 2008.  Although our income categories 
correspond to Census household distributions, our dataset is highly skewed towards middle and 
upper income households because many low-income households do not own property or reside 
in less densely populated regions that Acxiom does not track.  Low-income households account 
for just 9.3% of our sample whereas high-income households make up 44.4%.  In addition, 
55.5% of the households in our sample are classified as highly educated. 
 Panel A of Table 1 reports mean values for foreclosed households, and Panel B, mean 
values for none-foreclosed households.  Households in foreclosure are relatively less educated 
and have relatively less income and net worth; not surprising, since the heads of households in 
foreclosure are far more likely to be single and nearly an average nine years younger.     




groups in the same year, defaulted households spent an average 4.39% less on purchasing a 
home.  But households in default are significantly more leveraged.  Their loan to income ratio is 
440.7% versus 269.5% for non-defaulting households.  Mean loan to value is 87.6%, far above 
the 63.0% for households not in foreclosure.  And the mean loan to purchase is nearly 13% 
higher for defaulting households.  Further, the average residency for foreclosed households of 
6.69 yesrs, which is at least three years shorter than the average 9.73 years for non-foreclosed 
households, suggests that foreclosed households purchased their homes more recently and likely 
at higher average prices than non-foreclosed households but much before the onset of the 
financial crisis.  Higher average levels of loans outstanding for defaulting households were 
almost certainly either the result of mortgage refinancing during the housing price bubble period 
or included home equity loans, both of which were intended to finance consumption.  Lastly, 
defaulting households are far more likely to have chosen variable interest rate loans.   
 Middle income households spent the most on home purchase, and low income households, 
the least.  For the most part, leverage increased with decreased income regardless of household 
income or education as expected.  The one exception is loan to value which is lowest for low 
income households. 
 Table 1 also presents mortgage default rates by household income and education groups.  
The overall default rate is 3.52 per 1000 (we use the symbol ‰ to express per 1000 units).  The 
mortgage default rate is highest among middle income households at 4.14‰, and highest among 
low educated households at 4.33‰, precisely the household groups with stagnating incomes.  
However, even the high-income and high-educated households participated in the mortgage 




2. County Influences on Mortgage Default 
 Household attributes and property characteristics aside, mortgage default are influenced by 
broader regional factors.  In particular, we argue that households in counties with greater income 
inequalilty demanded relatively more mortgage credit in order to stay abreast of their wealthier 
neighbors.  From the 2000 Census data, GINI coefficients that range from 0 to 1, are used to 
proxy for income inequality, where higher values imply more income inequality. 22   We 
distinguish between rural and urban counties using the 2003 Rural-Urban Continuum Code 
computed by the Economic Research Service of U.S. Department of Agriculture.23  The variable 
takes values from 1 (urban) to 9 (rural) based on population and adjacency to metropolitan areas. 
 Regional economic conditions can also be a causal factor in mortgage default.  All else 
equal, we expect counties with stronger economies to experience fewer foreclosures.  We use the 
mean county household income from the U.S. Bureau of the Census, monthly county 
unemployment from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, and state GDP per capita growth rates from 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis as proxies for regional economic conditions.  Each of these 
variables is evaluated between the years 2000 and 2007. 
 Lastly, differences in housing market dynamics across counties can impact the prospective 
for mortgage default.  The housing bubble may be stronger in some areas because high 
population and housing unit growth result in higher price appreciation during the property boom.  
We calculate annual house price appreciation, population growth, and housing unity between 
                                                     
22GINI index is from Burkey, M., 2006. Gini Coefficients for the 2000 Census. 
(www.ncat.edu/~burkeym/Gini.htm). 





2000 and 2007 by averaging the annual price changes.  Quarterly house price indices are from 
the Federal Housing Finance Agency, population growth is from the U.S. Census Bureau, and 
housing unit growth is from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) database.   
 Summary statistics at the county level are presented in Table 2.  For each variable, we 
classify counties as above or below median.  Aggregating households across the entire sample, 
we compute household shares and default rates per 1000 households for counties above and 
below the median.  For example, counties with above median GINI (higher income inequality) 
between 2000 and 2007 account for 61.5% of all households in the sample but 70.0% of all 
foreclosures, and the foreclosure rate is 4.01‰.  In contrast, 38.5% of sample households reside 
in counties with below median GINI, and their foreclosure rate is 2.74‰.  The pattern of 
household shares and default rates support Rajan’s credit substitution thesis that households in 
areas with high income inequality are more likely to obtain credit they have difficulty repaying. 
 Table 2 also shows that, as expected, foreclosure rates are higher in counties that are more 
urban with relatively high unemployment, house price appreciation, population growth, and 
housing unit growth.  Housing markets were the hottest, and crashed the hardest, in the high 
growth areas.  Surprisingly, default rates are higher in counties with higher average income.  
However, many counties where income inequality are highest, are situated in the southeast where 
large fractions of the population live below the poverty level.  The homeownership rate in these 
areas is relatively low. 
 We argue that given broad access to mortgage credit, households in counties where 
income inequality is greater, are more likely to increase leverage.  But higher leverage can 




by a desire of households to consume more from limited incomes.  
 Table 3 examines how the households attributes and property characteristics of mortgage 
default differ between high (above median) and low GINI counties.  For each variable, we 
subtract the values for low from high GINI counties, and test whether the differences are 
statistically significant.  We expect households in high GINI counties to be more leveraged. 
 Panel A of Table 3 reports the differences in household attributes and property 
charecteristics between defaulted and non-defaulted households as of the 3rd quarter of 2008.  
The differences in household attributes are modest.  For example, household income registers -
0.1, which indicates that households in high GINI counties earned approximately $750 less in 
annual income than households in low GINI counties.  The most significant difference is the 
percent of singles as heads of households.  Defaulting households in High GINI counties are 
3.6% more likely to have singles as heads of household.  The differences in property 
characteristics between foreclosed and non-foreclosed households are larger in magnitude and 
more economically significant.   
 Households in high GINI counties are far more leveraged than households in low GINI 
counties.  In high GINI counties, the household mean loan to income is 77.9% higher, loan to 
value is 2.2% higher, and loan to purchase is 5.8% higher.  In addition, the number of foreclosed 
properties with variable interest rate loans is 6.1% higher for households in high GINI counties. 
 Some of the differences in household attributes and property characteristics shown in 
Panel A are not unique to defaulted households.  Panel B of Table 3 reports differences in high 




attributes are not large, but even non-foreclosed households in high GINI counties take on more 
mortgage debt.  The loan to income ratio is 31% higher, and the loan to purchase ratio, 6.6% 
higher.  In sum, both foreclosed and non-foreclosed households exhibit a pattern of leverage 
consistent with the credit substitution thesis. 
 We repeat the same analysis for high versus low urban counties and find that urban 
households had far higher leverage.  The housing crisis was clearly centered in urban areas.  
However, we avoid drawing strong conclusions from this evidence because 94% of households 
in the sample reside in urban areas. 
3. Contagion in Household Defaults 
 Aside from broad regional factors that influence foreclosure, there are latent factors that 
surely played a role.  Indeed, the sizable concentration of foreclosures in certain areas such as the 
southwest and Florida suggest a contagion effect.  Latent factors can include network effects 
where family and friends that purchase homes they ultimately cannot afford encourage their 
social networks to also purchase homes.  In addition, the social stigma from losing one’s home 
can vary across regions and almost certainly decline with the ubiquity of foreclosures in a given 
area.  The role of speculators (“flippers”) is also important because speculative investors 
purchased many more homes in bubble states than others.  The dynamic changes in the 
composition of mortgage borrowers amplified the upward pressure on house prices during the 
boom (Haughwout et at, 2011).  Finally, mortgage brokers and bankers may have marketed 
mortgage products much more aggressively in certain areas, drawing in marginal home buyers. 




Spatial Association (LISA) (Anselin, 1995) assess significant local clustering patterns around an 
individual location and identify local pockets of nonstationarity – the “hot spots.”  The LISA 























  (1) 
where y  is the vector of mortgage default rate deviations from the average across counties; y is 
the mean of y ; W  is a proximity weight matrix, and N  is the total number of counties.  We 
construct the weight matrix in one of two ways.  In an adjacency weight matrix, weights are 
dummy variables based on the contiguity of two counties that take on values of 1 if two counties 
share a boundary, and 0 otherwise.  In a centroid distance weight matrix, weights are the inverse 
distances squared in miles between pairs of counties.  
 LISA ranges from -1 (perfectly negative) to +1 (perfectly positive) spatial correlation.  
High spatial correlation represents counties where the LISA statistic is significant at the 5% level 
expressed as a percentage of the counties where similar households reside.  The test statistic used 
to determine significance is a z-statistic under the null hypothesis that default rates are randomly 
distributed across counties. 
 A map of U.S. counties is displayed in Figure 1 where shaded counties indicate 
statistically significant spatial contagion.  Mortgage defaults in these counties are significantly 




reflect the combined effects of social networks and social stigma, as well as, aggressive 
marketing of mortgage products and speculative residential purchases in local housing markets. 
 Table 4 compares foreclosure rates by household income and education groups between 
counties with high and low spatial contagion.  Using adjacency to capture proximity, the 
household shares in counties with high and low spatial contagion are 27% and 73%, respectively.  
The overall default rate is 7.10 per 1000 in high spatial contagion counties vs. 2.60 per 1000 in 
low spatial contagion counties.  Across household income groups, default rates in counties with 
high spatial contagion are more than three times greater in magnitude than default rates in 
counties with low spatial contagion.  Regardless of household education, the default rate is more 
than twice as high in “hot spot” counties.  The results are consistent when proximity is 
determined by centroid distance.  
D. Income Inequality, Leverage, and Mortgage Default 
 Our multivariate analysis of the mortgage crisis involves two separate but related facets.  
First, we wish to show that, all else equal, households who experience stagnant income growth, 
and at the same time, reside in counties with higher income inequality, will take on increased 
leverage.  Second, we wish to show that more leveraged households suffer higher rates of 
mortgage default.  Note that evidence consistent with the first objective provides support for 
Rajan’s credit substitution thesis, and with the second objective, that credit substitution by 
stagnant income growth households contributed to the recent mortgage crisis. 
 We proceed with a two-stage least squares regression using the GINI index, household 




of leverage on the GINI index and all the control variables included in the second stage.  In the 
second stage, we regress foreclosure status on predicted leverage and control variables.  The 
GINI index is an ideal instrument because the credit substitution thesis suggests that income 
inequality should be positively correlated with leverage, but not necessarily, with the incidence 
of foreclosure.   
 The credit substitution theory suggests that households with less income and education 
should be relatively more leveraged.  Moreover, the combined effects of income, education, and 
other household attributes may predict credit scores, and thereby, mortgage default.  But there 
are reasons other than leverage that may explain why some households default more often.  In 
this regard, we also use property characteristics also as instruments recognizing their potential 
weakness.   
1. Income and Education Interactions   
 As a first pass, we create household profiles by interacting income and education.  We 
create six interactive dummy variables from the three household income classifications (HI, MI, 
LI) and the two education classifications (HE, LE).  For example, a middle income household 
with low education is labeled MILE, and so on.  These interactions allows us to assess 
simultaneously the effects of income and education on leverage rather than assuming that each 
affects leverage independently.  The five other household characteristics remain as single 
instrumental variables.24  The resulting first-stage regression is expressed in equation (2). 
                                                     
 24Ultimately, we create 72 unique profiles interacting most of the household attributes, and we 
present those results below in a more succinct format.  This simplification of interacting only 




 eiii GINILeverage   iiii2 CCOHHHGINIHH 5431  (2) 
 Leverage for household i are proxied by loan to income; loan to value; loan to purchase; 
and a loan interest indicator that equals 1 if the loan has a variable interest rate, and 0 otherwise.  
All leverage variables are expressed as percentages.  We use a dummy variable for GINI where a 
value of 1 is assigned if the county has above-median income inequality, and 0, otherwise.25  We 
opt for this specification rather than a continuous variable because the credit substitution theory 
specifies a positive, but not necessarily monotonic, relationship between income inequality and 
leverage.   is a five-dimension vector of household income and education profiles.  To avoid 
multicollinearity, we exclude the high income, high education (HIHE) household group from the 
regressions, and consequently, coefficients are interpreted relative to household reference group.  
 is a vector of interaction variables that capture the marginal effects of income 
inequality on leverage for a given income and education profile.   is a vector of other 
household attributes.  Finally,  is a vector of county characteristics (including the 
neighborhood spatial contagion effects) of the county in which the household resides. 
 Regression results shown in Table 5 largely confirm the credit substitution thesis.  The 
dependent variable in column 1 is loan to income.  Because we expect the majority of MILE 
households experienced stagnant income growth in the past two decades, and (compared to lower 
income households) represent a large fraction of households in our sample, attention is focused 
on this household group.  But other household groups can be evaluated similarly.   
 MILE households in counties with below median income inequality (low-Gini counties) 
                                                     





have, on average, loan to income 109% higher than HIHE households.  The marginal effect of 
county income inequality is captured by summing the coefficients from GINI andMILEGINI
.  The summed value of 29.7 indicates that, on average, MILE households in counties with above 
median income inequality (high-Gini counties) have loan to income ratios nearly 30% higher 
than MILE households residing in below median counties.  This result is consistent with the 
credit substitution thesis but suggests that household attributes play a more important role than 
county income inequality in determining loan to income ratios.  
 Loan to value results in column 2 of Table 5 reveal a different leverage dynamic.  MILE 
households in below median counties have loan to value 48% below HIHE education 
households, a statistically significant but economically small difference.  However, MILE 
households in high Gini counties have loan to value 2% higher than their peers in low Gini 
counties.  Loan to value for these households are affected more by income inequality in a given 
county.  Loan to purchase results also support the credit substitution thesis.  MILE households 
have loan to purchase 8.8% above HIHE households, and the marginal effect of income 
inequality is an additional increase in loan to purchase of 7.4%. 
 The final leverage proxy, the variable interest rate dummy, also points to strong effects 
from county inequality.  Although there is no statistical difference in the percentage of variable 
interest rate loans between MILE and HIHE households in low Gini counties, MILE households 
in high Gini counties are 9% more likely to have variable interest rate loans than their peers in 
low Gini counties. 
 With one exception, our results hold up when we consider all low- and middle-income 




relatively low loan to value relative to HIHE households.  However, even in this case, low 
income households in high Gini counties are more leveraged than similar households in low Gini 
counties.   The bulk of the evidence is consistent with the credit substitution thesis. 
 Control variables in Table 5 are all statistically significant signs vary across regressions.  
Contagion is consistently positive, reflecting increased leverage in ‘hot spots’; and rurality is 
negative, reflecting the urban nature of the housing crisis. Coefficients are mixed on county 
economic variables – such as household income, population growth, and unemployment, and 
suggests that regional economic conditions are relative unimportant in driving the housing 
bubble. 
 In the second stage regressions, the logit model expressed in (3) regresses a limited 
dependent variable – household mortgage (F) in the 3rd quarter of 2008, on predicted leverage 
(Leverage*) from the first stage regressions together with the same county variables included in 
first stage regressions.26  F equals 1 if the household is in foreclosure, and 0, otherwise.   
 iii LeverageF   iCC2
*
1   (3) 
 Second stage regressions results shown in Table 6 are consistent for the leverage variables.  
Panel A the results for each predicted leverage measure based on income and education groups 
separately, while Panel B1 includes the interation of income and education for each leverage 
variable.  When viewed separately, the coefficients on the predicted values of loan to income, 
loan to value and loan to purchase are positive for both middle income and low income groups 
compared with high income group.  For the low education group, the default likelyhood is 
                                                     
 26Because the floating rate measure is a binary variable, we use the inverse Mills ratio instead of 




significantly positively correlated with each leverage variable. The results are consistent when 
we interact income and education. In sum, for middle and low class households, the default 
likelyhood is more highly correlated with their leverage. County control variables are consistent 
across all columns, and generally have the expected signs.   
This measure computes the post-acquisition leverage on the house assuming that the original 
loan(s) to purchase the house was amortized and no new loans were taken.  We can debate the 
exact formula to use, but the methodology is the following. 
 Panel A and Panel B of Table 6 also implies that a household who purchased a expensive 
house is 1.65 (exp(0.5)) times more likely to default than those who purchsed less. The results 
are consistent regardless of each leverage variable. Moreover, households who use variable loans 
are more likely to default than those who use fixed-term loans. The odds ratios of defaults are 3.0 
for households with variable loans after year 2005, vs. 1.9 for those with variable loans before 
year 2005. 
 We compute odds ratios in Panel B2 of Table 6 to provide economic significance metrics 
for the second stage regression coefficients. The odds ratios are computed relative to the HIHE 
household group by GINI . Specifically, for MILE households in low GINI  counties, we 
multiply the loan to income coefficient of 0.002 from second stage regressions by the MILE 
coefficient (109.0) from first stage regressions, which are the marginal changes in leverage 
relative to HIHE households.  The resulting 1.21 value for loan to income implies that MILE 
households in low Gini counties are 1.21 times as likely to default than HIHE households.  For 
MILE households in high GINI  counties, we multiply the second stage coefficients by the 




MILEGINI .  The resulting odds value is 1.27.  Because the difference between the odds 
ratios is small, we conclude that MILE households in above median GINI  counties are only 
slightly more likely to default than MILE households in below median GINI  counties. 
 The economic significance of coefficients on other leverage proxies is consistent.  Odd 
ratios for loan to value show that MILE households in below median GINI  counties are just 
100% as likely as HIHE households to default.  However, MILE households in above median 
GINI  counties are 1.1 times as likely to default.  For loan to purchase, the odds ratios 
consistently show that households are more likely to default relative to HIHE households, and 
households in above median GINI  counties are more likely to default than households in below 
median GINI  counties. 
 We decompse leverage into two components, acquisition leverage and post-acquisition 
leverage to distiguish househodl purchase and consumption components. First, we estimate what 
the remaining principal balance of the mortgage would be as of the 3rdQ 2008 if the borrower 
put down a relatively small down payment at purchase and financed the rest (either through one 
or more loans).  We posited that a 5% downpayment with a 25 year maturity. The interest rate at 
origination was taken from the Fannie Mae web site for 30 year fixed rate mortgages. Second, 
we subtract the current loan balance from the estimate remaining principal balance of the 
mortgage to get the post-acquisition leverage. We would expect it to be positively correlated 
with the variables that represent stagnant-income households in Table 5. This measure captures 
the marginal leverage—in other words, it approximates the leverage a household uses for 
consumption instead of home purchases. 




defaults. We find that the coefficients of post-acquisition leverages are comparable to those of 
leverages respectively. Households who borrow more after purchasing a house are more likely to 
default that those who borrow less.  
 In sum, we find strong evidence for the credit substitution thesis and the evidence shows 
that post leverage plays a role in a higher incidence of mortgage foreclosure. 
2. Detailed Household Interactions 
 In the analysis above, we created household profiles by interacting income and education, 
but the other household attributes entered the first stage regressions as stand-alone variables.  
This approach assumes that variables such as age and marital status affect the leverage of all 
households equally.  Instead, we create 72 unique household profiles by interacting income and 
education with marital status, age, and tenure of residence.27  The trade-off for this more precise 
approach is that we are unable to present the full regression results in a tabular format because of 
the large number of variables.  The base household, excluded from the regression to avoid 
multicollinearity, is high income, high education, married, elderly, and long tenure.  We 
anticipate that such a household should have relatively low leverage. 
 We run the same regressions as in equations (2) and (3), except that the  vector 
contains 72 variables, and the  vector are combinations of net worth and household size.  Of 
the 154 coefficients for the loan to income (loan to value) regression, 135 (130) are statistically 
                                                     
 27A household is classified as young if the head of household is less than 45 years old; elderly if 
more than 65 years old; and middle otherwise.  Households that purchased a home before (after) 
the year 2000 have long (short) tenure.  The 72 categories are created by the variable dimensions 
of 3x2x2x3x2.  We omit from the interactions net worth and number of persons in the household 





significant, mostly at the 1% level, and the R2 for both regressions is 22.9.  First stage regression 
results are presented in Figures 2 and 3. 
 Figure 2 plots the average values of loan to income by household profile, tenure, and 
GINI .  Values represent relative differences in loan to income by household profile using 
HIHE-Married-Elderly long-tenure households as the reference group.  This profile was chosen 
as the reference group because we expect this household group to have the lowest leverage.  
Instead of plotting all 72 profiles on the horizontal axis, we split the sample by tenure because 
short tenure has a large positive effect on leverage.  We also split the sample by median GINI .  
In all, four series are plotted, and loan to income values are sorted in descending order for short 
tenure, high GINI  households.  Because loan to income for low income households are so much 
higher than for the other households, we split the chart at 350% loan to income and rescale it for 
middle-income and high-income households. Note that a short-tenure, high GINI LIHE-
Married-Middle (age) household has the highest leverage.  As we observe household profiles 
from highest to lowest leverage, household income dominates the rankings.  Indeed, the most 
leveraged high income household (HIHE, single and young) ranks in the top 24 out of the 36 
profiles.  Age is also important.  Half of the top 18 households with high leverage are young, and 
just four are elderly.  For a given tenure, the vertical distance between any two points represents 
the marginal effect of living in a high GINI  county relative to a low GINI  county.  Loan to 
income across household profiles in high GINI  (70 of 72) counties are nearly always higher 
than in low GINI  counties.  In addition, the marginal income inequality effect is the smallest for 
high income households. 




GINI  households are sorted in descending order.  This time, age dominates the rankings.  With 
just one exception, young households have higher leverage, followed by middle age and elderly.  
Beyond that, there is no clear pattern other than high- and middle-income households have 
higher loan to value than low-income households.  Households who reside in high GINI  
counties have higher leverage than their low GINI  peers in 63 of 72 cases. 
   The (unreported)results of second stage logit regressions of foreclosure status against 
predicted leverage are nearly identical to those shown in Table 6.  Leverage estimates from more 
detailed household profiles contain little additional information about the likelihood of 
foreclosure.  In sum, with the more detailed household profiles, we find that households in 
counties with more income inequality are more leveraged than similar households in counties 
with less income inequality in support for the credit substitution thesis.  But the evidence that 
higher leverage leads to a higher incidence of mortgage foreclosure is still mixed. 
E. Conclusion 
 Rajan (2010) argues that income inequality is a deep cause of the recent U.S. housing 
crisis because households with stagnant incomes use leverage to maintain consumption.  Using 
nationwide databases on household profiles and foreclosures as of the 3rd quarter of 2008 we find 
evidence consistent with this thesis.  Low and middle income households have relatively high 
leverage, especially in counties with high income inequality.  Moreover, these households are 
more likely to default. 
 The central implication of our analysis is that easy access to credit by households with 




regardless of the source of credit, be it mortgage debt, credit card debt, or some other source.  
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Appendix:  Data Definitions 
Acxiom data on household incomes are assigned values from 1 to 9. 
1 = less than $15,000 
2 = $15,000 - $19,999  
3 = $20,000 - $29,999  
4 = $30,000 - $39,999 
5 = $40,000 - $49,999  
6 = $50,000 - $74,999  
7 = $75,000 - $99,999  
8 = $100,000 - $124,999  
9 = greater than $124,999 
 
Years of education represent the total number of years of education of the head of household.  
Values range from 12 to 20. 
 
12 = completed high school 
14 = completed vocational or technical school  
16 = completed college 
20 = completed graduate school  
 
Net worth, which is the difference between household assets and liabilities, is assigned a value 
from 1 to 11. 
  1 = less than or equal to $0 
  2 = $1-$4,999 
  3 = $5,000-$9,999  
  4 = $10,000-$24,999  
  5 = $25,000-$49,999  
  6 = $50,000-$99,999  
  7 = $100,000-$249,999  
  8 = $250,000-$499,999  
  9 = $500,000-$999,999   
10 = $1,000,000-$1,999,999  





























































































































































































































































































































































































































Long tenure, low Gini
Long tenure, high Gini
Short tenure, low Gini



















































































































































































































































































































































































































Panel B.  Relative difference in LTV ratio by household profile, tenure and income inequality 
Long tenure, below median
Long tenure, above median
Short tenure, below median




Table 1:  Households Attributes and Property Characteristics of Mortgage Foreclosure 
 
This table presents household attributes and property characteristics classified by the foreclosure 
status of households as of the 3rd quarter of 2008.  Households with annual incomes above 
$75,000 are classified as High Income (HI); with annual incomes between $30,000 and $75,000 
as Middle Income (MI); and annual incomes below $30,000 as Low Income (LI).  Households 
where the head of household completed at least vocational or technical school are classified as 
High Education (HE), and where the head of household completed only high school as Low 
Education (LE).  Reported values are averages.  a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively, from the overall sample.  See Appendix for variable definitions. 
 
Panel A:  Households in 
Foreclosure 







Income 5.97a 7.59a 5.47b 2.29b 6.28a 5.71b
Education, years 14.16a 14.73a 13.87a 13.58a 16.77a 12.00 
Net Worth 6.58a 7.29a 6.24a 5.71a 6.80a 6.39a
Single, % 30.4a 22.43a 33.28a 49.21a 29.83a 30.88a
Age, years 45.25a 46.11a 44.51a 46.30a 46.78a 43.98a
Number of Residents 3.55 3.72b 3.48a 3.31a 3.59 3.52b






Purchase to Median Purchase, % 92.60a 90.01a 97.40a 72.16b 92.09a 93.02b
Loan to Purchase, % 140.06a 137.81a 140.55a 148.11a 139.46a 140.57a
Loan to Value, % 87.64a 87.58a 88.03a 85.31a 86.83a 88.32a
Loan to Income, % 440.68a 318.01a 399.07a 1303.13a 429.38a 450.10a
Variable Interest Loan, % 53.39a 57.00a 51.54a 48.52a 54.05a 50.54a
Panel B:  Households not in 
Foreclosure 
All HI MI LI HE LE 




Education, years 14.87 15.66 14.36 13.68 17.18 12.00 
Net Worth 7.00 7.52 6.64 6.30 7.20 6.75 
Single, % 23.17 15.91 30.22 43.06 22.11 24.73 
Age, years 53.10 51.72 53.12 59.76 52.98 53.26 
Number of Residents 3.55 3.75 3.43 3.17 3.59 3.49 






Purchase to Median Purchase, % 96.99 97.87 99.59 74.17 98.77 94.52 
Loan to Purchase, % 127.22 124.23 130.19 130.74 124.33 131.35 
Loan to Value, % 62.97 62.60 64.01 58.79 62.29 63.91 
Loan to Income, % 269.51 212.25 258.25 777.47 267.30 272.61 
Variable Interest Loan, % 18.50 19.39 16.96 21.52 18.50 18.00 
Panel C:  All Households All HI MI LI HE LE 
 Household Share, % 100.00 44.39 46.34 9.26 55.46 44.54 
 Default Rate per 1000 
Households 






Table 2:  Mortgage Shares and Foreclosure Rates at County Level 
 
This table presents summary statistics for mortgage shares and foreclosure rates at the county 
level.  The county GINI Coefficient in year 2000 and Rurality Index in year 2003, which reflect 
income inequality and distinguishes metropolitan from non-metropolitan counties by population 
and size respectively, are from Burkey, M. (2006) and the Economic Research Service of the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture.  The average Household Income and Unemployment Rate 
between 2000 and 2007 by county are from the U.S. Census Bureau and Bureau of Labor 
Statistics respectively.  The cumulative growth rates in GDP per Capita between 2000 and 2007 
by county are from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.  The House Price Appreciation between 
2000 and 2007 by county is computed from the Federal Housing Financing Agency House Price 
Index of average price changes on repeat sales of single-family house prices whose mortgages 
are purchased or securitized by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac.  The cumulative growth rates in 












Rate      per 
1000
GINI Coefficient, 2000 Average 0.44 
High: Above 0.46 61.47 4.01 
 Low:  Below 0.40 38.53 2.74 
Rurality Index, 2003 Average 1.65 
High Urban 1.43 93.57 3.70 
  Low Urban 4.94 6.43 0.95 
Household Income 00-07, Average 41.52 
High: Above 53.24 73.52 3.80 
Low:  Below 35.03 26.48 2.75 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00- Average 1.17 
High: Above 1.63 45.07 4.13 
Low:  Below 0.79 54.93 3.02 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % Average 4.68 
High: Above 5.60 44.59 3.89 
  Low:  Below 3.94 55.41 3.22 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, Average 5.35 
High: Above 8.12 58.29 4.06 
Low:  Below 4.15 41.71 2.76 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % Average 1.35 
High: Above 2.56 48.30 4.03 
Low:  Below 0.23 51.70 3.04 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, Average 1.74 
High: Above 2.93 47.13 4.10 






Table 3:  Differences in Household Attributes and Property Characteristics of Mortgage 
Foreclosure 
 
This table compares attributes and property characteristics across households classified by their 
mortgage foreclosure status and the income inequality of the counties in which they reside.  
Counties with above-median income inequality are categorized as High GINI, and below-median 
income inequality, as Low GINI.  Households with annual incomes above $75,000 are classified 
as High Income (HI); with annual incomes between $30,000 and $75,000 as Middle Income 
(MI); and annual incomes below $30,000 as Low Income (LI).  Households where the head of 
household completed at least vocational or technical school are classed as High Education (HE), 
and where the head of household completed only high school as Low Education (LE).  Reported 
values are the differences the mean values between High and Low GINI counties across 
household groups by mortgage foreclosure status expressed in percentage terms.  a,b,c denote 







    High GINI - Low GINI 
Panel A:  Households in 
Foreclosure 







Income -0.06a 0.10a -0.05a -0.06b 0.02 -0.13a 
Education, years 0.11a 0.22a 0.05 -0.01 0.08a 0.00 
Net Worth -0.03b 0.17a -0.12a -0.23a 0.06a -0.11a 
Single, % 3.64a 1.15a 4.61a 4.65a 3.58a 3.70a 
Age, years 1.04a 1.00a 0.99a 0.92b 1.26a 0.77a 
Number of residents -0.10a -0.10a -0.10a -0.12b -0.10a -0.11a 
Length of residence, 
years 






Purchase to median 
purchase, % 
-4.22a -7.80a -1.00 -2.65 -7.19a -1.77 
Loan to purchase, % 5.81b -5.47 11.46a 21.48a 0.13 10.52a 
Loan to value, % 2.22a 1.55a 3.07a -0.08 1.46a 2.87a 
Loan to income, % 77.89a 33.62a 62.35a 165.05a 56.49a 95.83a 
Variable interest loans, 
% 
6.13a 4.99a 7.55a 2.37a 4.46a 6.09a 
Panel B:  Households not in 
Foreclosure 







Income -0.08a 0.13a -0.08a -0.06a -0.01a -0.21a 
Education, years 0.16a 0.26a 0.14a 0.03a 0.08a 0.00 
Net Worth -0.03a 0.18a -0.15a -0.38a 0.04a -0.15a 
Single, % 2.61a 1.51a 2.80a 3.32a 2.76a 2.52a 




Number of residents -0.05a -0.06a -0.05a 0.02a -0.08a -0.03a 
Length of residence, 
years 






Purchase to median 
purchase, % 
-0.86a -0.58a 0.24 -3.71a -0.42a -1.67a 
Loan to purchase, % 6.57a 3.36b 8.71a 17.09a 3.92b 10.63a 
Loan to value, % 0.10a -0.49a 0.88a 0.68a -0.14a 0.51a 
Loan to income, % 30.98a 19.13a 21.69a 27.43a 30.11a 32.46a 
Variable interest loans, 
% 






Table 4:  Contagion in Household Mortgage Default 
 
This table reports the mortgage shares and mortgage default rates of households in counties that exhibit high and low spatial 
contagion.  The LISA statistic for each county is computed using two alternative proximity weight matrices: one based on adjacency, 
and the other, on centroid distance.  
   
Ii 
( yi  y ) Wij ( y j  y )j
( yi  y )
2
i /N  
where y is the vector of mortgage default rate deviations from the average across counties; y is the mean of y ; W is a proximity weight 
matrix, and N is the total number of counties.  Counties with LISA statistics that are statistically significant at the 5% are classified as 
high spatial contagion counties and low spatial contagion counties otherwise.  The results are consistent across both weighting matrix 
structures.  a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
 
 High Spatial Contagion Low Spatial Contagion 
 All HI MI LI HE LE All HI MI LI HE LE 
Adjacency             
     Household Share, % 27.05 49.41 42.58 8.01 57.39 42.61 72.95 42.53 47.74 9.73 56.33 43.67
     Default Rate per 1000 
Households
7.10a 5.55a 8.84a 7.44a 5.70a 8.99a 2.60 1.77 2.58 2.12 2.11 3.23
Centroid Distance             
     Household Share, % 30.53 48.09 43.18 8.73 56.66 45.89 69.47 42.77 47.74 9.49 54.83 45.07
     Default Rate per 1000 
Households





Table 5:  First Stage Regressions of Household Leverage 
 
Columns 1 to 3 report least squares regressions of household leverage, column 4 reports least 
squares regressions of household purchase decision, and Column 5, the logistic regression of 
interest loan type, against income, education, marital status, age, household size, net worth, and 
tenure of residency, controlling for contagion and the economic characteristics of counties to 
which the households belong. Column5-8 report least squares regressions of household post-
acquisition leverage again the same controls. High income-high education households are used 
as the reference group.  a,b,c denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. 
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Loan to 
Income   
Loan 
to 
Value   
Loan to 
Purchase   
Purchase 
to Med 
Purchase   
Variable 
Loans   
PostAcq-
Lev to Inc   
PostAcq-
Lev to 














Intercept -277.63 *** 124.51 *** 74.75 *** -277.63 *** 124.51 *** -231.65 *** 305.59 * -0.08
GINI 16.12 *** 0.53 *** -2.09 16.12 *** 0.53 *** -3.39 *** 170.24 *** 0.32 *** 
HILE 6.96 *** 0.85 *** 5.52 *** 6.96 *** 0.85 *** 10.57 *** -22.28 0.04
MIHE 119.45 *** -0.82 *** 5.90 *** 119.45 *** -0.82 *** 52.55 *** -34.68 -0.01
MILE 109.02 *** -0.48 *** 8.79 *** 109.02 *** -0.48 *** 55.27 *** -34.31 0.03
LIHE 785.44 *** -2.91 *** -1.92 785.44 *** -2.91 *** 320.25 *** -44.43 -0.03
LILE 575.53 *** -3.37 *** -0.12 575.53 *** -3.37 *** 257.53 *** -51.26 -0.03
HILE*GINI -3.77 *** 0.68 *** 1.17 -3.77 *** 0.68 *** 0.39 -1.64 0.00
MIHE*GINI 13.66 *** 1.31 *** 3.27 13.66 *** 1.31 *** 18.38 *** 74.23 -0.04
MILE*GINI 13.56 *** 1.51 *** 9.59 *** 13.56 *** 1.51 *** 21.08 *** 6.36 0.01
LIHE*GINI 34.68 *** 0.99 *** 16.31 *** 34.68 *** 0.99 *** 59.39 *** -17.50 0.21
LILE*GINI 10.89 *** 0.74 *** 17.11 *** 10.89 *** 0.74 *** 60.66 *** -66.10   0.02   
Single -4.16 *** 0.47 *** -0.19 -4.16 *** 0.47 *** -6.77 *** -22.97 0.03
Age -2.67 *** -0.28 *** -0.22 *** -2.67 *** -0.28 *** 0.46 *** 3.90 *** 0.01 *** 
Number of Residents 6.00 *** 0.39 *** 2.89 *** 6.00 *** 0.39 *** 11.27 *** 5.73 0.11 *** 
Net Worth 49.41 *** -1.55 *** -1.39 *** 49.41 *** -1.55 *** 13.57 *** -24.81 ** -0.06 *** 









Contagion: Adjacency 13.00 *** 0.71 *** 2.05 *** 13.00 *** 0.71 *** 11.23 *** -17.20 *** -0.09 *** 
Rurality Index -15.02 *** -2.10 *** -1.43 *** -15.02 *** -2.10 *** -12.47 *** 10.82 -0.06 *** 
Household Income 3.27 *** -0.11 *** -0.15 *** 3.27 *** -0.11 *** 1.25 *** -0.20 -0.01 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 19.72 *** -1.33 *** 6.43 *** 19.72 *** -1.33 *** 11.13 *** -10.62 0.23 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.94 *** -0.07 *** 0.66 *** -0.94 *** -0.07 *** -0.89 *** 2.61 -0.03 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.26 *** 0.19 *** -0.59 *** -0.26 *** 0.19 *** -0.09 -1.64 0.04 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -13.51 *** -4.79 *** -12.72 *** -13.51 *** -4.79 *** -16.33 *** -33.41 -0.11 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 8.53 *** 0.07 *** -1.86 *** 8.53 *** 0.07 *** 4.44 *** -34.05 ** -0.04 ** 
  F-statistic 87465 *** 92514 *** 231 *** 87465 *** 92514 *** 5433 *** 4 *** 55 *** 




Table 6:  Second Stage Logistic Regressions of Household Mortgage Default 
 
Table reports logistic regressions of household mortgage default against predicted household 
leverage and interest loan type from first stage regressions of household leverage and interest 
loan type against income, education, marital status, age, household size, net worth, and tenure of 
residency, controlling for contagion and the economic characteristics of counties to which the 





Panel A1: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.696 *** -4.520 *** -5.023 *** -4.900 *** -6.580 *** -7.946 *** 
Loan to Income_MI 0.002 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  
Loan to Income_LI 0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  
Loan to Income_LE  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after   0.482 *** 0.531 *** 0.473 *** 0.653 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after     1.102 *** 1.826 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before     0.626 *** 1.319 *** 
Value to Purchase -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Contagion: Adjacency 0.123 *** 0.123 *** 0.125 *** 0.124 *** 0.165 *** 0.197 *** 
Rurality Index -0.274 *** -0.280 *** -0.274 *** -0.277 *** -0.287 *** -0.292 *** 
Household Income -0.015 *** -0.017 *** -0.015 *** -0.017 *** -0.010 *** -0.009 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.067 *** 0.070 *** 0.059 *** 0.060 *** 0.084 *** 0.105 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.025 *** -0.024 *** -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.035 *** -0.042 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.040 *** 0.048 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.303 *** -0.311 *** -0.303 *** -0.308 *** -0.345 *** -0.384 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.031 *** 0.027 *** 0.031 *** 0.027 *** 0.033 *** 0.026 *** 
Wald Statistics 18854 *** 18945   20486 *** 20921   22337 *** 23281 *** 







Panel A2: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -5.429 *** -4.969 *** -5.684 *** -5.301 *** -6.353 *** -7.083 *** 
Loan to Value_MI 0.010 ***  0.009 ***  0.008 *** 
Loan to Value_LI 0.012 ***  0.012 ***  0.011 *** 
Loan to Value_LE 0.010 ***  0.009 ***  0.008 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after  0.487 *** 0.516 *** 0.411 *** 0.536 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after    0.673 *** 1.201 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before    0.252 *** 0.749 *** 
Value to Purchase -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Contagion: Adjacency 0.132 *** 0.128 *** 0.132 *** 0.128 *** 0.152 *** 0.174 *** 
Rurality Index -0.280 *** -0.273 *** -0.280 *** -0.271 *** -0.288 *** -0.283 *** 
Household Income -0.008 *** -0.014 *** -0.009 *** -0.015 *** -0.007 *** -0.010 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.097 *** 0.091 *** 0.085 *** 0.080 *** 0.095 *** 0.107 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.026 *** -0.024 *** -0.027 *** -0.025 *** -0.032 *** -0.035 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.035 *** 0.040 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.303 *** -0.301 *** -0.303 *** -0.300 *** -0.325 *** -0.347 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.036 *** 0.028 *** 0.034 *** 0.027 *** 0.037 *** 0.029 *** 
Wald Statistics 20082 *** 19943 *** 21851 *** 21916 *** 23422 *** 23720 *** 






Panel A3: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.779 *** -4.600 *** -5.320 *** -5.113 *** -5.788 *** -6.512 *** 
Loan to Purchase_MI 0.003 *** 0.003 ***  0.003 ***  
Loan to Purchase_LI 0.003 *** 0.004 ***  0.004 ***  
Loan to Purchase_LE 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after 0.641 *** 0.647 *** 0.499 *** 0.600 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after  0.597 *** 1.052 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before  0.105 * 0.542 *** 
Value to Purchase -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Contagion: Adjacency 0.132 *** 0.130 *** 0.131 *** 0.128 *** 0.144 *** 0.164 *** 
Rurality Index -0.289 *** -0.285 *** -0.286 *** -0.280 *** -0.293 *** -0.290 *** 
Household Income -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.012 *** -0.015 *** -0.010 *** -0.011 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.079 *** 0.078 *** 0.063 *** 0.062 *** 0.070 *** 0.084 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.026 *** -0.025 *** -0.028 *** -0.027 *** -0.032 *** -0.035 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.033 *** 0.032 *** 0.036 *** 0.040 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.307 *** -0.306 *** -0.301 *** -0.300 *** -0.314 *** -0.336 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.040 *** 0.036 *** 0.039 *** 0.034 *** 0.042 *** 0.036 *** 
Wald Statistics 16931 *** 17053 *** 19805 *** 19935 *** 21838 *** 22038 *** 





Panel B1: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.650 *** -4.939 *** -7.634 *** -5.928 *** -6.088 *** -7.295 *** -4.831 *** -5.461 *** -6.140 *** 
Loan to Income_HILE 0.002 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***      
Loan to Income_MIHE 0.002 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***      
Loan to Income_MILE 0.003 *** 0.002 *** 0.002 ***      
Loan to Income_LIHE 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***      
Loan to Income_LILE 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 ***      
Loan to Value_HILE    0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.011 ***   
Loan to Value_MIHE    0.013 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 ***   
Loan to Value_MILE    0.018 *** 0.016 *** 0.015 ***   
Loan to Value_LIHE    0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 ***   
Loan to Value_LILE    0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.018 ***   
Loan to Purchase_HILE       0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Loan to Purchase_MIHE       0.002 *** 0.003 *** 0.003 *** 
Loan to Purchase_MILE       0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 
Loan to Purchase_LIHE       0.002 *** 0.004 *** 0.004 *** 
Loan to Purchase_LILE       0.004 *** 0.005 *** 0.006 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after  0.413 *** 0.529 ***  0.428 *** 0.437 *** 0.694 *** 0.575 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after   1.633 ***   0.914 ***  0.700 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before   1.158 ***   0.528 ***  0.195 *** 





Contagion: Adjacency 0.108 *** 0.112 *** 0.179 *** 0.126 *** 0.127 *** 0.161 *** 0.130 *** 0.127 *** 0.144 *** 
Rurality Index -0.262 *** -0.264 *** -0.280 *** -0.263 *** -0.266 *** -0.277 *** -0.288 *** -0.283 *** -0.291 *** 
Household Income -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.010 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** -0.005 *** -0.012 *** -0.012 *** -0.009 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.051 *** 0.048 *** 0.089 *** 0.105 *** 0.095 *** 0.113 *** 0.077 *** 0.058 *** 0.068 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.024 *** -0.025 *** -0.040 *** -0.025 *** -0.026 *** -0.034 *** -0.026 *** -0.029 *** -0.034 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.046 *** 0.029 *** 0.029 *** 0.037 *** 0.032 *** 0.033 *** 0.038 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, -0.292 *** -0.296 *** -0.364 *** -0.284 *** -0.287 *** -0.324 *** -0.303 *** -0.292 *** -0.308 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.020 *** 0.021 *** 0.022 *** 0.028 *** 0.027 *** 0.029 *** 0.038 *** 0.037 *** 0.040 *** 
Wald Statistics 21263 *** 22515 *** 24418 *** 22609 *** 24093 *** 25510 *** 17704 *** 20784 *** 22807 *** 





 Panel B2: GINI HILE MIHE MILE LIHE LILE 
Loan to Income High 1.04 1.27 1.47 1.64 1.94 
  Low 1.02 1.21 1.35 1.59 1.88 
Loan to Value High 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
  Low 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Loan to Purchase High 1.01 1.01 1.04 1.01 1.02 
  Low 1.01 1.01 1.02 1.00 1.00 
 
Panel C1: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.553 *** -4.469 *** -4.976 *** -4.903 *** -6.523 *** -7.306 *** 
PostAcq LTI_MI 0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  
PostAcq LTI_LI 0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 ***  
PostAcq LTI_LE  0.002 ***  0.002 ***  0.002 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after   0.571 *** 0.591 *** 0.541 *** 0.648 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after     1.119 *** 1.537 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before     0.611 *** 1.012 *** 
Value to Purchase -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 





Rurality Index -0.274 *** -0.281 *** -0.271 *** -0.276 *** -0.283 *** -0.289 *** 
Household Income -0.015 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** -0.017 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.073 *** 0.075 *** 0.060 *** 0.062 *** 0.084 *** 0.097 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.025 *** -0.025 *** -0.034 *** -0.038 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.040 *** 0.045 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.301 *** -0.308 *** -0.299 *** -0.304 *** -0.340 *** -0.364 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.030 *** 0.029 *** 0.032 *** 0.029 *** 
Wald Statistics 17061 *** 17036 *** 19463 *** 19566 *** 21589 *** 21925 *** 
Pseudo R-squared 4.32   4.31   4.83   4.86   5.32   5.40   
Panel C2: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.674 *** -4.693 *** -5.159 *** -5.192 *** -6.441 *** -6.850 *** 
PostAcq LTV_MI 0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 *** 
PostAcq LTV_LI 0.000  0.000 ***  0.001 *** 
PostAcq LTV_LE 0.001 ***  0.001 ***  0.001 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after  0.581 *** 0.594 *** 0.521 *** 0.570 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after    0.986 *** 1.163 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05before    0.486 *** 0.653 *** 





Contagion: Adjacency 0.139 *** 0.142 *** 0.140 *** 0.143 *** 0.173 *** 0.185 *** 
Rurality Index -0.287 *** -0.287 *** -0.284 *** -0.283 *** -0.294 *** -0.294 *** 
Household Income -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.015 *** -0.011 *** -0.010 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.084 *** 0.085 *** 0.072 *** 0.072 *** 0.092 *** 0.098 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.023 *** -0.023 *** -0.024 *** -0.024 *** -0.032 *** -0.034 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.030 *** 0.038 *** 0.040 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.310 *** -0.305 *** -0.305 *** -0.298 *** -0.339 *** -0.339 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.050 *** 0.052 *** 0.051 *** 0.054 *** 0.054 *** 0.057 *** 
Wald Statistics 16033 *** 16113 *** 18484 *** 18644 *** 20564 *** 20784 *** 
Pseudo R-squared 4.14   4.17   4.66   4.71   5.14   5.21   
Panel C3: Foreclosure:  Yes = 1 / No = 0 
Intercept -4.693 *** -4.543 *** -5.120 *** -4.987 *** -5.949 *** -6.724 *** 
PostAcq LTP_MI 0.343 *** 0.342 ***  0.330 ***  
PostAcq LTP_LI 0.265 *** 0.322 ***  0.340 ***  
PostAcq LTP_LE 0.313 *** 0.333 *** 0.339 *** 
Pur to Med Pur 00after 0.580 *** 0.598 *** 0.481 *** 0.588 *** 
Variable Interest Loans 05after  0.768 *** 1.209 *** 





Value to Purchase -0.003 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** 
Contagion: Adjacency 0.154 *** 0.148 *** 0.154 *** 0.148 *** 0.176 *** 0.192 *** 
Rurality Index -0.279 *** -0.275 *** -0.276 *** -0.270 *** -0.284 *** -0.281 *** 
Household Income -0.009 *** -0.013 *** -0.009 *** -0.013 *** -0.007 *** -0.008 *** 
House Price Appreciation 00-07, % 0.040 *** 0.047 *** 0.026 *** 0.031 *** 0.040 *** 0.057 *** 
Population Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.016 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.018 *** -0.023 *** -0.028 *** 
Housing Unit Growth Rate 00-07, % 0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.022 *** 0.026 *** 0.032 *** 
GDP per Capita Growth Rate 00-07, % -0.315 *** -0.311 *** -0.311 *** -0.307 *** -0.334 *** -0.352 *** 
Unemployment Rate 00-07, % 0.044 *** 0.039 *** 0.042 *** 0.038 *** 0.044 *** 0.039 *** 
Wald Statistics 17383 *** 17451 *** 19837 *** 20011 *** 21800 *** 22113 *** 




IV. Geographic Concentration of Residential Foreclosures: Household Demographics 
and Spatial Contagion 
Abstract: We use Spatial Statistics (Anselin, 1988, 1990) to analyze data of residential 
foreclosures at county level to account for the unusual concentration of foreclosures  observed in 
the south Pacific, east North Central, and south Atlantic regions. We show that spatial correlation 
at county level plays an important role in explaining the large number of mortgage defaults that 
clustered in these regions. Refining our data with Acxiom Corporation’s household demographic 
data, we construct income-education indicators for each U.S. county and provide evidence on the 
relations between mortgage default and socio-economic composition of county populations. 
A. Introduction 
 The residential foreclosure crisis that struck U.S. housing market since 2007 were unusual 
in at least two aspects.  First, foreclosures were mostly concentrated in regions of the United 
States with vibrant economies prior to 2007 – specifically in California, Florida, Arizona and 
Nevada. Second, foreclosures were higher in counties largely populated by households with 
relatively high incomes and education levels than in counties populated by households with 
lower incomes and levels of education. It is therefore highly plausible that foreclosures were 
prompted by causes other than economic factors – regional recession and rising unemployment, 
in particular. 
 This paper attempts to explain this unusual concentration of foreclosures observed in the 
south Pacific, east North Central, and south Atlantic regions. We obtain foreclosure data from 




analysis. Employing the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) of Anselin (1990, 1995), we construct 
measures of spatial correlation across households that incorporate the adjacency effects of 
contiguous counties.  
 Foreclosure at the county level exhibit significant spillover.  County default rates are 
spatially correlated with neighboring counties.  Our results are robust to alternative definitions of 
ajacency, either measured by the distance between centroid points of pair-wise counties, or as a 
dummy variable that equals 1 when adjacent counties share the same boundary or corner points, 
and 0, otherwise.   
 In addition, we categorize the population in each county into six income-education groups 
and provide evidence on the relations between mortgage default and socio-economic 
composition of county populations.  The six groups are generated by interacting three levels of 
income, namely, HI (above 75,000 in annual income), MI (between $30,000 and $74,999) and LI 
(below $29,999), and two levels of education, namely, HE (over 12 years’ of education) and LE 
(12 years or below).  Unlike other research that analyze the pure effects of income and/or 
education averages for each U.S. county, which masks the distribution of each dimension, our 
data and methodology allow us to study each population group and introduce new evidence on 
the relations between mortgage defaults on the density of centain population groups.  
 Controlling for spatial correlation, county default rates were positively correlated with 
average household income in the county, as well as, with the percentage of middle-income, low 
education households that reside in the county.  Household income was not the sole determinant 
of mortgage default, contrary to the thesis that home foreclosures were primarily the result of 




populated counties with higher percentages of households that simply went too far in purchasing 
homes they could not afford.  Households went into foreclosure when income was insufficient to 
cover interest payments and the refinancing option became unavailable when housing prices 
declined. 
 Research using similar spatial methodology include Leonard and Murdoch (2009) and 
Harding, et al. (2009).  In Leonard and Murdoch (2009), the authors estimate that a foreclosure 
within 250 feet adversely affects housing price by about $1,666, after accounting for the spatial 
dependence of housing prices and in the errors of models and other known factors impacting sale 
price of a home. Similarly, Harding, Rosenblatt and Yao (2009) show that contagion from 
nearby foreclosure amonts to about 1% decline in local housign price per foreclosed property and 
diminishes quickly with the increased distance to the distressed property.  Both papers focus on 
the effects of foreclosure on housing price changes, but not on the determinants of foreclosure 
itself.    
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows.  Section B reviews the current literature on 
residential default models and introduces spatial correlation methods. Data descriptions are 
presents in the next section. Section D reports our empirical results. Section E concludes. 
B. Residential Default Models  
1. Frictionless Default Model 
 An extensive literature on mortgage default is summarized in Quercia and Stegman 
(1992). “Ruthless” or strategic default (Fabozzi, Ramsey, and Marz, 2000) is a real option whose 




and Van Order, 1984, 1985; Epperson et al., 1985).  The decision to exit through default by 
exercising the implied American put option is solely dependent on the value of the home relative 
to the size of the outstanding mortgage, which will be the same across households who own 
identical properties.  Because no transaction cost is assumed in the Frictionless Option Model 
(Vandell 1995, Archer et al. 1996), it is not surprising the model fails to find compelling 
empirical support.  
 Borrower traits impact mortgage default decisions.  Vandell and Thibodeau (1985) point to 
transaction costs – damage to one’s credit rating, relocation costs, and psychological costs, 
associated with the household default decision.  Riddiough (1991) finds that trigger events such 
as divorce, unemployment, or illness either considered in isolation or interacted with negative 
equity precipitate mortgage default.  Moreover, as Vandell (1995) notes, the Frictionless Option 
Model neglects the role of the lender on mortgage default – namely that, bank capital and 
solvency considerations influence the willingness of the lender to renegotiate the original terms 
of the mortgage.  Transactions costs and the possibility of prepayment through refinancing 
changes the threshold values at which households will exercise their put options to default, and 
thereby, the timing of strategic default (Kau, Keenan and Kim 1994).  In a friction-adjustable 
mortgage default model, Kau and Slawson (2002) imbed the impact of transactions costs and 
heterogeneity in homeowners.  Moreover, as Deng et al. (2000) find, the heterogeneity and 
subjective valuation of properties also affect household default decisions.  Given the complexity 
of the household default decision, omitted variable bias is an important source of errors in 
mortgage default studies (Pavlov, 2001; An et al., 2004; Deng et al., 2005).  




and household default decisions.  Households with similar social, economic, and demographic 
attributes will cluster together.  Using survey data to study household default propensities, Guiso 
et al. (2009) find that households will default only when the equity shortfall is severe.  Social and 
moral norms constrain household default, but the social stigma from default wanes when the 
percentage of households in foreclosure rises.  Further, Deng et al. (2005) note that households in 
affluent counties tend to refinance, and relocate into and out of communities, at a higher rate. 
2. Spatial Default Model 
 Because homeowners with similar traits tend to cluster in neighborhoods, it is likely that 
many of the latent variables that influence household default are spatially correlated.  High 
foreclosure rates in real estate “hot” spots such as California, Nevada, and Florida, strongly 
suggest that neighborhoods affect mortgage foreclosures.   
 In this paper, we introduce a Spatial Default Model (Anselin, 1988; Anselin, 1990) to 
account for the spatial dependencies of household defaults, which also takes into consideration, 
economic fundamentals and household demographics. The disturbance terms of spatially 
correlated events violate the identical and independence assumptions of ordinary-least-squares 
(OLS) regressions.  Spatial models that explicitly recognize the geographic dependencies of 
events provide more realistic inference, better prediction, and more efficient parameter 
estimation (Pace, Barry and Sermans, 1998). 





 , 0  for  i jcorr y y i j      (1) 
where iy , jy  refers to y  valued at locations i and j.  The  i, j  pair has a spatial interpretation 
based on the underlying connectedness of the neighborhood.  Because yi depends on neighboring 
outcomes, we can formulate this relationship in a spatial autoregressive process as in Lesage and 
Pace (2009). 
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where ijW  is the element at the i





 , which is the spatial lag, is simply a linear combination of values taken by 
neighboring observations.  The weight matrix reflects pairwise proximities across locations. 
 More weight is typically given to close neighbors, and less weight, to distant neighbors.  
We construct the weight matrix in two ways.  In the first, weights equal the inverse distance 
squared in miles between the centroid points across pairs of counties.  In the second, weights are 
dummy variables based on the contiguity of two counties – equal to 1, if two counties share a 
boundary, and 0 otherwise. 
 Spatial models take into consideration the geographic spillover effects of mortgage 
default.  Li (2011) uses sheriffs’ foreclosure sale data to examine the relationship between 
residential mortgage default and neighborhoods.  She finds that residential foreclosure rates are 




characteristics – the percentage of population that is black, the percentage of households where 
the head of househod is female, median household income, and unemployment rate.  Moreover, 
she finds that a high default rate in one region affects the default rate of a nearby region when 
their housing markets overlap.  Specifically, high foreclosure rates and declining home values in 
region i  lead to declining home values in region j  that precipitates high foreclosure rates in 
that region.  The interaction between default in a region and its neighboring region is captured by 
the spatial correlation coefficient.  
 Considering the spatial dependence of default and homeowner characteristics, we 
introduce the Spatial Durbin Model (Anselin, 1988).  This model specified in (3) incorporates a 
spatial lag for dependent and independent variables. 
 
2~ (0, )N 
   y ρWy Xβ WXγ u
u I
 (3) 
where y  is a vector of county default rates; spatially lagged default rates, Wy  , are weighted 
default rates in surrounding counties; and ρ , is the coefficient of spatial correlation.  X  is a 
matrix of explanatory variables, and WX , the corresponding matrix of spatially lagged 
explanatory variables.  u  is a vector of errors. 
 Exploratory spatial data analysis commonly starts with Moran’s I  (Moran, 1950) and the 
Moran scatterplot (Anselin, 1996) to test whether the dependent variable is spatially correlated.  
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where y  is the variable of interest; y  is the mean of y ; ijW  is the weight matrix based on the 
proximity structure, and N , the total number of observations.  Moran’s I  ranges from -1 
(perfect negative) to +1 (perfect positive) spatial correlation.  The null hypothes that spatial 
correlation is absent is rejected when the  p-value that 0I   is small. 
 Moran’s I  can be decomposed into Local Indicators of Spatial Association (LISA) that 
quantifies the degree to which a given episode impacts surrounding regions (Anselin, 1995).  For 



















The summation of LISA indices across locations is proportional to the Moran’s I . 
 In the next section, we present our data and compute Moran’s I  and LISA indices for our 
sample of U.S. residential mortgage defaults.  We use these statistics to evaluate the spatial 
dependency of defaults.  As will become evident, accounting for the geographic distribution of 
foreclosures provides important insights on mortgage default and implications for public policy. 
C.  Data and Variables 




 Our mortgage default rates (DR) are calculated as the ratio of the total number of notices 
of default or sale issued to households divided by the total number of mortgaged properties in 
each county.  Default and sale notices were obtained from Realty Trac, and the number of 
mortgaged properties, from the U.S. Census Bureau.  A “notice of default” occurs when the 
borrower misses three or more monthly payments and the lender issues a notification of default.  
Should the borrower fail to modify the terms of the mortgage and reaffirm good standing, a 
“notice of sale” is then served on the borrower, which specifies the date and place of the public 
auction.  There were a total of 217,088 mortgage foreclosures across 41 states and the District of 
Columbia in our sample over the the third quarter of 2008 – a peak period for mortgage 
foreclosures. 
 Because the default rate, which ranges between 0 to 1, is not normally distributed, we take 
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Observe from the default heat map shown in Figure 1 that mortgage defaults are distributed 
unevenly across counties and highly clustered in certain regions of the U.S.  We use Moran’s I  
(Moran, 1950) and the Moran scatterplot (Anselin, 1996) discussed in Section II-B to formally 
test for spatial correlation in county default rates.  Our computed Moran’s I , with a p-value less 
than 0.0001, confirms significant spatial correlation in mortgage foreclosures.  
 To visualize the spatial effect, we show the Moran scatter plot in Figure 2 and the 




apparent that default is positively correlated to spatially lagged default.  The red (dark) spots in 
the figures concentrate in most counties in California, counties in Arizona and Nevada adjacent 
to California, and some counties in Florida.  Residential mortgage defaults and tbe spatial 
dependence of defaults were higher in these counties.  
 Figure 4 maps the important LISA counties where local spatial dependencies contribute to 
global spatial association.  The map substantiates the regional contagion in mortgage defaults.  
Counties with significant LISA indices congregate in California, Arizona, Florida, northern New 
York, and West Virginia. 
2. Household Demographics and Leverage 
 Two additional datasets, referred to as “Real Property” and “Consumer”, respectively, 
were used to compile household demographics.  Both datasets were provided by the Acxiom 
Corporation in Little Rock, Arkansas.28  The “Real Property” dataset, covering 59.5 million 
housing units, presents information on the housing choice of consumers, with details on home 
purchase, loan information (loan value, interest rate type), andother features of the house 
(purchase price, and market value estimates).  The “Consumer” database, covering 191 million 
households, contains household demographics (marital status, education, age, number of 
children) and household finance (net worth, and estimated income).  These two datasets were 
merged based on the property address and the first and last name of the head of household – 44 
million individual properties across 45 states and the District of Columbia.29  The merged 
                                                     
28Acxiom uses these databases to customize mailing lists or target advertising to specific 
consumer segments for its clients 
29Five of the least populated states are missing from the database:  Maine, Vermont, New 




datasets were further consolidated with a RealtyTrac foreclosure dataset containing 13 million 
households.  In the resulting final dataset, there were 46,584 households in foreclosure, 
representing a nationwide default rate of 3.5 per 1,000 households. 
 To construct household profiles, we classified households into 6 income-education groups.  
Income has 3 levels – HI (at or above 75,000 in annual income), MI (between $30,000 and 
$74,999) and LI (at or below $29,999).  Education has 2 levels – HE (over 12 years’ of 
education) and LE (12 years or below).  The interaction generates 6 groups: High Income High 
Education (HIHE), High Income Low Education (HILE), Middle Income High Education 
(MIHE), Middle Income Low Education (MILE), Low Income High Education (LIHE), and Low 
Income Low Education (LILE).  Households from Alaska and Hawaii were deleted because 
these states were not adjacent to any other state, as was North Dakota and Mississippi, which had 
missing values on requisite data.  The resulting sample encompassed 875 counties across 41 
states and the District of Columbia. 
 Using 5-digit county codes (FIPS), aggregate household profiles at the county level were 
then formed  in one of two ways.  First, in each county, we counted the number of households 
belonging to each income-education group and divided by the total number of households to 
arrive at a percentage.  Second, we calculated a rank score for each income-education group by 
assigning to each household the sum of its income (1 through 9 from lowest to highest) and 
education (1 for low or 2 for high education) rank.  In each county, the rank score for each 
income-education group is the sum total of rank scores across households in the income-
education group divided by the number of households.   




median age of the head of the household. Household size, denoted as HSIZE, is the county 
median number of people residing in the same residence. SING is the ratio of single to married 
household. LENG is the average length of residence. Our household finance variables are INCO, 
the median household income of the county, and NETW, the median household networth. 
 Importantly, joint decisions on the amounts spent on home purchase and financed by debt, 
which determine household “indebtedness”, will impact the liklihood of mortgage default by 
households.  We define loan-to-value (LTV) as the ratio between the initial mortgage loan at the 
time of house purchase over the estimated market value of the house.  Similarly, loan-to-income 
(LTI) is the ratio of initial loan over a household’s estimated income.  We set Over-Leverage 
equal to 1 when a household spent more than the median home purchase in the same county-
year, and incurred a larger loan (in terms of loan-to-income ratio) than the median in the income-
education group to which the household belongs, and 0, otherwise.  In our robustness checks, we 
also measure over-leverage by comparing to the income-education group median of loan-to-
purchase or loan to value.   
 Our Leverage measure at the county level, LEV, is the percentage of households that over-
extended themselves in their home purchase and loan decisions weighted by the population of 
the county relative to the total population across counties.  Weighting by population density is 
important because the likelihood of contagion in mortgage default will depend on the size of 
neighborhoods.  When a county is sparsely populated, decisions of households will weakly 
influence their closest neighbors, but will strongly influence, in densely populated areas.  
Assigning a population density weight reflects our sense that overreaching behavior is more 




3. Other Social and Economic Determinants of Default 
 During the housing boom, many of the subprime loans made were variable interest rate 
loans, especially in the hottest markets.  In California, for example, about 60% of all loans in the 
year 2005 were interest-only or payment-option ARMs.30  These loans allowed borrowers to 
qualify for (bigger) homes than otherwise because lenders based loan decisions on the low initial 
monthly payments.  We use the ratio of variable to fixed interest loans, VAR, to proxy for the 
credit risk embedded in mortgages in a given county.  We expect this variable to be positively 
correlated with default risk. 
 Population growth proxies for population mobility and market demand, and housing unit 
growth, with the supply of residential properties.  We obtain population and housing unit growth 
rates, denoted as POPG and HOUG, respectively, between 2000 and 2008 from the U.S. Census 
Bureau and HMDA.  The Census Bureau also provides the percentage of the white population in 
2008.  We calculate the ratio of white to non-white households, WHIT, to measure ethnic 
differences across counties, which we expect to be negatively correlated with default probability.  
Chan et al. (2010) find that mortgage default rates were higher in predominantly black 
communities regardless of the borrower’s own race, using a database from New York City. 
 Additonally, we control for housing market trends.  On the one hand, home price 
appreciation provides an equity cushion for homeowners in delinquency.  Homeowners can 
avoid foreclosure by prepaying loans through refinancing or property sale.  On the other hand, 
stagnating or falling home prices provide fewer opportunities to exit the foreclosure process.  
                                                     
30Noelle Knox, “Some homeowners struggle to keep up with adjustable rates,” USA Today, 





Home price appreciation by county should be negatively correlated with default rate.  Quarterly 
house price indices are obtained from the Federal Housing Finance Agency.   
 We use four variables to evaluate the effect of home prices on mortgage defaults.  The first 
variable is LHPI, the log transform of the House Price Index in 2000, which is the benchmark 
price level before the rise in home prices.  All else equal, we expect higher initial home prices to 
be positively correlated with default rates because many of the defaults are from coastal areas 
with relatively high home values.  The second variable is DHPI0006, the annual price appreciation 
between 2000 and 2007, calculated by averaging the annual price changes.  Counties with the 
highest appreciation during this period should have higher default rates in subsequent years 
because rising home prices either invite more keeping up with the Jones’s behavior or attract 
speculative investors and house ‘flippers’.  The last variable, price volatility (VOL), quantifies 
the temporal dynamics of the housing market. 
 Next, we control for local economic conditions.  Utilizing data from the Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, we calculate the average unemployment rate (UNEM) between 2005 and 2007 by 
county, and from the Bureau of Economic Analysis, real GDP per capita growth by state 
(GDPG).  We also distinguish between rural and urban areas using the rurality index (RURA), 
which is computed by the Economic Research Service of U.S. Department of Agriculture.31  The 
variable takes values from 1 (urban) to 9 (rural) based on population and adjacency to metro 
areas.  
 Finally, we control for GINI coefficients measured in year 2000 to indicate the level of 
income distribution inequality in each county. Theoretically, GINI coefficients ranges from 0 to 





1, with 0 representing perfect equality. The mean and median for our sample are both 0.43, with 
an interquartile range of 0.41 to 0.45.  Our data are taken from the U.S. Census.   
 For ease of reference, a summary of the key variables is included as Appendix 1. 
D.  Empirical Results 
 Summary statistics on state foreclosure rates and LISA indices are reported reported in 
Table 1.  The Pearson correlation coefficients between foreclosure and LISA is 0.547 and 
significant at 1% level.  California has the highest default rate, 6.621 per thousand households, in 
our sample.  The mean spatial correlation is 2.199 across neighboring counties in California.  
Neighborhood effects are more significant in the top five default states than in all other states. 
 Table 2 shows the summary statistics for county level variables.  The mean (median) 
county default rate is 2.74 (1.46) per thousand population.  The mean (median) of LISA statistics 
is 0.38 (0.11).  Middle income households make up the largest share of households in each 
county, followed by high income households.  Low income households, on average, make up 
13% of the households across counties.  Approximately two-thirds of the households in high 
income groups are also highly educated, with a college degree or higher.  In contrast, about two-
thirds of the low income group also have low levels of education, with twelve or fewer school 
years.  
 The last column of Table 2 are the Pearson correlation coefficients between county default 
rates and all other variables.  Default rate is significantly and positively correlated with LISA at 
0.78 – county defaults were impacted by defaults in neighboring counties.  Consistent with Table 




proportion of single homeowners.  Age is negatively correlated with default.  Households with 
recently purchased homes, high loan to value, and variable interest rate mortgages, are more 
likely to default.  Default is positively correlated with home price appreciation between 2000 and 
2006, and negatively correlated, with home price appreciation between 2006 and 2008.  Finally, 
default is more likely to occur in urban regions relative to rural regions, and in minority 
communities relative to less diverse communities.   
         Table 3 reports the distribution of household profiles and default shares across county 
default quintiles. The six household profiles are constructed by interacting income and education. 
Middle income households with low education (MILE) are more likely to default than other 
groups with default rate 4.72 per thousand households. For each county quintile, MILE is the 
group with highest default rate. If a household defaults, it is 32.41% likely to be a middle-income 
class with low education.  For each income group, households with low education are more 
likely to default than those with high education. For top quintile, the default rate of MILE is 
almost twice of default rate of the peers for all counties. The default distribution of six profiles 
are consistent across county quintiles. 
 Table 4 compares the determinants of default between high and low cluster regions.  The 
sample is divided based on the median of county LISAs.  The mean default rate is 6.639 per 
thousand households in counties with high spatial correlation, and 1.64 per thousand households, 
at counties with low spatial correlation.  The mean and median default rate across high and low 
cluster regions are significantly different at 0.1% level.  There are more households with seniors 
as head of household, and the Gini index is relatively higher, in high spatially correlated 




correlated counties, almost double that in low spatially correlated counties.  In 2000, there are no 
significant differences in housing prices across the two subsamples.  After 2000, however, the 
change in housing prices were greater in high spatially correlated counties.  Home prices 
appreciated 8.3% per year on average during 2001-2006 and depreciated 4.7% per year after 
subprime mortgage crisis in year 2007 in high spatially correlated areas.  Contagion in default is 
more significant on variable interest rate mortgages and in regions that experienced significant 
appreciation in home prices. 
 Prior research that examine default at the county or zip code level, average out many 
aspects of geographic diversity (e.g., Mian and Sufi, 2009, and others).  Our analysis, which 
accounts for the spillover effects, offers a distinct advantage in predicting default after 
controlling the spatial contagions of mortgage default. 
 County data allows us to categorize and disentangle the factors of default into pure and 
spatial effects which provide insights on the geographic clustering of defaults.  Pure effects 
capture homeowner and property characteristics, and spatial effects, the spillover effects from 
adjacency.  Again, adjacency in measured in two different ways – the first, as the distance 
between centroid points of pair-wise counties, and the second, as a dummy variable that equals 1 
when adjacent counties share the same boundary or corner points, and 0, otherwise.   
 We use Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) of Anselin(1988) to isolate factors that impact areas 
with high spatial correlation in default rates.  As shown in Figure 2, default is not evenly 
distributed across the country.  Counties in California, Florida, and Arizona experienced much 
higher likelihoods of default.  Non-spatial default models do not account for geographic 




 Table 5 presents the linear regressions of LISA on county level economic and 
demographic variables.  LISA is calculated from equation (5) using a centeriod distance weight 
matrix (left panel) and adjacency matrix (right panel).  Household income and education 
averages across counties are not significantly related to LISA.  
 Table 5 shows, however, that higher percentages of LILE and MIHE groups in the county 
are associated with spatial contagion.  Overreaching by MILE households also contribute to 
contagion.  The cluster of household defaults within county is stronger as the rank score of 
HILE, LILE, and MIHE groups increase.  The “hot” spots of defaults are also driven by younger 
households.  In addition, LISA is significantly positively correlated with ratio of variable to fixed 
interest loans, GDP growth rate, and ratio of white to non-white population.  
 Table 6 uses the Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) of Anselin (1988) to predict county level 
foreclosure.  The weight matrix in the left panel is based centeriod distance, and adjacency, in 
the right panel.  In both models, the spatial autocorrelation coefficient is positive and 
significantly different from zero.   County default rates correlate positively with neighborhood 
proximity.   
Regression coefficients, adjusted for the latent spatial influence on household default, reveal that 
affluent counties, with higher average household income, experience higher levels of default 
compared to poorer counties.  A robustness check eliminating counties in the 90th and higher 
income percentile confirms the positive impact of household income on default.  Counties with 
higher average education also had higher, but statistically insignificant, default rates.  In 
addition, consistent with prior litereature, average default rates are lower in counties with a 




more singles as head of household, and higher incidence of variable interest loans. 
 Regression coefficients of the percentage of households in the income-education groups 
confirm the confluence of income and education in describing foreclosure suggested by the 
above results.  Default is lowest for the baseline HIHE group as indicated by high and 
statistically significant negative intercepts.  Default is also lower when the percentage of the 
LIHE group in the county is higher.  Further, the posituve and significant leverage coefficents 
confirm that county defaults are more severe as the perecentage of overreaching households 
increases.  Counties with a larger percentage of MILE households who overbought and 
overborrowed have higher foreclosure rates.   
 An advantage of the SDM model is that it can distinguish between the direct impact of an 
explanatory variable on the default rate in the county itself, and the indirect impact from all other 
regions. In Panel B and C of Table 6, we decomposed effects of each explanatory variable on 
mortgage defaults into direct and indirect effects. The total impact of income on default rate is 
0.25, of which 88% of the effect is from the county itself and 12% are spillover effects from 
neighboring counties.  Home price appreciation between 2000 and 2007 significantly increases 
the likelihood of default.  The spillover effect from home price appreciation accounts for more 
than one half of total default risk.  Although state GDP growth decreases mortgage default risk, 
the overall impact will diminish when GDP growth in nearby states is low.  Moreover, a county 
income inequality significantly increases the default rate. The effect of income inequality on 
default rates spills over to the surrounding counties. The overall effect of GINI on default rate is 
10.8, of which 68% of the effect is from the neighbor counties. This implies that an uneven 




 In summary, strong spatial correlations in foreclosures at the county level explain clusters 
of real-estate “hot” markets.  In addition, the results lend support to the overreaching hypothesis.   
Foreclosures are higher in counties with higher average incomes and higher percentage of 
households who overbought and overborrowed – MILE households, in particular.   
E.  Conclusion 
 We utilize foreclosure and household data to construct county-level measures of mortgage 
default and population compositions at U.S. counties and apply spatial statistics to examine the 
relations between aggregate default and socio-economic characters of household groups in each 
county.  We find that spatial correlation plays a significant role in mortgage defaults.  Defaults 
cluster on the east and west coasts where incomes and home prices are higher.  In these regions, 
borrowers relied heavily on adjustable rate loans presumably to make monthly payments 
manageable.  Wall Street banks were complicit in devising creative financing products to enable 
households to purchase homes.  Once home prices stopped rising, the credit cycle collapsed, 
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Figure 3:  Counties with Influence 
 





Table 1:  Summary Statistics on Mortgage Default Rates and Spatial Contagion   
 
Table presents household mortgage default and spatial contagion at the county level across 41 
states and the District of Columbia. The spatial impact of a certain county’s mortgage 
foreclosure on its neighboring counties is evaluated by Local Indicator of Spatial Association 

















where y is the default rate of the ith county; y is the mean of y ; W  is the weight matrix based 
on the proximity structure, and N  is the total number of counties. 
  Default Rate LISA 
  County Mean Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
California, CA 58 6.62 2.20 0.35 3.58 -0.17 3.49
Nevada, NV 8 6.31 0.78 -0.01 2.29 -0.13 0.21
Idaho, ID 2 5.38 0.34 0.34 0.05 0.30 0.38
New Jersey, NJ 21 5.06 0.26 0.14 0.36 0.07 0.18
Florida, FL 67 4.96 0.82 0.15 1.32 0.02 1.65
Ohio, OH 37 4.94 0.22 0.15 0.42 0.05 0.24
Michigan, MI 10 4.86 0.24 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.27
Arizona, AZ 15 4.75 0.54 -0.02 1.14 -0.11 0.87
Indiana, IN 4 4.71 0.01 0.04 0.06 -0.03 0.05
Illinois, IL 17 4.32 0.14 0.03 0.25 0.00 0.25
District of Columbia, DC 1 3.72 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
Georgia, GA 45 3.38 0.16 0.02 0.32 -0.02 0.14
Connecticut, CT 8 2.94 -0.01 -0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Virginia, VA 25 2.89 0.55 0.04 1.38 0.02 0.10
Maryland, MD 24 2.81 0.03 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.03
Massachusetts, MA 14 2.77 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.00 0.04




Missouri, MO 10 2.36 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.01 0.24
Wyoming, WY 2 1.94 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.00
Utah, UT 8 1.86 0.10 0.04 0.28 -0.05 0.12
Arkansas, AR 5 1.73 0.03 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.05
Washington, WA 19 1.72 0.01 0.00 0.06 -0.02 0.07
Oregon, OR 15 1.67 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.00 0.12
Rhode Island, RI 5 1.60 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.04
Pennsylvania, PA 24 1.58 0.04 0.04 0.07 -0.01 0.07
Wisconsin, WI 23 1.42 0.00 0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.05
Iowa, IA 6 1.37 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.00 0.07
Delaware, DE 2 1.20 -0.05 -0.05 0.01 -0.05 -0.04
South Carolina, SC 28 1.20 0.12 0.17 0.14 0.06 0.22
Texas, TX 48 1.09 0.12 0.13 0.11 0.04 0.19
Tennessee, TN 95 0.93 0.16 0.17 0.09 0.11 0.22
Kentucky, KY 3 0.78 -0.01 0.00 0.12 -0.14 0.10
New York, NY 62 0.66 0.16 0.18 0.12 0.10 0.25
Minnesota, MN 10 0.61 0.17 0.20 0.18 0.18 0.27
North Carolina, NC 40 0.57 0.20 0.23 0.11 0.18 0.28
Oklahoma, OK 15 0.49 0.23 0.25 0.07 0.17 0.28
Alabama, AL 9 0.48 0.13 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.15
Louisiana, LA 4 0.44 0.18 0.20 0.06 0.14 0.21
New Mexico, NM 4 0.36 0.13 0.15 0.08 0.08 0.19
Montana, MT 3 0.34 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.04 0.00
Nebraska, NE 3 0.18 0.24 0.24 0.03 0.21 0.26
West Virginia, WV 55 0.04 0.31 0.33 0.07 0.30 0.35





Table 2:  Summary Statistics on Household Demographics and Macroeconomic Conditions 
  Mean Median Std Q1 Q3 
Correlation with 
Default Rate 
DEF 2.74 1.46 3.75 0.36 3.63 1.00 
LISA 0.38 0.11 1.26 0.01 0.24 0.78 (000) 
INC 5.86 6.00 0.84 5.00 6.00 0.25 (000) 
EDU 13.83 12.00 1.94 12.00 16.00 0.17 (000) 
HIHE, % 23.19 20.21 12.38 13.50 30.76 0.22 (000) 
HILE, % 11.90 11.12 5.20 7.71 15.49 0.34 (000) 
MIHE, % 23.59 24.10 4.56 21.11 26.68 -0.15 (000) 
MILE, % 28.44 29.56 8.34 23.20 34.59 -0.21 (000) 
LIHE, % 4.17 3.87 2.07 2.53 5.64 -0.27 (000) 
LILE, % 8.71 7.47 5.54 4.33 11.86 -0.28 (000) 
LEV 167.40 41.92 726.62 16.44 103.84 0.04 (.288) 
HIHE, 
RANK 2.60 2.23 1.44 1.49 3.42 0.22 (000) 
HILE, 
RANK 1.02 0.95 0.45 0.66 1.35 0.33 (000) 
MIHE, 
RANK 2.05 2.09 0.39 1.83 2.31 -0.13 (000) 
MILE, 
RANK 1.79 1.85 0.50 1.50 2.16 -0.19 (000) 
LIHE, 
RANK 0.23 0.21 0.11 0.14 0.31 -0.27 (000) 
LILE, 
RANK 0.28 0.24 0.18 0.14 0.39 -0.28 (000) 
NETW 6.73 7.00 0.66 6.00 7.00 0.20 (000) 
AGE 52.89 52.00 2.62 52.00 54.00 -0.24 (000) 
HSIZE 2.98 3.00 0.22 3.00 3.00 -0.06 (.097) 




LENGTH 7.60 7.82 2.72 5.85 9.25 -0.12 (.001) 
LTV 62.63 62.00 14.92 53.00 74.00 0.22 (000) 
VAR 0.16 0.14 0.16 0.02 0.21 0.45 (000) 
LHPI2000 4.85 4.82 0.15 4.78 4.87 0.17 (000) 
DHPI0007 0.05 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.08 0.25 (000) 
POPG 11.31 7.90 13.92 2.10 16.30 0.22 (000) 
HOUG 14.58 11.20 13.30 5.50 18.60 0.24 (000) 
GDPG 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 -0.08 (.027) 
WHIT 6.55 3.81 7.52 1.87 7.93 -0.26 (000) 
UNEM 0.05 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.00 (.976) 
RURA 2.75 2.00 2.01 1.00 4.00 -0.30 (000) 






Table3: Distribution of household profiles and default shares 
Counties are grouped into quintiles by default rates. For each quintile, the table reports the distribution of household profiles and 
default shares. The default rates for each household profile are also calculated across county quintiles. 
County Default Rate # of obs. HIHE HILE MIHE MILE LIHE LILE 
Total share of sample 29.99% 14.46% 22.28% 24.02% 3.23% 6.03%
share of defaults 20.14% 16.55% 22.06% 32.41% 3.04% 5.81%
  default rate per 1000 pop 13,320,198 2.35 4.00 3.46 4.72 3.30 3.37
  
Top 20% share of sample 32.16% 15.87% 21.48% 22.53% 2.93% 5.03%
share of defaults 20.48% 16.90% 21.83% 32.11% 3.01% 5.66%
  default rate per 1000 pop 5,419,150 4.08 6.83 6.52 9.14 6.59 7.22
  
4/5 share of sample 32.74% 15.13% 21.18% 22.85% 2.81% 5.28%
share of defaults 20.19% 16.09% 22.35% 32.50% 2.79% 6.08%
  default rate per 1000 pop 3,390,158 1.54 2.66 2.64 3.56 2.49 2.88
  
3/5 share of sample 29.76% 14.15% 22.54% 23.96% 3.30% 6.29%





  default rate per 1000 pop 2,013,833 0.78 1.34 1.37 1.81 1.63 1.37
  
2/5 share of sample 22.52% 10.67% 25.42% 28.62% 4.26% 8.50%
share of defaults 10.71% 11.51% 24.40% 42.66% 3.77% 6.94%
  default rate per 1000 pop 994,954 0.24 0.55 0.49 0.75 0.45 0.41
  
Bottom 
20% share of sample 21.06% 10.87% 25.68% 29.35% 4.29% 8.75%
share of defaults 12.35% 9.26% 21.60% 46.91% 3.09% 6.79%




Table 4:  Comparisons Across High and Low Spatial Correlation Counties  
 
The full sample is partitioned into two subsamples according to national median of Local 
Indicator of Spatial Association (LISA). The p-values of T-test and Wilcoxon Rank test are 
reported in the parentheses.  Statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted as ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
  High Spatial Correlation 
Low Spatial 
Correlation 
  Mean Median Mean Median 
DEF 6.64 (0.000) 6.61 (0.000) 1.64 1.03
LISA 1.76 (0.000) 0.72 (0.000) 0.08 0.08
INC 5.69 (0.324) 6.00 (0.696) 5.78 6.00
EDU 13.85 (0.233) 12.00 (0.225) 13.63 12.00
HIHE, % 27.05 (0.000) 24.93 (0.000) 22.55 19.15
HILE, % 14.02 (0.000) 13.79 (0.000) 11.56 10.64
MIHE, % 22.82 (0.061) 23.55 (0.053) 23.71 24.22
MILE, % 25.27 (0.000) 25.97 (0.000) 28.96 29.82
LIHE, % 3.73 (0.016) 3.30 (0.019) 4.25 3.96
LILE, % 7.11 (0.001) 6.21 (0.000) 8.98 7.85
LEV 173.46 (0.857) 60.70 (0.010) 166.41 38.50
HIHE, RANK 2.57 (0.427) 2.30 (0.549) 2.46 2.06
HILE, RANK 1.02 (0.273) 0.97 (0.572) 0.97 0.90
MIHE, RANK 1.95 (0.001) 1.93 (0.000) 2.06 2.10
MILE, RANK 1.72 (0.003) 1.85 (0.002) 1.85 1.91
LIHE, RANK 0.25 (0.311) 0.24 (0.370) 0.23 0.22
LILE, RANK 0.34 (0.050) 0.24 (0.463) 0.30 0.27
NETW 6.71 (0.624) 7.00 (0.805) 6.68 7.00
AGE 53.69 (0.016) 54.00 (0.015) 52.99 52.00




SINGLE 0.35 (0.941) 0.33 (0.575) 0.35 0.34
LENGTH 8.45 (0.055) 7.58 (0.419) 7.58 7.96
LTV 61.58 (0.628) 62.00 (0.591) 62.19 62.00
VAR 0.24 (0.000) 0.23 (0.000) 0.12 0.11
LHPI2000 4.85 (0.547) 4.81 (0.595) 4.84 4.82
DHPI0007 0.08 (0.000) 0.09 (0.000) 0.06 0.05
POPG 11.90 (0.276) 5.80 (0.415) 10.13 7.50
HOUG 16.31 (0.061) 8.70 (0.827) 13.38 10.35
GDPG 0.01 (0.522) 0.01 (0.132) 0.01 0.01
WHIT 11.47 (0.008) 2.79 (0.008) 7.56 4.51
UNEM 0.05 (0.199) 0.05 (0.261) 0.05 0.05
RURA 2.97 (0.746) 2.00 (0.358) 2.90 2.00
GINI 0.44 (0.000) 0.44 (0.000) 0.43 0.43






Table 5:  Impact of Household Demographics and Macroeconomic Conditions on Spatial Correlations  
 
The dependent variable is the spatial correlation, LISA statistics. On the left panel, the weight matrix is constructed by the inverse of 
distance squared between each pair of centroid points. On the right panel, the weight takes the binary value. If two counties share the 
common boundary, weight takes value one, and zero otherwise. Statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% are denoted as ***, **, 
and *, respectively. 
  Proximity_Distance   Proximity_Neighborhood   
  Mod1   Mod2   Mod3   Mod4   Mod5   Mod6   
INC -0.12 (0.11) 0.01 (0.88)   -0.17 (0.07) 0.02 (0.88)
EDU -0.03 (0.19) 0.00 (0.99)   -0.04 (0.21) 0.01 (0.77)
HILE, % 5.71 (0.01)   7.91 (0.00)
MIHE, % 4.21 (0.01)   5.75 (0.00)
MILE, % 1.74 (0.11)   2.53 (0.07)
LIHE, % -4.27 (0.37)   -7.37 (0.22)
LILE, % 6.01 (0.02)   9.20 (0.00)
HILE, RANK 0.84 (0.00) 1.14 (0.00)
MIHE, RANK 0.56 (0.00) 0.80 (0.00)
MILE, RANK 0.22 (0.15) 0.28 (0.14)
LIHE, RANK -0.88 (0.32) -1.48 (0.19)
LILE, RANK 2.39 (0.00) 3.63 (0.00)






RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.14) 0.00 (0.32)
MIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.14) 0.00 (0.16)
MILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.14) 0.00 (0.14)
LIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.74) 0.00 (0.73)
LILE, 
RANK*LEV -0.01 (0.21) -0.01 (0.21)
NETW 0.08 (0.35) 0.14 (0.11) 0.13 (0.14) 0.07 (0.53) 0.16 (0.17) 0.15 (0.17)
AGE -0.05 (0.01) -0.05 (0.02) -0.05 (0.03) -0.09 (0.00) -0.09 (0.00) -0.09 (0.00)
HSIZE -0.15 (0.44) -0.16 (0.39) -0.08 (0.66) -0.24 (0.32) -0.28 (0.25) -0.20 (0.42)
SINGLE -0.64 (0.28) -0.58 (0.33) 0.28 (0.68) -0.84 (0.26) -0.77 (0.31) 0.30 (0.73)
LENGTH 0.00 (1.00) 0.00 (0.76) 0.00 (0.95) 0.01 (0.81) 0.01 (0.59) 0.01 (0.72)
VAR 2.87 (0.00) 2.94 (0.00) 2.95 (0.00) 3.75 (0.00) 3.87 (0.00) 3.85 (0.00)
LTV 0.00 (0.25) -0.01 (0.13) -0.01 (0.07) -0.01 (0.24) -0.01 (0.13) -0.01 (0.09)
POPG -0.01 (0.33) -0.01 (0.36) 0.00 (0.50) -0.01 (0.48) -0.01 (0.52) 0.00 (0.66)
HOUG 0.01 (0.30) 0.01 (0.32) 0.01 (0.47) 0.00 (0.58) 0.00 (0.61) 0.00 (0.80)
LHPI2000 0.13 (0.63) 0.26 (0.33) 0.24 (0.38) 0.19 (0.57) 0.32 (0.34) 0.31 (0.36)





GDPG 6.43 (0.43) 5.94 (0.47) 9.22 (0.27) 2.87 (0.79) 2.11 (0.85) 6.09 (0.58)
WHIT 0.00 (0.74) 0.00 (0.89) 0.00 (0.82) 0.00 (0.60) 0.00 (0.78) 0.00 (0.69)
UNEM 13.67 (0.00) 12.58 (0.00) 13.42 (0.00) 17.51 (0.00) 16.25 (0.00) 17.09 (0.00)
RURA -0.09 (0.00) -0.09 (0.00) -0.10 (0.00) -0.13 (0.00) -0.13 (0.00) -0.15 (0.00)
GINI 0.61 (0.64) 2.33 (0.11) 2.88 (0.05) 1.36 (0.41) 3.80 (0.04) 4.68 (0.01)
Intercept 2.59 (0.23) -2.86 (0.28) -3.89 (0.11) 4.60 (0.10) -2.78 (0.41) -4.02 (0.20)
Adj. R-square 0.23   0.24   0.24   0.25   0.26   0.27   





Table 6:  Mortgage Default Rates and Spatial Contagion 
 
The dependent variable is log transformation of default rate (Log DF). Spatial Durbin Model (SDM) adds lagged dependent variable 
and lagged independent variable to traditional OLS model.  In the left panel, the weight matrix is constructed by the inverse of 
distance squared between each pair of centroid points. In the right panel, the weight takes the binary value. If two counties share the 
common boundary, weight takes value one, zero otherwise. The direct impacts and indirect impacts from Spatial Durbin Model. Direct 
impact is calculated by averaging all diagonal values in matrix Sr(W) for the r
th explanatory variable. Indirect impact is the average of 
all off-diagonal values in Sr(W). In SDM model, )()()(
1




Proximity_Distance   Proximity_Neighborhood   
Mod1   Mod2   Mod3   Mod4   Mod5   Mod6   
RHO 0.76 (0.00) 0.65 (0.00) 0.64 (0.00) 0.46 (0.00) 0.42 (0.00) 0.41 (0.00) 
INC 0.22 (0.01) 0.27 (0.01)   0.28 (0.00) 0.31 (0.00) 
EDU 0.03 (0.27) 0.07 (0.05)   0.01 (0.68) 0.05 (0.16) 
HILE, % 2.42 (0.33)   3.58 (0.15) 
MIHE, % 2.86 (0.11)   3.24 (0.08) 
MILE, % 1.79 (0.18)   2.41 (0.08) 
LIHE, % -9.82 (0.06)   -8.36 (0.12) 
LILE, % 3.34 (0.22)   2.59 (0.37) 
HILE, RANK 0.30 (0.34) 0.48 (0.14) 





MILE, RANK -0.03 (0.89) 0.08 (0.69) 
LIHE, RANK -2.08 (0.03) -1.92 (0.06) 
LILE, RANK 0.39 (0.64) 0.31 (0.72) 
LEV 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.02) 
HILE, RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.02) 
MIHE, RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.49) 0.00 (0.05) 
MILE, RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.64) 0.00 (0.09) 
LIHE, RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.55) 0.00 (0.62) 
LILE, RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.95) 0.00 (0.68) 
NETW -0.19 (0.06) -0.15 (0.15) -0.15 (0.16) -0.12 (0.22) -0.09 (0.41) -0.07 (0.52) 
AGE -0.14 (0.00) -0.13 (0.00) -0.12 (0.00) -0.15 (0.00) -0.13 (0.00) -0.11 (0.00) 
HSIZE 0.34 (0.12) 0.47 (0.03) 0.49 (0.02) 0.40 (0.06) 0.46 (0.03) 0.53 (0.01) 
SINGLE 1.92 (0.01) 2.24 (0.00) 2.18 (0.01) 2.33 (0.00) 2.55 (0.00) 2.77 (0.00) 
LENGTH 0.00 (0.90) 0.01 (0.68) 0.01 (0.78) -0.01 (0.57) 0.00 (0.95) 0.00 (0.94) 
VAR 0.87 (0.03) 0.93 (0.02) 0.88 (0.03) 0.77 (0.07) 0.97 (0.02) 1.05 (0.01) 
LTV 0.01 (0.23) 0.00 (0.33) 0.00 (0.30) 0.00 (0.30) 0.00 (0.36) 0.00 (0.27) 
POPG 0.01 (0.31) 0.01 (0.41) 0.01 (0.39) 0.01 (0.43) 0.00 (0.60) 0.01 (0.34) 
HOUG -0.01 (0.47) 0.00 (0.66) 0.00 (0.60) -0.01 (0.51) 0.00 (0.65) -0.01 (0.45) 





DHPI0007 2.76 (0.55) 2.91 (0.53) 3.60 (0.44) 4.81 (0.30) 5.83 (0.21) 7.64 (0.10) 
GDPG -64.48 (0.00) -60.64 (0.00) -63.27 (0.00) -90.55 (0.00) -88.68 (0.00) -84.34 (0.00) 
WHIT -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.00) -0.02 (0.02) -0.02 (0.03) -0.02 (0.05) 
UNEM 1.18 (0.78) 1.52 (0.72) -0.93 (0.83) 0.96 (0.83) 2.00 (0.66) -0.03 (0.99) 
RURA -0.09 (0.00) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.08 (0.01) -0.09 (0.01) 
GINI 0.72 (0.65) 1.83 (0.32) 1.46 (0.43) 0.91 (0.57) 2.79 (0.12) 2.68 (0.14) 
Lag.INC -0.16 (0.51) -0.26 (0.53)   -0.11 (0.45) -0.24 (0.22) 
Lag.EDU -0.25 (0.01) 0.00 (0.99)   -0.18 (0.00) -0.07 (0.29) 
Lag.HILE, % 15.84 (0.04)   5.09 (0.17) 
Lag.MIHE, % -10.91 (0.05)   -8.37 (0.01) 
Lag.MILE, % 4.13 (0.35)   3.24 (0.11) 
Lag.LIHE, % 17.36 (0.39)   14.42 (0.19) 
Lag.LILE, % 8.07 (0.47)   -2.72 (0.60) 
Lag.HILE, RANK 1.73 (0.11) 0.38 (0.46) 
Lag.MIHE, RANK -1.29 (0.07) -1.12 (0.00) 
Lag.MILE, RANK 0.70 (0.22) 0.74 (0.01) 
Lag.LIHE, RANK 4.08 (0.31) 4.06 (0.06) 
Lag.LILE, RANK 3.08 (0.34) -0.76 (0.63) 






RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.85) 0.00 (0.59) 
Lag.MIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.70) 0.00 (0.68) 
Lag.MILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.92) 0.00 (0.46) 
Lag.LIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.75) -0.01 (0.60) 
Lag.LILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.83) 0.00 (0.96) 
Lag.NETW 0.58 (0.05) 0.38 (0.19) 0.53 (0.10) 0.25 (0.11) 0.15 (0.35) 0.21 (0.20) 
Lag.AGE 0.06 (0.46) 0.18 (0.03) 0.18 (0.04) 0.06 (0.05) 0.09 (0.02) 0.07 (0.08) 
Lag.HSIZE -0.23 (0.73) 0.26 (0.71) 0.17 (0.82) -0.24 (0.52) -0.32 (0.40) -0.45 (0.25) 
Lag.SINGLE -4.92 (0.01) -3.19 (0.09) -3.79 (0.10) -2.57 (0.01) -1.71 (0.11) -1.93 (0.11) 
Lag.LENGTH 0.01 (0.91) 0.09 (0.15) 0.09 (0.16) 0.03 (0.27) 0.05 (0.08) 0.05 (0.09) 
Lag.VAR -0.56 (0.53) -1.81 (0.06) -1.61 (0.10) -0.07 (0.90) -0.68 (0.25) -0.46 (0.44) 
Lag.LTV -0.03 (0.04) 0.01 (0.68) 0.00 (0.79) -0.01 (0.21) 0.00 (0.67) 0.00 (0.93) 
Lag.POPG -0.06 (0.02) -0.07 (0.00) -0.06 (0.01) -0.02 (0.14) -0.03 (0.04) -0.03 (0.05) 
Lag.HOUG 0.07 (0.01) 0.09 (0.00) 0.08 (0.00) 0.03 (0.08) 0.03 (0.02) 0.03 (0.03) 
Lag.LHPI2000 0.37 (0.68) -0.65 (0.47) -0.69 (0.50) 0.15 (0.72) -0.34 (0.45) -0.62 (0.17) 





Lag.GDPG 58.68 (0.11) 68.03 (0.07) 73.38 (0.05) 65.63 (0.01) 71.39 (0.00) 66.67 (0.01) 
Lag.WHIT 0.05 (0.02) 0.07 (0.00) 0.07 (0.00) 0.02 (0.05) 0.03 (0.01) 0.03 (0.02) 
Lag.UNEM 7.21 (0.46) 2.50 (0.82) 5.71 (0.60) 4.72 (0.46) -0.59 (0.93) 2.22 (0.74) 
Lag.RURA -0.07 (0.49) -0.17 (0.09) -0.16 (0.14) -0.03 (0.57) -0.05 (0.38) -0.04 (0.51) 
Lag.GINI 4.33 (0.36) 0.48 (0.93) -0.03 (1.00) 3.30 (0.19) 3.41 (0.24) 4.00 (0.17) 
Intercept -2.64 (0.69) -16.22 (0.06) -13.93 (0.10) -4.25 (0.10) -10.11 (0.00) -8.51 (0.00) 
Control for 
Dependence Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes
Wald Statistics 252 (0.00) 126 (0.00) 122 (0.00) 168 (0.00) 128 (0.00) 122 (0.00) 









Direct   Indirect   Direct   Indirect   Direct   Indirect   
INC 0.22 (0.02) 0.03 (1.00) 0.26 (0.02) -0.23 (0.86)
EDU 0.01 (0.67) -0.90 (0.04) 0.07 (0.07) 0.12 (0.77)
HILE, % 3.58 (0.18) 48.17 (0.04)
MIHE, % 2.25 (0.22) -25.08 (0.11)
MILE, % 2.14 (0.12) 14.65 (0.22)
LIHE, % -9.09 (0.09) 30.45 (0.58)
LILE, % 4.02 (0.15) 28.31 (0.38)
HILE, RANK 0.43 (0.17) 5.29 (0.10)
MIHE, RANK 0.24 (0.26) -2.99 (0.14)
MILE, RANK 0.02 (0.90) 1.87 (0.24)
LIHE, RANK -1.90 (0.08) 7.52 (0.53)
LILE, RANK 0.61 (0.46) 9.14 (0.32)
LEV 0.00 (0.02) 0.00 (0.97)
HILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.78)
MIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.53) 0.00 (0.84)
MILE, 







RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.58) 0.01 (0.85)
LILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.88) -0.01 (0.79)
NETW -0.15 (0.14) 1.79 (0.13) -0.14 (0.20) 0.79 (0.32) -0.12 (0.26) 1.18 (0.19)
AGE -0.15 (0.00) -0.21 (0.49) -0.12 (0.00) 0.27 (0.25) -0.12 (0.00) 0.28 (0.22)
HSIZE 0.34 (0.13) 0.10 (0.95) 0.51 (0.02) 1.56 (0.44) 0.53 (0.02) 1.33 (0.51)
SINGLE 1.61 (0.03) -14.08 (0.07) 2.13 (0.01) -4.81 (0.33) 2.02 (0.02) -6.55 (0.33)
LENGTH 0.00 (0.88) 0.03 (0.89) 0.01 (0.45) 0.25 (0.13) 0.01 (0.55) 0.25 (0.15)
VAR 0.88 (0.03) 0.41 (0.86) 0.84 (0.03) -3.35 (0.17) 0.82 (0.05) -2.85 (0.25)
LTV 0.00 (0.47) -0.09 (0.09) 0.00 (0.27) 0.02 (0.58) 0.00 (0.25) 0.02 (0.61)
POPG 0.00 (0.69) -0.21 (0.05) 0.00 (0.81) -0.18 (0.01) 0.00 (0.72) -0.17 (0.03)
HOUG 0.00 (0.94) 0.28 (0.02) 0.00 (0.81) 0.23 (0.00) 0.00 (0.92) 0.22 (0.01)
LHPI2000 0.50 (0.16) 2.87 (0.35) 0.56 (0.13) -0.77 (0.71) 0.35 (0.37) -1.22 (0.64)
DHPI0007 3.89 (0.38) 50.65 (0.02) 4.14 (0.35) 51.09 (0.00) 4.69 (0.27) 45.12 (0.01)
GDPG -63.61 (0.00) 39.50 (0.70) -58.73 (0.00) 79.66 (0.32) -61.11 (0.00) 89.52 (0.24)
WHIT -0.02 (0.00) 0.12 (0.15) -0.02 (0.01) 0.16 (0.01) -0.02 (0.01) 0.14 (0.01)
UNEM 1.92 (0.63) 32.95 (0.34) 1.75 (0.70) 9.64 (0.72) -0.59 (0.90) 14.03 (0.59)









Direct   Indirect   Direct   Indirect   Direct   Indirect   
INC 0.28 (0.00) 0.04 (0.86) 0.30 (0.01) -0.17 (0.57)
EDU -0.01 (0.63) -0.29 (0.00) 0.05 (0.28) -0.08 (0.47)
HILE, % 4.48 (0.09) 10.36 (0.08)
MIHE, % 2.28 (0.21) -11.06 (0.02)
MILE, % 2.99 (0.03) 6.68 (0.02)
LIHE, % -6.86 (0.23) 17.24 (0.32)
LILE, % 2.37 (0.44) -2.59 (0.74)
HILE, 
RANK 0.56 (0.10) 0.89 (0.26)
MIHE, 
RANK 0.30 (0.19) -1.47 (0.01)
MILE, 
RANK 0.18 (0.34) 1.20 (0.01)
LIHE, 
RANK -1.48 (0.20) 5.10 (0.13)
LILE, 





LEV 0.00 (0.01) 0.01 (0.29)
HILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.01) 0.00 (0.32)
MIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.03) 0.00 (0.39)
MILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.05) 0.00 (0.26)
LIHE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.54) -0.01 (0.52)
LILE, 
RANK*LEV 0.00 (0.65) 0.00 (0.89)
NETW -0.09 (0.37) 0.33 (0.20) -0.07 (0.50) 0.18 (0.42) -0.04 (0.64) 0.29 (0.23)
AGE -0.15 (0.00) -0.01 (0.86) -0.13 (0.00) 0.06 (0.33) -0.11 (0.00) 0.03 (0.59)
HSIZE 0.40 (0.09) -0.09 (0.92) 0.44 (0.05) -0.20 (0.75) 0.50 (0.03) -0.37 (0.55)
SINGLE 2.10 (0.00) -2.53 (0.12) 2.46 (0.00) -1.02 (0.51) 2.66 (0.00) -1.24 (0.48)
LENGTH -0.01 (0.72) 0.05 (0.31) 0.01 (0.75) 0.08 (0.07) 0.01 (0.79) 0.08 (0.08)
VAR 0.81 (0.04) 0.47 (0.56) 0.93 (0.02) -0.44 (0.59) 1.05 (0.01) -0.04 (0.96)
LTV 0.00 (0.41) -0.01 (0.33) 0.00 (0.30) 0.01 (0.48) 0.01 (0.26) 0.00 (0.84)
POPG 0.00 (0.68) -0.03 (0.20) 0.00 (0.97) -0.04 (0.05) 0.00 (0.59) -0.04 (0.08)
HOUG 0.00 (0.83) 0.04 (0.12) 0.00 (0.94) 0.05 (0.03) 0.00 (0.77) 0.05 (0.04)





DHPI0007 6.30 (0.15) 15.96 (0.01) 7.14 (0.09) 15.06 (0.01) 8.64 (0.06) 11.66 (0.05)
GDPG -86.76 (0.00) 40.78 (0.13) -83.97 (0.00) 54.38 (0.05) -80.04 (0.00) 50.16 (0.06)
WHIT -0.02 (0.04) 0.02 (0.19) -0.01 (0.06) 0.04 (0.02) -0.01 (0.09) 0.04 (0.04)
UNEM 1.77 (0.71) 8.72 (0.34) 2.04 (0.66) 0.39 (0.97) 0.26 (0.96) 3.44 (0.70)
RURA -0.09 (0.00) -0.11 (0.17) -0.09 (0.01) -0.12 (0.10) -0.09 (0.00) -0.11 (0.18)




Appendix 1:  Variable Description 
Variables Variables Description Data Source 
Default Rate DEF 
Number of default properties divided by 




















Classify population into six groups: 
HIHE (High Income High Education), 
HILE (High Income Low Education), 
MIHE (Medium Income High 
Education), MILE (Medium Income Low 
Education), LIHE (Low Income High 
Education), and LILE (Low Income Low 
Education) based on income and 
education. Income has three levels: Low 
(annual income $29,999 and below), 




Rank Score RANK 
Take an average of rank scores of income 
and education for each head of 
household. At county level, take an 
average of rank scores for each class of 





Take value of one if head of household 
over-purchase and over-borrow then 








Net Worth NETW 




























Median length of residence, defined as 





Ratio of Single 
to Married 
SINGLE 



















Log HPI_2000 LHPI 
Log transformation of Federal Housing 
Finance Agency (FHFA) House Price 






Annual house price appreciation from 




















Annual per capital GDP growth rate from 
year 2000 to year 2007 
Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
Ratio of White 
and Non-White 
WHIT 






Average unemployment rate from year 
2005 to year 2007 
Bureau of Labor 
Statistics 
Rurality Index RURA 
2003 Rural-urban continuum code. 
Range from 1 to 9. 
U.S. Department of 
Agriculture 







Household income is expressed as a value from 1 to 9 as follows. 
 
1 = less than $15,000;  
2 = $15,000 - $19,999;  
3 = $20,000 - $29,999;  
4 = $30,000 - $39,999; 
5 = $40,000 - $49,999;  
6 = $50,000 - $74,999;  
7 = $75,000 - $99,999;  
8 = $100,000 - $124,999;  
9 = greater than $124,999. 
 
Net worth ranges from 1 to 11 as follows. 
 















In the first essay, we explain why a robust link between independent directors on boards 
and firm value. Boards dominated by powerful independent directors increase shareholder’s 
valuations of those companies. Sudden director death event study regressions show causation to 
flow from powerful independent directors to shareholder valuations. These results validate 
measuring not just directors’ status as independent, but also their power – their ability to access 
information, draw on external resources, and mobilize support to question and, if necessary, defy 
CEOs bent on strategies that risk destroying shareholder wealth and exposing directors to 
lawsuits.    
In the second essay, we examine Rajan (2010) credit substitution for income hypothesis that 
income inequality is a deep cause of the recent U.S. housing crisis because households with stagnant 
incomes use leverage to maintain consumption. Using nationwide databases on household profiles and 
foreclosures as of the 3rd quarter of 2008 we find evidence consistent with this thesis. Low and middle 
income households have relatively high leverage, especially in counties with high income inequality.  
Moreover, these households are more likely to default. 
In the last essay, we utilize foreclosure and household data to construct county-level measures of 
mortgage default and population compositions at U.S. counties and apply spatial statistics to examine the 
relations between aggregate default and socio-economic characters of household groups in each county.  
We find that spatial correlation plays a significant role in mortgage defaults.  Defaults cluster on the east 
and west coasts where incomes and home prices are higher.  In these regions, borrowers relied heavily on 
adjustable rate loans presumably to make monthly payments manageable.  
 
